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Allah هللا 
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23 years. 
Sunnah السنة 
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Ownership structure is considered to be one of the key aspects of corporate governance 
systems because it influences their effectiveness and efficiency. This research provides 
systematic, empirical evidence to demonstrate how the complex ownership structure 
predominant in Saudi Arabia affects the corporate governance systems of petrochemical 
companies listed in the Saudi Capital Market. 
This thesis investigates the following research questions: What is unique about the ownership 
structures in the Saudi context and corporate governance systems within petrochemical 
companies listed in the Saudi capital market? What problems are associated with corporate 
governance in this context? What response to these problems will improve governance 
systems in the Saudi petrochemical context? 
This research used the non-classical principal–principal conflict view of agency theory to 
describe how ownership structure affects corporate governance systems in the Saudi context 
(Young et al. 2008). Theoretical arguments are tested by gathering primary and secondary 
data via a mixed-method approach to gather both qualitative and quantitative data. Three 
methods were used: a demographic survey, an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews.  
One of the main features of this research is the Saudi context, with its unique ownership 
structure and its legal, economic, political, social and cultural systems. There is a gap in the 
literature examining the relationships between ownership structure and corporate governance 
systems in the Saudi context. Another feature of this research is the use of AHP, a 
  
XV 
sophisticated systematic mathematical methodology that analyses how people think and 
behave (Saaty 1980). 
The study findings demonstrate that Saudi Arabia has distinguishing factors that are 
associated with internal problems in its corporate governance systems. The key findings show 
that participants relied extensively on external rather than internal governance systems, and 
paid almost no attention to external auditors, communication with minor shareholders, 
interference of others, the functions and process of the board of directors or board 
characteristics. 
The main contribution of this thesis to current knowledge is that it extends the literature on 
the effect of ownership structure on corporate governance systems in Saudi Arabia. These 
findings show that policy makers and companies should consider the uniqueness of the Saudi 
context. Further, the results can be used by participants in the Saudi Capital Market to 
evaluate current corporate governance systems and the role of major shareholders; they can 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The research context 
After the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, concerns were raised about the effectiveness 
and efficiency of corporate governance systems because they failed to prevent or minimise 
the financial crisis. Many aspects of corporate governance can influence its effectiveness and 
efficiency, so every aspect must be investigated to identify the most influential factors to 
increase the trust and confidence of current and potential investors. 
The structure of share ownership is one of the main aspects of a corporate governance 
system, and a key area in investigations of how ownership structure can stimulate or hamper 
corporate governance systems. Ownership structures depend on the local circumstances of the 
country. Thus, ownership in developed and mature markets differs from that in developing 
and immature markets; these differences must be considered when building or improving a 
local corporate governance system. 
As an emerging economy, Saudi Arabia is a developing country that has experienced 
enormous developments and change. The Saudi market occupies a competitive position 
regionally and globally, which makes it a destination for new local and foreign investors, but 
there are concerns about its corporate governance. In 2006, new Saudi Corporate 
Governance Regulations (SCGRs) were issued to ensure that the Saudi corporate governance 
system was effective and efficient, but the legal system still needs improvement before it can 
guarantee the highest possible protection for all stakeholders; action to ensure market 
sophistication, credibility and stability is also needed. 
Chapter (1)  Introduction 
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These features make Saudi Arabia an excellent research setting for a scholarly investigation 
into the influence of ownership structure on corporate governance systems, particularly since 
the Capital Market Authority (CMA) (the regulatory body in Saudi Arabia) continues to 
develop laws, regulations, policies and programs to encourage effective and efficient 
corporate governance systems. This study therefore investigates the ownership structure—
particularly the power and abilities of major shareholders—needed to achieve an effective 
and efficient corporate governance system. 
This chapter is organised as follows: the next section provides a brief background to 
corporate governance; the third section describes the Saudi context; the fourth outlines the 
objectives of this research; the fifth demonstrates the significance of the research; the sixth 
introduces the research questions; the seventh outlines the research strategy; the eighth 
describes the scope of the research; the ninth outlines the structure of this thesis; and the final 
section provides a chapter summary. 
1.2 Background 
Corporate governance has attracted the attention of academics, government officers, 
legislators, practitioners, business executives and investors throughout the business world, as 
well as the general public. At a national level, most countries have attempted to promote 
effective and efficient corporate governance practices by issuing local corporate governance 
regulations, acts and codes such as the United States (US) Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX), the SCGRs of 2006 and the Italian Corporate Governance Codes of 2015 (ICGCs).  
At an international level, organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the World Bank have expressed their own concerns, and have 
either issued general guidelines or encouraged countries to enhance their corporate 
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governance systems. For example, the OECD issued its Principles of Corporate Governance 
in 1999 and they are continuously reviewed and updated, the latest amendments being in 
2015. 
Worldwide interest in corporate governance has emerged because of a long history of 
corporate governance-related incidents that resulted in a number of market scandals, failures 
and collapses. In the 1700s, The first documented company failure occurred ‘South Sea 
Bubble’, which was followed by the US stock market crash in 1929, the secondary-banking 
crisis in the 1970s, and the US savings and loans crisis in the 1980s (Iskander & Chamlou 
2000). The East Asian financial crisis took place from 1997 to 1998 (Mitton 2002). The most 
recent case was the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 (Coffee 2009). 
These collapses affected most countries in the world, such as the US, United Kingdom (UK), 
Italy, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand (Johnson et al. 
2000; Kirkpatrick 2009). The GFC began in the US and quickly spread to the world’s 
markets and companies (Coffee 2009). Moreover, corporate accounting scandals and related 
financial irregularities were revealed in corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, 
Adelphia, Parmalat and Nortel; these also affected financial markets (Coffee 2004). 
Failures in corporate governance negatively influence the social, economic and financial 
systems of a country. For example, ineffective protection for small shareholders, particularly 
from tunnelling, can affect small shareholders to the extent that they lose their investments 
(Iskander & Chamlou 2000; Johnson et al. 2000). Such negative outcomes tend to reduce 
investors’ confidence and trust in markets, which in turn reduces the number of investors. 
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Although pressure from global attention has improved corporate governance principles, 
regulations, processes and mechanisms, weaknesses remain. Sun, Stewart and Pollard (2011) 
vividly illustrated that corporate governance systems still failed to prevent the GFC of 2008.  
Investigations in response to failures, scandals and collapses help in exploring aspects of 
corporate governance systems, and in building better economic environments that are free 
from financial problems. Moreover, essential cultural, social, legal, financial and institutional 
differences among countries and companies must be considered because they influence 
corporate governance systems (Lu & Batten 2001). Detailed investigations will contribute to 
improving corporate governance practices worldwide. 
The structure of share ownership is one of the most important aspects of corporate 
governance systems (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; Denis & McConnell 
2003), but following the publication in 1932 of Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, the concept of ownership has developed and changed. The company 
ownership structure in a country is a consequence of local circumstances such as its legal, 
economic, political and cultural systems. Various forms of ownership structures across 
countries (Desender 2009) are described below. 
Ownership structures can generally be divided into two categories: dispersed and 
concentrated. Neither is better; they each suit different contexts (Coffee 2005). The dispersed 
ownership structure exists mainly in strong and mature securities markets such as the US and 
UK (Coffee 2005). In such a structure, managers are often considered to be the ‘main 
players’ because they have the power and the ability to engage in earnings manipulation and 
motivation to create an earnings spike (Coffee 2005). As the Saudi context differs from the 
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conditions in countries with dispersed ownership structures, this study focuses on 
concentrated structures. 
Concentrated ownership structures dominate the world’s markets, and even some large US 
companies have such a structure (Shleifer & Vishny 1986, 1997; Roe 1993; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes & Shleifer 1999; Coffee 2005; Kirchmaier & Grant 2005; Filatotchev, Jackson & 
Nakajima 2013). Even among countries with concentrated ownership structures, there are 
differences in how ownership is set up. For example, the major shareholder in the Chinese 
market is the Chinese Government; in the Italian market, the major shareholder is family 
ownership; and in Germany, banks are the major shareholders. The main players in a 
concentrated ownership structure are the major shareholder(s), who represent a fundamental 
challenge to corporate governance systems because they have enough power to control 
management and its activities (Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Pedersen & 
Thomsen 1997; Young et al. 2008). 
Power is considered to be a strong tool, based on how and in whom it is concentrated, and it 
can be used positively or negatively (Salancik & Pfeffer 1980; Song, Wang & Cavusgil 
2015). Corporate governance regulations, codes and standards must take the local situation 
into account, and both enhance their positive effects and eliminate their negative effects. 
1.3 The Saudi context 
One of the features of this study is an examination of the Saudi context. Saudi Arabia has 
shifted rapidly from being a very poor country with few natural resources and limited power 
to one of the largest and most powerful emerging markets both regionally and internationally. 
This process of development and improvement continues. 
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The Saudi market has a concentrated ownership structure such that in the Saudi Capital 
Market (SCM), most companies are controlled by a person, organisation or group that owns a 
large portion of shares. Family ownership controls 75% of firms in the SCM (Al-Tonsi 2003; 
Al-Harkan 2005; Alamri 2014), while privatisation increases the Saudi Government’s 
ownership in the SCM, as the Saudi Government holds large portions of the shares of most 
private companies. For example, when the Saudi Telecommunication Company was 
privatised, the Government retained 83.77% of total shares. Of this percentage, 70% is held 
by the Public Investment Fund, 7.00% by the General Organization for Social Insurance and 
6.77% by the Public Pension Agency. In the petrochemical industries sector, all the listed 
companies have one or more major shareholders. Based on ownership information from the 
Tadawul (Saudi Stock Exchange) website (2015), the Author developed Figure 1.1, which 
shows the percentage of controlling shares in each company in the sector, demonstrating that 
it is a highly concentrated sector.  
 
Economically, Saudi Arabia is one of the largest oil-producing and oil-exporting countries in 
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Figure 1.1: Ownership structure in the petrochemical industries sector 
1Figure 1.1: Ownership structure in the petrochemical industries sector 
 
Chapter (1)  Introduction 
24 | P a g e  
and gas industries to Saudi Government revenue is approximately 92% (Ministry of Economy 
and Planning 2015). One significant change (among many) in the Saudi Capital Market 
(SCM) has been the number of listed companies. Between 1960 and 2015, this increased 
from 5 to 171 (Tadawul 2016). Regionally, the Saudi economy is considered to be the largest 
economy among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC
1
) countries and Arab countries; 
internationally, Saudi Arabia is a member of the G20—an international forum for the 
governments and central bank governors from the 19 largest economies in the world plus the 
European Union (EU). 
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy in which the king has multiple roles and functions, including 
being Prime Minister and head of the legal system. The King must be a direct male 
descendant (sons or grandsons) of the founder of Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud. 
The royal family plays an important role in Saudi Arabia, with some members occupying key 
positions in the public and private sectors. 
Most aspects of life in Saudi Arabia are greatly influenced by its Islamic faith and Arabic 
roots, including the social and cultural systems. For example, the Saudi legal system is based 
on the Islamic Shariah.
2
 However, there are strong business and political relationships 
between Saudi Arabia and regional and international countries, all of which have influenced 
the Saudi legal, economic, political, social and cultural systems. For example, the commercial 
legal system is influenced by the British legal system and the SCGRs have largely been 
influenced by the US model (Fallatah & Dickins 2012). 
                                                          
1
 The Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) is a regional intergovernmental union comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
2
 Shariah is the Islamic legal system, which consists of moral and religious laws derived from religious 
prophecy, particularly the Quran and the Sunnah. 
Chapter (1)  Introduction 
25 | P a g e  
1.4 The purpose of the research 
The general purpose of this research is to demonstrate the complexity of the dominant 
ownership structure in Saudi Arabia, and how that complexity affects the corporate 
governance systems of listed petrochemical companies in the SCM. To fulfil these aims, this 
research will first identify the uniqueness of both ownership structures and corporate 
governance systems in the Saudi context, particularly for the petrochemical companies listed 
on the SCM. Second, this research will explore the problems arising from the influence of 
major shareholders on corporate governance systems in the Saudi context. Third, this 
research will suggest improvements and reforms as a response to problems in current 
corporate governance systems in the listed petrochemical companies in Saudi Arabia. 
1.5 The significance of the research 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been selected because of its unique ownership structure, as 
well its legal, economic, political, social and cultural systems, which differ markedly from 
those in western countries (Rice 2004). These systems were built based on local 
circumstances. This research will demonstrate that a corporate governance system based on a 
“one-size-fits-all” model is not applicable because of differences between Saudi systems and 
those in other countries. The broader assertion this study makes is that a country wanting to 
borrow a system—such as a corporate governance system—from another country must 
consider how the system might be applied to suit the local context. 
While the SCGRs are largely influenced by the US model (Fallatah & Dickins 2012), there 
are still huge differences between the Saudi and US legal systems. For instance, the Saudi 
legal system has weak enforcement mechanisms (Baamir 2008) and a lack of description and 
detail, whereas US legal systems have strong enforcement mechanisms with full descriptions 
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and details. Imitating US laws and regulations will not solve local agency issues because the 
US legal system is based on a dispersed-ownership structure with a corporate governance 
model that aims to resolve agent–principal issues. The ownership structure in the SCM is 
concentrated ownership, where agency issues are between principals.  
The positive effect of adopting effective and efficient corporate governance systems can 
extend to individual companies and the market as a whole. Implementing effective and 
efficient corporate governance systems will improve firm performance and benefit all 
shareholders (Kirchmaier & Grant 2005). The capital market can be expanded by promoting 
better governance practices (World Bank 2009), which in turn will improve sophistication, 
legal protection and stability and lead to increased investor confidence and trust in the 
market. 
The SCM can be an attractive market for national, regional and foreign investors, but it must 
become more sophisticated. The CMA needs to promote better governance systems that will 
help develop it further (International Monetary Fund 2012); for instance, improving the 
governance systems will increase investor trust and confidence, which in turn will expand the 
opportunities for more national, regional and foreign investors to invest in the SCM, making 
it a competitive destination for investments. 
The petrochemical sector has a significant influence on both the Saudi and world economies. 
This sector plays a vital role in the Saudi economy because it helps to diversify Saudi 
revenues and implement development and improvement plans. One example is expansion of 
the production base. The world’s dependence on oil and gas is a good reason to maintain the 
stability and effectiveness of this sector. In 2015, the Independent Chemical Information 
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Service (ICIS)
3
 ranking of the top 100 companies in the global chemical industry, based on 
the volume of sales, included two Saudi listed petrochemical companies: Saudi Arabia Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC) at fifth position and National Industrialization Company 
(Tasnee) at 83rd. Thus, any change in petrochemical stability will affect both the Saudi and 
global economies. 
Improving corporate governance systems will enhance the accounting and auditing 
environment and legal systems in Saudi Arabia. Although the accounting and auditing 
systems are in a developing environment in Saudi Arabia, Al-Harkan (2005, p. 4) noted that 
“the accounting environment in Saudi Arabia is still not developed; there are many steps that 
need to be taken over a period of time to facilitate its development”. Moreover, since 
corporate governance is relatively new in Saudi Arabia, more research is needed to achieve 
the highest possible standards in accounting and auditing. 
Finally, there is a gap in the literature examining the relationships between ownership 
structure and corporate governance systems in the Saudi context. Al-Harkan (2005, p. 4) 
argues that “no study has been significantly undertaken to focus on examining the implication 
of CG (Corporate Governance) in Saudi Arabia”, while Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) 
noted that research on corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is limited. According to 
Ghabayen (2012), there is very little academic literature addressing corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia, while Alamri (2014, p. 4) concluded that “a review of the literature raises the 
issue of the scarcity of research on corporate governance in developing countries, in Gulf 
countries and especially in Saudi Arabia, despite calls for more work in this area”. Hill et al. 
(2015) identified a lack of research or statistics on corporate governance and corporate 
                                                          
3
 ICIS is the largest provider of petrochemical market information in the world. 
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ownership in Saudi Arabia. This lack of research includes investigations of corporate 
governance systems in the petrochemical industries sector in the SCM. 
Further, there appears to be almost no research into the field of corporate governance systems 
using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) methodology; thus, this thesis makes a 
contribution through its use of the AHP methodology. There are several advantages in using 
AHP; for instance, Partovi (1994) showed that AHP is a sophisticated method that can be 
used in complex and unstructured settings, and Saaty (1980) claims that it reflects the way 
people think and behave. 
1.6 The research questions 
This thesis poses three questions: 
i. What is unique about the ownership structures in the Saudi context and corporate 
governance systems within petrochemical companies listed in the Saudi Capital 
Market?  
ii. What problems are associated with corporate governance in this context?  
iii. What response to these problems will improve governance systems in the Saudi 
petrochemical context? 
1.7 The research strategy  
This research uses the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) methodology, a sophisticated, 
multi-criterion, decision-making technique (Partovi 1994). Figure 1.2 illustrates the 
application of the AHP methodology, which involves four stages (Saaty 1980, 1987, 1994a, 
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1994b, 1999, 2008). Most aspects of the current research were based on the AHP 









The first stage involves structuring problems and building the AHP model, which is generally 
completed in two phases. In the first phase, the secondary resources allow an exploration of 
the literature and cases about the corporate governance systems and ownership structure in 
Saudi Arabia and other contexts. This supports a comprehensive understanding of the 
problem. The second phase establishes the foundations and basics of the research and builds 
the AHP model. After the problem is understood, it can be structured using the AHP 
hierarchy. 
Fourth Stage: Discussion and Conclusion 
Contribution to knowledge 
Third Stage: Results and Analysis 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) Thematic Analysis (ThA) 







First Stage: Structuring problems and building the AHP model 









Figure 1.2: Research strategy 
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The second stage involves primary data collection, in which an interview tool is used to 
collect data from relevant participants. The interview has three sections. The first includes 
demographic questions, which are standardised questions covering socio-biographical details 
to identify quantifiable subsets within the given population. Second, AHP questionnaires are 
created to handle qualitative and quantitative aspects of the data (Saaty 1980; Kurttila et al. 
2000; Hafeez, Zhang & Malak 2002). Third, semi-structured interview questions are designed 
to gather an understanding of participants’ experiences, opinions, attitudes, values and 
processes (Rowley 2012; Kvale & Brinkmann 2015). The interviewer is given a list of 
discussion themes and areas to cover most research aspects (Rowley 2012; Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2015). This typifies the AHP model. 
In the third stage, the results are determined and analysed. The results for each section of the 
AHP questionnaire are considered separately. Expert Choice software (ECDesktop version) 
was used here to synthesise and analyse the results of the AHP questionnaires. For the semi-
structured interviews, the results were based on the designed themes. This study used two 
analytical processes: Thematic Analysis (ThA) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
The fourth stage is discussion, which connects understanding from the conceptual framework 
and research questions with demonstrated results to provide a comprehensive picture. This 
illustrated the uniqueness of the Saudi context and its associated problems, and suggests 
reforms to improve the system. 
1.8 The scope of the research 
This research focuses on corporate governance systems and ownership structures. To obtain a 
broader view of the effects of ownership, the overall concept of the corporate governance 
system is divided into external and internal governance systems based on the AHP model. 
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Because the Saudi economy is significant, the focus is on the SCM and, more specifically, on 
all 14 listed companies in the petrochemical industries sector. This study does not involve 
petrochemical companies listed in other sectors, and does not include listed companies in 
other sectors even if they have petrochemical-related businesses. It does not involve non-
listed petrochemical companies or any Saudi companies listed in capital markets other than 
the SCM. These companies are not included because, first, they have different practices and 
operations from those in the petrochemical industries sector; second, it is difficult to access 
information from non-listed companies; and third, corporate governance systems and 
ownership structures differ among markets. 
To choose participants that best suit the research, several factors were considered, including 
the position of the interviewee, their availability and willingness, and the availability and 
willingness of the interviewer (Rowley 2012). Moreover, in the AHP methodology there is no 
ideal number of participants (Saaty 1980), because the number depends on the research 
questions and research strategy. However, it is important to note that large numbers of 
participants and long interviews would give rise to a large amount of data that would be 
unwieldy to analyse (Rowley 2012). This research gathers data from participants with 
personal experience and knowledge of Saudi corporate governance systems and ownership 
structure. 
The participants were selected based on their role in a corporate governance system: whether 
inside a company as a chief financial officer (CFO) or outside as an advisor or regulator. The 
sample involved 21 participants in two groups. The first group consisted of participants from 
inside companies, including 14 from listed petrochemical companies. The second consisted 
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of participants from outside the listed petrochemical companies, including four from external 
auditing firms (the “Big Four”
4
), and three from the CMA. 
For the richness of this research and to cover the entire picture, forming one set of questions 
for both external and internal participants helps to determine each group’s view about the 
issues and roles relating to the other. This study took place between 2012 and 2016 and 
covers the current practices and reforms of corporate governance systems in Saudi Arabia. 
1.9 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is presented in eight chapters, as outlined in Table 1.1.  
Chapter Name Description 
1 Introduction 
Provides an overview of corporate governance and the Saudi 
context, and states the research purpose, significance, 
questions, strategy and scope 
2 Saudi context 
Explores social and cultural, political, economic, legal 
systems, and ownership structures and corporate governance 




Reviews extensive literature to provide an understanding of 
ownership structures, corporate governance and the 




Presents some of the theoretical perspectives that explain the 
impacts of different ownership structures on corporate 
governance systems 
5 Methodology 
Addresses the methodology adopted in this research and the 
methods for collecting the primary and secondary data 
6 
Results and data 
analysis (1) 
Presents and analyses the results of the first and second data 
collection methods (demographic questions and AHP 
questionnaires) 
7 
Results and data 
analysis (2) 
Presents and analyses the results of the third data collection 




Summarises the previous chapters to provide an overview of 
and conclusion to the research 
 
                                                          
4
 The “Big Four” are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst & Young and KPMG. 
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1.10 Summary  
This chapter presented a brief explanation of this study. The background highlighted 
corporate governance and its issues, and gave an overview of the Saudi context. The chapter 
then highlighted the research significance, purpose, questions, strategy and scope. Finally, it 
outlined the structure of this research. 
The next chapter will describe the Saudi context in detail, demonstrating its uniqueness and 
how its systems influence corporate governance and ownership structures. The following 
chapter will also describe the ownership structure in Saudi Arabia, as well as its social, 
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Chapter 2: The Saudi Context 
2.1 Introduction 
All countries can be considered unique because each has distinguishing characteristics, but 
this does not negate their similarities. National characteristics are shaped and developed 
through history by internal and external factors, such as legal and economic developments, 
social systems and external relationships. These characteristics must be investigated and 
understood because ensuring that a local corporate governance system is effective and 
efficient means considering them when building, implementing or improving the system. 
This thesis investigates the corporate governance systems within a specific context: the SCM 
and, in particular, the petrochemical industries sector. It is important to explore Saudi systems 
to demonstrate their uniqueness and their influences over the effectiveness and efficiency of 
Saudi corporate governance. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is influenced by both traditional 
and emerging factors, which distinguish Saudi Arabia from other developed and developing 
countries. 
This chapter provides an overview of significant aspects of the Saudi context that have 
shaped the nation and its people; these aspects include social and cultural, political, 
economic, and legal systems, ownership structures and corporate governance systems. The 
assessment of the Saudi systems will specify similarities and differences with other 
influential countries such as the US, UK and some of Saudi Arabia’s neighboring countries. 
The country’s desert location, which is home to the holiest mosques in Islam, and its 
traditional tribal population are inherent influential factors that shape almost every aspect of 
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Saudi society and its people. Islam is considered to be the most important criterion that 
directs the movements of individuals and society; understandably, the Islamic faith exerts an 
enormous influence over Saudis because it drives perceptions of “halal” (acceptable) and 
“haram” (unacceptable). Moreover, because Saudi Arabia is located in the Arabian 
Peninsula, which is the indigenous location of Arabs, the tribal system and Arabic traditions 
can define the relationships, including strong bonds of loyalty, among individuals and groups. 
Alongside these inherent characteristics, the emergence of modern Saudi Arabia and the 
discovery of oil resulted in enormous changes and pervasive development. These changes 
have transformed Saudi Arabia from a very poor country into one of the largest economies in 
the world. Saudi Arabia occupies a prominent position at regional and international levels 
such that it is part of the G20, a gathering of the world’s largest economies (G20 2016). 
Based on the market capitalization of the Arab world markets, the SCM is the largest market 
in the region (Arab Monetary Fund 2016). 
Due to Saudi Arabia’s political, economic, cultural and social position, most countries around 
the world want some sort of relationship with the country. For instance, it has strong business 
relationships with the US and UK due to a long history of trading, and the SCM now attracts 
investments from all over the world. This means it is important to investigate and study the 
SCM.  
However, the characteristics of Saudi Arabia are not all positive. The Saudi legal system is 
considered to be weak because its development has not kept pace with the country’s 
economic development (Hussainey & Al-Nodel 2008; Al-Nodel & Hussainey 2010; Al-
Matari, Al-Swidi & Fadzil 2012). There is also a lack of collaboration between legal and 
monitoring agencies; the accounting and auditing professions urgently need further 
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development and improvement; and information on the ownership structure in the SCM is out 
of date.  
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section provides a brief overview of Saudi 
Arabia. The third section describes the social and cultural systems; the fourth outlines the 
political system; the fifth describes how the legal system developed; the sixth introduces 
external auditing; the seventh is an overview of the economic systems; the eighth explains the 
Saudi ownership structure; and the final section summarises the chapter. 
2.2 Overview of Saudi Arabia 
In 1932, the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in the southwest corner of Asia, was founded 
by King Abdulaziz Al Saud (Al-Angari 2004; Al-Turaiqi 2008); 30 years later the King 
consolidated the territories within it into what is now known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
The land area is ~2 million square kilometres, which makes it the second-largest Arab 
country. It is bounded in the north by Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait, in the south by Yemen and 
Oman, in the west by the Red Sea, and in the east by the Arabian Gulf, Bahrain, Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (General Authority for Statistics 2016). 
Saudi Arabia is considered to be the birthplace of Islam in the seventh century, and thus the 
heartland of the Islamic world. It hosts the two holiest places in Islam: Makkah (Mecca), 
where the most important mosque is situated, and Al-Madinah (Medina), where the mosque 
and the grave of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) is located. In accordance with 
Article 23 of the Basic Law of Governance (the Saudi Constitution), “[t]he state shall protect 
the Islamic creed, apply the Shariah, encourage good and discourage evil”. Islam affects 
every aspect of life in Saudi Arabia, especially business operations, by emphasising high 
ethical standards, strong beliefs and human equality (Moustafa 1985). 
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Its capital city is Riyadh, with Makkah (Mecca), Al-Madinah (Medina), Jeddah, Dammam 
and Al-Jubail as major cities (Ministry of Economy and Planning 2016). Saudi Arabia has 
multiple levels of administrative divisions consisting of 13 regions or provinces, with each 
region being divided into a number of governorates. 
In 2010, the population of Saudi Arabia was 29,195,895, including 6.69 million non-Saudis. 
Of the overall population, 78.2% is under 40 years of age, and 32.3% is under 15 years of age 
(Ministry of Economy and Planning 2016). The local currency is the Saudi Riyal, which in 
2016 was equivalent to 0.267 US dollars (its fixed rate). The official language is Arabic, as 
stated in the Basic Law of Governance. All official agencies in Saudi Arabia issue their 
documents in Arabic although English is considered the business language, and thus the 
issuer of laws and regulations provides an official English translation. 
2.3 Saudi social and cultural systems 
According to Hofstede (1984a, p. 25), a culture can be defined as “the collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of 
Figure 2.1: Saudi Arabia’s borders and provinces 
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people from another”. Culture can be influenced by past events, knowledge and systems that 
are shared by a relatively large group of people. Many aspects of Saudi social and cultural 
systems could have an influence on any existing event. Saudi Arabia has never been invaded 
by another country so it has developed its own culture, language, society and economy, and 
due to its location, economy and political positions, it has strong relationships with most 
countries around the world. 
Saudi culture is generally “fairly homogeneous” (Idris 2007), but two elements influence its 
social and cultural systems: the Islamic faith and the population’s Arabic roots. Saudi Arabia 
is the indigenous centre of Arabs and Muslims (Menoret 2005), and as such holds a strong 
position in the Islamic and Arab worlds. These two factors permeate all aspects of the country 
from the Constitution to the social behaviour of individuals. 
Saudi Arabia is a tribal society built on Arabic traditions that exert a considerable degree of 
influence over local and national events (Idris 2007). In the Arab world, Saudi Arabia has 
been considered the “Big Brother” because of its economic, political and social pre-
eminence. Field (1985) describes how Saudis focus on the people in government departments 
with whom they deal on an interpersonal level, rather than thinking about how the institution 
might affect their lives. This personal relationship is an essential element in Saudi life that 
can often appear to be a hindrance to societal systems like law enforcement. Tribal 
relationships and strong business interconnections between individuals make it difficult for 
the government and its agencies to enforce its rules and regulations effectively (Idris 2007). 
Saudis believe that God (Allah) has ultimate control over everything (Walker, Walker & 
Schmitz 2003). Islamic teachings influence all decision-making in the Kingdom, and also 
have a substantial influence over business and legal practices (Alanazi & Rodrigues 2003; 
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Idris 2007; Alzeban 2015). Menoret (2005, p. 100) shows that “Islam is inseparable from 
Saudi consciousness and national pride, not only because Arabia houses the holy places of 
Mecca and Medina, but also because it was the centre of the first indigenous Arab-Muslim 
resistance to foreign domination. Even for the youngest Saudis, therefore, Islam is the key to 
their self-perception and their affirmation of national sentiments”. Saudi Arabia strictly 
adheres to “Islamic Shariah”, which governs their social behaviour and provides a strong 
cultural fabric that covers the whole nation. 
Table 2.1 illustrates another way of exploring Saudi culture in more detail via Hofstede’s 5-D 
Model
5
 (Hofstede 1984b; Idris 2007; Cassell & Blake 2012). 
Hofstede’s 5-D Saudi results 
Dimension Definition Score
6




“The fundamental issue 
addressed by this dimension is 
the degree of interdependence 
a society maintains among 
individuals. It relates to 
people's self-concept: “I” or 
“we”” (Hofstede 1984b, p. 
83). 
25 
The collectivist nature of Saudi 
culture, Islamic teachings and Arab 
traditions control the social behaviour 
of the nation (Alanazi & Rodrigues 
2003; Idris 2007). In a collectivist 
society, loyalty is paramount and 
overrides most other societal rules 
(Cassell & Blake 2012). 
Power 
Distance 
“The fundamental issue 
addressed by this dimension is 
how a society handles 
inequalities among people 
when they occur” (Hofstede 
1984b, p. 83). 
95 
There is a high level of inequality of 
power and wealth within Saudi 
Arabia (Cassell & Blake 2012). 
“People in Large Power Distance 
societies accept a hierarchical order in 
which everybody has a place which 
needs no further justification” 
(Hofstede 1984b, p. 83).  
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
“The fundamental issue 
addressed by this dimension is 
how a society reacts on the 
fact that time only runs one 
way and that the future is 
unknown: whether it tries to 
control the future or to let it 
happen” (Hofstede 1984b, p. 
83). 
80 
This indicates that Saudi society has a 
low level of tolerance for uncertainty 
(Cassell & Blake 2012). To reduce 
the level of uncertainty, there is a 
need to adopt or implement strict 
rules, laws, policies and regulations. 
                                                          
5
 The Dutch social psychologist Professor Geert Hofstede and his team conducted a comprehensive study, 
identifying five fundamental dimensions, demonstrating values that are deeply embedded in people from 
different cultures. 
6
 The Hofstede Centre website 2016.  
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“This fundamental issue 
addressed by this dimension is 
the way in which a society 
allocates social (as opposed to 
biological) roles to the sexes” 
(Hofstede 1984b, p.83). 
Cassell and Blake (2012) 
show that Hofstede was not 
referring specifically to the 
roles of gender orientation. 
60 
Saudi Arabia is considered to be a 
masculine society where people, “live 
in order to work”, where managers 
are expected to be decisive and 
assertive, where equity, competition 
and performance are emphasised, and 
where conflicts are resolved by 
assertive discussion and resolution 






This describes how every 
society has to maintain some 
links with its own past while 
dealing with the challenges of 
the present and future, and the 
ways in which societies 
prioritise these two existential 
goals differently (Cassell & 
Blake 2012). 
36 
This low score means that traditions 
are highly respected by Saudis. Saudi 
society has a normative nature, a 
relatively minimal focus on the 
future, and a strong propensity to 
achieve rapid outcomes (Cassell & 
Blake 2012; Alzeban 2015). 
 
Table 2.1 highlights several important features of Saudi social and cultural systems. Saudis 
are more concerned with personal relationships; there is more respect and appreciation for 
those who are at high levels, such as the royal family, religious scholars and business 
executives; and Saudi social and cultural systems influence the legal system such that 
enforcement differs between the acceptance of Sharia and civil law systems. Another 
important factor is the size of the average Saudi family, which is considered by Western 
standards to be large: “The Saudi household size ranges from 5.5 to 8.4 (average of 6.4)” 
(Abdul Salam et al. 2014, p. 4). Finally, Saudis believe that as Shariah laws emanate from 
God, they cannot choose to accept or refuse them, whereas civil laws are not compulsory, and 
they can choose to accept or refuse them. 
2.4 The Saudi political system 
Saudi Arabia is an absolute and hereditary monarchy: eligibility to serve as the head of the 
Saudi monarchy is restricted to male descendants of the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, 
King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud. The Saudi monarchy has its own system, which differs from 
Table 2.1: Hofstede’s 5-D Model 
2Table 2.1: Hofstede’s 5-D Model 
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primogeniture. The king traditionally must be the oldest son of the surviving sons of King 
Abdulaziz. When the king dies, authority is transferred to the oldest of the surviving brothers. 
This system has now changed and there is a new committee made up of members of the royal 
family and others who choose a new king among all the sons and grandsons of King 
Abdulaziz. The current King is Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, a son of King Abdulaziz; for 
the first time, the Saudi crown prince (currently Muhammad bin Nayef) is a grandson of King 
Abdulaziz. 
The political system is centralised, which gives the King wide internal and external authority. 
The King is also the Head of State, the Prime Minister and the head of the legal system— 
although a Crown Prince, who is second in line to the throne, is appointed by the King to help 
him with his duties.   
There are three state authorities in Saudi Arabia: the Executive Branch, the Legislative 
Branch and the Judicial Branch. The Executive Branch has a Council of Ministers who 
advises the King regarding governance of the country. These ministers are directly appointed 
by the King every four years, and the King can reappoint them for another term. The most 
important ministries, including the Interior Ministry and the Defence Ministry, are run by one 
of the male members of the royal family. 
The Legislative Branch is the Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura). Established in 1991, 
its role in the legislative system of Saudi Arabia is limited to proposing new laws and 
amending existing ones. It acts as an advisory body to the King, but any decisions can only 
be acted on after final approval from him. The Council has 150 members who are appointed 
by the King for four-year terms that can be renewed. The Judicial Branch is concerned with 
the Shariah Courts and is governed and administered according to Islamic law. 
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In most political systems, government officials have high social status and prestige within 
society (Berger 1957); in Saudi Arabia this is particularly true because the political system is 
dominated by the royal family, and thus most of the important positions are allocated to a 
family member or to someone that the royal family has had a significant role in appointing. 
The royal family and those close to them hold most of the political and economic power. 
However, it is generally considered that most people appointed by the royal family have been 
appointed because of their loyalty, expertise and skills. 
Another important issue in Saudi Arabia is that the king and Council of Ministers have the 
legal standing to intervene in the economy. For example, Article 66 of the Laws of 
Companies 1965 states that “the Council of Ministers may determine the number of the board 
of directors on which a director may serve”. This allows the government to determine the 
number of board members and thus to ensure the majority of the board’s voting processes. 
2.5 The Saudi legal system 
The development of the Saudi legal system has not kept pace with the country’s economic 
development. The Saudi market evolved from an informal market to become one of the 
largest markets in the region. The Saudi legal system has not grown in line with this 
economic development; it is still considered a weak system (Hussainey & Al-Nodel 2008; 
Al-Nodel & Hussainey 2010; Al-Matari, Al-Swidi & Fadzil 2012). Issues such as shareholder 
protection increase the demand for further legal support to make the market more 
sophisticated. 
The following is an overview of the Saudi legal system, which is based on Islamic Shariah, 
and Islam is the main source for the Basic Law of Governance which is the Saudi 
Constitution. This is the highest law in the country, and it sets the standards for all the lower-
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level laws. There are several aspects of Islamic Shariah from which laws and regulations are 
derived; according to Chapter I, Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance, the tenets of the 
Saudi Constitution are from the Holy Quran and Sunnah, which are the primary sources of 
Islamic Shariah. 
The Holy Quran is considered to be the direct word of Allah that was revealed to the Prophet 
Mohammed (peace be upon him). It laid down the moral, philosophical, social, political and 
economic foundations needed to construct a society. The Sunnah is the traditions and customs 
of the Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) (Echagüe & Burke 2009). However, when 
there is an unprecedented case not covered by primary sources, there are secondary sources 





The Islamic Shariah and the Saudi legal system allow laws and regulations to be imported 
from any other country or system as long as they do not contradict the Islamic Shariah. For 
instance, the Saudi Laws of Companies issued in 1965 were derived mainly from the British 
Companies Act (Hussainey & Al-Nodel 2008; Al-Matari, Al-Swidi & Fadzil 2012). Saudi 
Arabia can also be party to international conventions, as long as they do not oppose or 
contradict Islamic Shariah. The legal and regulatory framework consists of two components: 
the external oversight agencies that issue laws and regulations, and the laws and regulations 
themselves. 
2.5.1 External oversight agencies  
This section provides an overview of the agencies that relate to corporate governance systems 
and the capital market in Saudi Arabia; it describes the issuers and monitors of laws and 
                                                          
7
 Ijma' is the Arabic word for consensus, which means the unanimous agreement of Prophet Muhammad's 
Companions, Muslims scholars or the entire community or public at large on an issue or case at any given time. 
8
 Qiyas is the Arabic word for reasoning by analogy to a previously accepted decision. 
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regulations related to corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Capital Market has 
been managed and organised by several agencies throughout its history. 
The SCM began as an informal market without any form of management or organisation, but 
due to huge growth in the public and private sectors, the need for an agency to regulate, 
manage and organise the capital market increased dramatically. In 1965, Royal Decree 
Number (32) approved the Laws of Companies 1965, which made the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry responsible for regulating every type of company in the Saudi market. In the 
early 1980s, many ministries, agencies and departments gathered together to establish an 
official capital market, for which they created all the necessary laws and regulations to ensure 
that the listed companies operated accordingly. Since the establishment of the official Saudi 
Capital Market, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)
9
 has been involved in 
managing, regulating, organising and monitoring the market. 
In 2003, Royal Decree Number (M/30) was issued to create the CMA (Capital Market 
Authority 2016) to manage and organise the capital market in Saudi Arabia. However, the 
SAMA continues to be responsible for the financial sector in Saudi Arabia, including banks 
listed in the SCM. 
According to Article 20 of the Capital Market Laws 2003, the Capital Market Authority must 
establish a joint stock company as the responsible agency for trading in the stock market in 
Saudi Arabia: “The Council of Ministers approved on the 19
th
 of March 2007 the formation 
of The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) Company” (Tadawul 2016). Tadawul is an Arabic 
word that refers to the exchange of stocks in the market. The objectives of Tadawul are to 
operate the market effectively and efficiently and to develop a leading financial exchange by 
                                                          
9
 Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency is the central bank; it supervises all financial sectors in Saudi Arabia. 
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supporting competitive investment and financing channels. Tadawul is a self-regulated 
authority governed by a board of nine members who are nominated by the Capital Market 
Authority and appointed by the Prime Minister (Tadawul 2016). 
The agencies that organise, manage, regulate, oversee and monitor the listed companies in the 
Saudi Capital Market now include (i) the Ministry of Commerce and Investment; (ii) the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA); (iii) the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA); (iv) the 
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul); and (v) the Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA). The following discussion illustrates how the external oversight 
agencies are fraught with problems such as the multiplicity of agencies, special agencies, 
conflict and duplication between agencies, and the level of agency authority. 
It is obvious that there are now multiple agencies regulating and overseeing listed companies 
with respect to corporate governance; for instance, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment 
issued the Laws of Companies 1965, which includes a section for listed companies; the CMA 
issued Saudi Corporate Governance regulations (SCGRs), Capital Market Laws 2003, and 
Listing Rules 2004, which regulate and manage the SCM; and the SAMA issued the 
Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia. These are for the 
financial sector, although some of the companies covered by these regulations are listed 
banks. 
Saudi Arabia has special agencies that monitor different types of companies; for instance, the 
General Auditing Bureau is a government agency that exists to monitor companies with 
government ownership. This could be beneficial for minor shareholders because major 
shareholder(s) have the ability and power to monitor their ownership, whereas minor 
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shareholders do not. However, these agencies can have negative impacts because they 
interfere with the decisions and processes of the controlled company. 
Multiple agencies can result in conflict and the duplication of roles, as well as associated laws 
and regulations. One example is the CMA and the SAMA, both of which monitor the same 
financial companies, including banks. Another example is that both the Ministry of 
Commerce and Investment and the CMA have issued regulations for listed companies. 
One factor that defines the role of an agency is its power or influence; some agencies can 
issue laws and regulations but they do not necessarily have the power to monitor them. For 
example, the SOCPA issues accounting and auditing standards, but these standards are 
approved and checked by other agencies such as the external auditor or the CMA. 
These issues have a positive impact on these listed companies, where, for instance, agencies 
have varying power and influence. In these instances the agency with more power and 
influence overrides the agency with less influence. For example, if a company has a problem 
because of doing something wrong, it may not be discovered by the agency with less power 
but by the agency with more power, or when a special agency sets out to achieve the 
company’s best interest, or when there are conflicts of interest and duplication with 
differences between the required standards. In such instances, a company will apply the 
highest required standards to cover the differences, in an effort to benefit the company. 
There are also cases that can have negative impacts, such as when all the agencies are weak 
and powerless and can exert no influence over listed companies, or when a special agency 
help to achieve the interests of major shareholders at the expense of minor shareholders, or 
where there is conflict or duplication between agency standards and no coordination between 
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agencies. This makes it difficult for a company to discover the differences between all laws 
and regulations to meet the regulations. 
2.5.2 Laws and regulations 
This section gives an overview of the laws and regulations relating to corporate governance 
and the capital market in Saudi Arabia. It seeks to provide an understanding of the regulatory 
environment pertaining to listed companies. 
The Saudi legal system relating to the business environment is generally a mixture of rules 
and regulations from US, UK and other countries’ legal systems; albeit controlled and 
influenced by an Islamic framework and the characteristics of the Saudi environment. In 
general, the laws and regulations that relate to corporate governance are the Laws of 
Companies 1965, the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations, the Principles of Corporate 
Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia, Listing Rules 2004, Capital Market Laws 
2003 and the Saudi Accounting and Auditing Standards. 
There are some issues with the laws and regulations, the first being that there are gaps in the 
regulatory system due to a lack of consideration of ownership structure in corporate 
governance regulations; specifically, there are no laws or regulations concerning major 
shareholders. In contrast, in Italy—a country with similar ownership structure and type of 
influential major shareholders—the ICGCs have a section for internal control. Article 10/b in 
the SCGRs shows that one of the main functions of a board of directors is to establish and 
supervise the internal control systems. 
Second, the lack of interpretation of laws and regulations makes them vague and ambiguous, 
and difficult for companies to understand. For example, in the SCGRs (2006, p. 4), minority 
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shareholders are defined as “those shareholders who represent a class of shareholders that 
does not control the company and hence they are unable to influence the company”, but this 
regulation does not define “control” or “influence”. Third, there is a lack of enforcement 
related to the power and influence of the agency and to the sanctions specified in the laws and 
regulations. 
Fourth, there are many conflicts and duplications between laws and regulations because 
although they are all concerned with corporate governance, each agency views it differently. 
For example, listed banks are regulated by the CMA and the SAMA, both of which have 
issued corporate governance regulations. There are elements that exist in the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Regulations that do not exist in the principles, and vice versa. Article 9/g of the 
Regulations states that a company is required to disclose the “results of the annual audit of 
the effectiveness of the internal control procedures of the company”, but this is not one of the 
SAMA’s principles. 
2.6 The Saudi corporate governance system 
Corporate governance is a relatively new topic in Saudi Arabia. In 2006, Dr Ibrahim 
Almneef
10
 wrote a book in Arabic about corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. He noted that 
before 2000, he had not heard of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia, learning of it only at 
a conference he attended that year. Sharif (2006) claims that before 2006 there were no 
unified corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia, although the Laws of Companies 
1965 do include some laws and regulations related to board of directors. 
                                                          
10
 Dr Ibrahim worked as a manager in several large companies and as a member of their boards.  
Almneef, I 2006, Corporate Governance: Board of Directors’ Tasks, Duties and Responsibilities [ الشركات حوكمة  
االدارة مجلس ومسئوليات مهام ], Almodeer, Riyadh. 
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In Saudi Arabia there have been many demands for corporate governance regulations by 
academics, professionals, editors of economics newspapers and others interested in corporate 
governance. At the international level, international organisations such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) encourage developing countries such as Saudi Arabia to develop 
corporate governance regulations as a priority (Rwegasira 2000; Clarke 2004; World Bank 
2009). This view is also supported by Islam because it encourages the incorporation of the 
principles of fairness, accountability, transparency and trust in Saudi corporate governance 
(Ahmed 2012). 
The Capital Market Authority is responsible for regulating the Saudi Capital Market and 
assisting with concerns about corporate governance regulations (Alshehri & Solomon 2012). 
In November 2006, by virtue of the authority granted to the Capital Market Authority by the 
King, its board issued the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations. 
The SCGRs
11
 have five parts. The first part, titled “Preliminary Provisions”, consists of the 
preamble and definitions. The second part, “Rights of Shareholders and the General 
Assembly”, consists of five sections: the “General Rights of Shareholders”, the “Facilitation 
of Shareholders’ Exercise of Rights and Access to Information”, “Shareholders’ Rights 
Related to the General Assembly”, “Voting Rights”, and “Dividends Rights of Shareholders”. 
The third part is “Disclosure and Transparency”, which consists of two sections: “Policies 
and Procedures related to Disclosure” and “Disclosure in the Board of Directors’ Report”. 
The fourth part is “The Board of Directors”, which consists of “Main Functions of the 
Board”, “Responsibilities of the Board”, “Formation of the Board”, “Committees of the 
                                                          
11
 Appendix A. 
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Board”, “Audit Committee”, “Nomination and Remuneration Committee”, “Meetings of the 
Board”, “Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members”, and “Conflict of Interest 
within the Board”. The fifth part is “Closing Provisions”, which includes “Publication and 
Entry into Force”. 
There are still some issues regarding the corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia. 
First, the SCGRs have been influenced by other legal systems, mainly the Anglo-American 
model (Alshehri & Solomon 2012; Fallatah & Dickins 2012; Seidl, Sanderson & Roberts 
2013); for example, their concept of “comply or explain” is mainly derived from the UK 
Cadbury Report 1992 (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra 2009; Al-Abbas 2009; Seidl, Sanderson 
& Roberts 2013). However, ownership structure in the Anglo-American model is dispersed, 
whereas in Saudi Arabia it is concentrated, and thus the corporate governance regulations are 
unlikely to work properly. 
Second, the elements of corporate governance are distributed over more than one law. For 
example, Article 9 of the SCGRs states that its requirements are “in addition to what is 
required in the Listing Rules”. However, because there are other important laws and 
regulations that are not mentioned in the SCGRs, companies find it difficult to gather all the 
related laws and regulations and resolve any conflicts between them. Third, there is no clear 
division between major and minor shareholders because there is almost no reference to them 
in any of the articles other than a simple definition of the minor shareholder. This may be 
because the Regulations were formulated based on a dispersed-ownership model, in which 
major shareholders do not have a strong influence. 
Fourth, significant elements are missing from the SCGRs. For example, there is no section 
for an internal control process; instead, the SCGRs rely on companies’ board of directors to 
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develop and oversee a process for their firms. Fifth, there are technical problems; for 
example, the responsibility for the internal control process lies with the board of directors, but 
what happens if the board is controlled by major shareholders? For instance, the board of 
Saudi Kayan consists of seven members and SABIC, which is the major shareholder, must 
appoint four of them. Thus, SABIC can control decisions because they are taken at the board 
level and the majority of the votes go to SABIC appointees. 
Sixth, there is no mention of the role of an external auditor who can build or assess internal 
corporate governance regulations. Seventh, the Regulations do not consider cultural factors in 
Saudi society. For example, the family unit is often very large because of the tribal system, 
yet the Regulations refer only to first-degree relatives such as parents, spouses and children. 
2.7 External auditing in Saudi Arabia 
In 1986, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry approved the issuance of national 
accounting and auditing standards. In 1992, the SOCPA, which is a professional membership 
organisation, was established to be responsible for reviewing, developing and approving 
accounting and auditing standards. These standards were originally derived from the US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles but the SOCPA is in the process of switching 
from national accounting and auditing standards to the International Financial Reporting 
Standards. Some national standards have been converted, but the remainder are still being 
scrutinised (SOCPA 2016). The Saudi accounting standards involve 23 standards, and the 
Saudi auditing standards involve 17 standards. 
Saudi accounting and auditing standards play an important role in the Saudi economy 
because they have improved the economic environment by increasing disclosure and 
transparency, the competence of external auditors and audit quality. In relation to corporate 
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governance, an important accounting standard has some relationship to ownership structure: 
the “related party transactions” standard aims to identify transactions that take place between 
the company and its related parties and disclose them in the company’s financial statements. 
Other improvements and developments in the accounting and auditing standards are needed. 
Al-Harkan (2005, p. 4) indicated that “the accounting environment in Saudi Arabia is still not 
developed; there are many steps that need to be taken over a period of time to facilitate its 
development”. One aspect missing from the corporate governance system is the role of 
external auditors in internal corporate governance systems. 
External auditors have three important roles: to build, or help build, internal governance 
systems for a company, which includes internal corporate governance regulations; to offer an 
opinion on the internal control process; and to undertake an examination and review of the 
internal corporate governance systems of a company at the request of a regulatory body such 
as the CMA. 
2.8 The Saudi economic system 
Some of the significance of this study is derived from the current economic position of Saudi 
Arabia locally, regionally and globally. This section illustrates the Saudi economy at different 
levels; it will describe the Saudi economy in general, the SCM, and the petrochemical sector. 
2.8.1 The Saudi economy   
Historically, Saudi Arabia was considered to be one of the poorest countries in the world 
because 80% of the country was desert and it lacked natural resources (Al-Sayari 2003). In 
1937, oil was discovered and petrodollars began flooding into the country. Since the 
discovery of oil, there has been an enormous evolution and growth in every aspect of Saudi 
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life, especially the economy. This development and growth has brought gradual changes to 
the social, economic and political situations at the local, regional, national and international 
levels. According to Niblock (2013), Saudi Arabia has an enormous influence on the 
production and pricing of crude oil and other petrochemicals in a way that is unlike any other 
country in the world. 
Locally, the discovery of oil transformed Saudi Arabia from a country whose national 
treasury was carried on the back of a camel and 95% of its inhabitants were illiterate, to one 
that drives cars, builds skyscrapers and has witnessed progressive change and development 
over a short period of time (Butler 2008). Oil and gas are the main sources of income, 
constituting roughly 90–95% of the total national income and 35–40% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). 
Oil revenue accounts for roughly 92% of the Saudi Government’s total revenues (Ministry of 
Economy and Planning 2016). In 2014, the value of GDP in Saudi Arabia was US$746.25 
billion. According to data from the World Bank (2014) and the Ministry of Economy and 
Planning (2014), between 2009 and 2013 the average annual growth rate in the GDP was 
5.5%. Figure 2.2 provides GDP values for Saudi Arabia from 2004 to 2014 (World Bank 
2016). 
Chapter (2)  Saudi context 
54 | P a g e  
 
Regionally, Saudi Arabia is considered the largest economy among the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries
 
and other countries of the Arab world. Figure 2.3 was based on 
Arab Monetary Fund (2016) data, which show that Saudi Arabia had the largest GDP of all 
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Figure 2.2: Saudi GDP 2004–2014 (World Bank 2016) 
4Figure 2.2: Saudi GDP 2004–2014 
 
Figure 2.3: GDP for GCC Countries 2007–2011 (US$ million) (Arab Monetary Fund 2016) 
5Figure 2.3: GDP for GCC Countries 2007–2011 (US$ million) 
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Figure 2.4 was based on Arab Monetary Fund (2016) data, and presents the GDP values for 
all Arab countries in 2013. It shows that Saudi Arabia had the largest Arab GDP, at 
US$597.08 billion. Saudi Arabia is an emerging economy that has achieved an important 
economic position at the international level. According to its GDP, the Saudi economy 
represents 1.20% of the world economy. It has gained access to the world economy ever 
since it became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2005 (World Trade 
Organization 2016). In 2008, it became a member of the G20, which is a forum for 20 major 
economies around the world (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, & Fadzil 2012). The IMF ranked Saudi 






















Figure 2.4: GDP for Arab Countries in 2013 (US$ million) (Arab Monetary Fund 2016)  
6Figure 2.4: GDP for Arab Countries in 2013 (US$ million) 
Figure 2.5: G20 countries GDPs (US$ million) (IMF 2016) 
7Figure 2.5: G20 countries GDPs (US$ million) 
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These significant local, regional and global economic positions have been achieved because 
Saudi Arabia is one of the largest oil and gas producers and exporters in the world. In 2013, 
Saudi Arabia produced an average of 11,591.86 barrels per day, giving them a leading role in 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and worldwide. Table 2.2 
shows the production from OPEC countries from 2010 to 2014. According to Energy 
Information Administration data, in February 2013 Saudi Arabia was the largest oil producer 
in the world. In 2014, it was ranked second, with 11,624 barrels per day; it also produced 
~3,258 billion cubic feet of gas in 2011, placing it at eighth in the world in Energy 
Information Administration rankings. 
No  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Saudi Arabia 8,254 9,296 9,737 9,586 9,683 
2 Iraq 2,401 2,665 2,979 3,037 3,265 
3 Kuwait 2,297 2,538 2,793 2,822 2,774 
4 Iran 3,706 3,628 2,977 2,673 2,766 
5 United Arab Emirates 2,304 2,516 2,624 2,741 2,761 
6 Venezuela 2,370 2,413 2,392 2,389 2,373 
7 Nigeria 2,061 2,111 2,073 1,912 1,911 
8 Angola 1,786 1,667 1,738 1,738 1,660 
9 Algeria 1,250 1,240 1,210 1,159 1,151 
10 Qatar 791 794 753 732 716 
11 Ecuador 475 490 499 516 542 
12 Libya 1,559 462 1,393 928 473 
Total OPEC 29,255 29,821 31,168 30,234 30,075 
Table 2.2: OPEC crude oil production 2010–2014 (1,000 bpd) (OPEC 2016) 
3Table 2.2: OPEC crude oil production 2010–2014 (1,000 bpd) 
Figure 2.6: Crude oil reserves in 2014 (OPEC 2016) 
8Figure 2.6: Crude il reserve  in 2014 
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2.8.2 The Saudi Capital Market 
This economic growth has had a huge influence on the Saudi Capital Market (SCM), which 
has grown from an informal market to one of the largest formal markets in the region. Both 
the public and private sectors of the Saudi economy have experienced enormous economic 
growth (Alzomaia 2014). In 1960, there were just five listed companies; this had increased to 
48 by 1985, to 75 by 2000, to 111 by 2007 and to 146 listed companies by 2010 (Alzomaia 
2014). In 2016, the Saudi Capital Market included 171 companies. 
In the SCM, total market capitalisation at the end of 2013 had reached SR 1,752.86 billion 
(US$467.43 billion), an increase of 25.17% since the end of the previous year (Tadawul 
2015). On 30 June, 2015, market capitalisation for the SCM was SR 2013.464 billion 
(US$536.924 billion). 
The strength of the SCM makes it a lucrative destination for investment from neighbouring 
countries. In 2011, it comprised 44% of total market capitalization for all GCC countries 
(Fallatah & Dickins 2012). Arab Monetary Fund (2016) data show that the capitalisation of 
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Figure 2.7: GCC capital markets in 2015 (Arab Monetary Fund 2016) 
9Figure 2.7: GCC capital markets in 2015 
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The SCM is now the biggest market in the Arab world, based on market capitalisation. Table 
2.3 is based on Arab Monetary Fund (2016) data, which indicate the difference between the 









Saudi Capital Market 40,296.3157 292,364.5169 522,420.94 
Doha Securities Market 1,511.8617 17,116.3090 172,153.03 
Abu Dhabi Securities Market 17,535.249 9,542.6821 133,952.36 
Dubai Financial Market 72,806.1302 31,362.8856 106,026.81 
Kuwait Stock Market 2,444.415 604.5068 96,523.52 
Egypt Capital Market 20,385.3628 12,966.9001 63,222.36 
Casablanca Stock Exchange 125.5801 2,726.0418 50,829.51 
Muscat Securities Market 2,867.9287 1,952.5599 28,750.52 
Amman Stock Exchange 1,673.1173 2,690.7614 25,067.62 
Bahrain Stock Exchange 262.8898 149.5055 19,781.86 
Beirut Stock Exchange 29.2543 249.6055 17,680.39 
Tunis Stock Exchange 155.0664 615.2738 9,490.93 
Palestine Securities Exchange 90.6809 174.0317 3,052.74 
Damascus Securities Exchange 4.7649 3.4481 572.44 






Banking and financial services 12 15,951 551,909 
Petrochemical industries 14 9,241 468,242 
Telecommunication and information technology 4 3,511 168,678 
Real estate development 8 3,766 129,695 
Agriculture and food industries 16 1,680 126,262 
Cement 14 1,841 89,377 
Multi-investment 7 4,029 88,995 
Retail 15 901 86,953 
Industrial investment 15 1,851 75,482 
Energy and utilities 2 4,241 74,040 
Insurance 35 1,201 49,474 
Transport 5 775 42,120 
Building and constructions 17 958 29,433 
Hotel and tourism 4 365 28,872 
Media and publishing 3 155 3,925 
Totals 171 50,473 2,013,464 
Table 2.3: Summary of market capitalisation for Arab markets (Arab Monetary Fund 2016) 
5Table 2.3: Summary of market capitalisation for Arab markets on 5 August 2015 
Table 2.4: Saudi Capital Market sectors details on 5 August 2015 (Tadawul 2015) 
4Table 2.4: Saudi Capital Market sector details on 5 August 2015 
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Table 2.4 is based on Tadawul information, which provides details for different sectors of the 
SCM: the number of companies, issued shares and the capitalisation. 
2.8.3 The petrochemical sector 
It is important to clarify what is meant by the petrochemical industry. There are two different 
classes of petrochemicals with very closely related industries. The petroleum industry relates 
to the exploration, discovery, refining and sale of different kinds of fuels and petroleum 
refining by-products. The petrochemical industry relates to the processing of petroleum by 
refining by-products in the form of olefins and aromatics, and transforming them into a large 
set of chemicals and other raw materials to be used in solvent, detergent, adhesive and 
monomer manufacturing (Zawya 2007). 
The focus of this research is on the petrochemical industry; specifically, on the listed 
petrochemical companies in the SCM. According to the Tadawul website (2015), the 
petrochemical industries sector consists of 14 petrochemical companies. Table 2.5 shows the 
listed petrochemical companies and their paid capital and issued shares. 
No. Company Paid capital* Issued shares 
1 Alujain Corporation (Alujain) 184,533,333 69,200,000 
2 Methanol Chemicals Company (Chemanol) 321,600,000 120,600,000 
3 Nama Chemicals Co. (Nama Chemicals) 342,720,000 128,520,000 
4 Advanced Petrochemical Company (Advanced) 437,320,000 163,995,000 
5 Saudi Arabia Fertilizers Co. (SAFCO) 888,888,888 333,333,333 
6 Saudi International Petrochemical Co (Sipchem) 977,777,776 366,666,666 
7 Sahara Petrochemical Co. (Sahara) 1,170,120,000 438,795,000 
8 Saudi Industrial Investment Group (SIIG) 1,200,000,000 450,000,000 
9 National Petrochemical Company (Petrochem) 1,280,000,000 480,000,000 
10 Yanbu National Petrochemical Company (YANSAB) 1,500,000,000 562,500,000 
11 National Industrialization Company (Tasnee) 1,783,771,109 668,914,166 
12 Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical Co (Petro Rabigh) 2,336,000,000 876,000,000 
13 Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Company (Saudi Kayan) 4,000,000,000 1,500,000,000 
14 Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 8,000,000,000 3,000,000,000 
*Prices in US$ (1 US$ = 3.75 SR), ** Share value is 10 SR 
Table 2.5: Listed petrochemical companies in the Saudi Capital Market (Tadawul 2015) 
6Table 2.5: Listed petrochemical companies in the Saudi Capital Market 
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There are several reasons for selecting petrochemicals as the focus of this research. First, the 
petrochemical industry influences local and international economies. Saudi Arabia is now 
experiencing exceptional rates of development in the petrochemical industry because of its 
large oil and gas reserves (Zawya 2007). The Saudi economy is primarily oil-based and 
crucially influenced by the petrochemical and petroleum industries. The petrochemical 
industries sector constitutes 23% of market capitalisation with SR 468,242 million. Based on 
this market capitalisation, it is the second-largest sector in the market after the banking and 
financial services sector, and the second-largest sector in the number of issued shares, with 
9,241,857,498 shares. 
Second, the petrochemical industries sector is a highly concentrated ownership sector because 
all the companies have at least one major shareholder (see section 2.9). Third, newly listed 
petrochemical companies have begun production and are beginning to achieve operational 
profits; thus, the distribution of dividends will attract more local and foreign investors. In 
2013, 9 out of 14 listed petrochemical companies distributed dividends to shareholders, 
although these varied greatly across companies. The distributed dividend ratios compared 
with closing prices for 2013 was between 7.67% and 1.69%. 
Fourth, the petrochemical industry supports the Saudi economy throughout the world. For 
example, the production of Al-Jubail and Yanbu represents 10% of global petrochemical 
production (Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu 2015). Fifth, petrochemical companies 
have specific characteristics that may both influence and be influenced by corporate 
governance mechanisms. In petrochemical companies there are two important types of 
decisions: capacity decisions, which consider the size of the company’s operations, and 
securing the optimal timing for changes in capacity (Henderson & Cool 2003). 
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Henderson and Cool (2003) concluded their article with several important points related to 
governance systems. First, a market-based governance model is better than a bank-based 
governance model at reducing bad investment behaviour. Second, in the bank-based system, 
major shareholders may encourage more investment without relying on internally generated 
cash flow. Third, there is a relationship between the major shareholder structure for a 
company and over-investment: “Overreliance on one large bank rather than several was a 
poor corporate governance choice” (Henderson & Cool 2003, p.371). In Japan, for example, 
companies with one large bank as a major shareholder are more likely to engage in bad 
investment behaviour. 
2.9 The Saudi ownership structure 
The structure of share ownership is not fixed; it changes according to changes in different 
aspects of the capital market and the nation, such as legal and economic systems. Thus, the 
Saudi ownership structure is a unique element of the Saudi context because it is structured 
based on Saudi circumstances and, as a result of the social, legal, and economic changes in 
Saudi Arabia, the structure of ownership has also changed. This contributes to the growth of 
companies and the number of banks in the Saudi Capital Market. 
The Saudization program for foreign companies and banks transfers the ownership of these 
companies and banks fully or partly to Saudis, to government and to groups or individuals. 
Major government companies such as SABIC, Saudi Telecommunication Company and 
Saudi Electricity Company have also been privatised, and the Saudi Government encourages 
business people and the general public to establish new companies in different sectors by 
providing different types of support. For example, the Saudi Government created the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund to provide the highest professional level of financial, technical, 
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administrative and marketing consultancy to support the borrower (Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund 2016), and a number of partnerships between the Saudi Government, 
companies, groups and individuals have been established with foreign companies so they can 
establish companies in Saudi Arabia. 
2.9.1 The ownership structure in the Saudi Capital Market 
It is important to mention that there is a lack of research on ownership structure in Saudi 
Arabia. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) investigated ownership structures in 
27 countries, but they omitted Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE due 
insufficient market information. Al-Harkan (2005) noted that only two studies had examined 
the nature of Saudi ownership structure before 2005. In fact it is difficult to trace the 
ownership of listed companies in Saudi Arabia because the Laws of Companies 1965 does not 
require ownership structure or the identity of major shareholders to be disclosed to the public 
or investors (Alajlan 2004). 
From the available literature, a number of later studies emerged that explored the ownership 
structure in Saudi Arabia. In 2003, family ownership dominated the SCM at approximately 
75%, while the primary public utilities and services were controlled by the Saudi Government 
(Al-Tonsi 2003). In 2004, Alajlan (2004) indicated that ~70% of existing companies were 
family-owned, and in 2005, the SAMA concluded that family ownership and government 
ownership dominated the SCM (Al-Harkan 2005). 
The SCM recently issued laws and regulations that mandate the disclosure of ownership 
percentage for any entity that owns 5% or more of a company. According to the Tadawul 
website in August 2015, most publicly traded companies have a concentrated ownership 
structure in which the company is controlled by a person, organisation or group owning a 
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larger portion of shares than the other shareholders. According to Tadawul’s information 
about ownership (see Figure 2.8), 57% of Saudi shares are controlled by different types of 
majority owners and 43% are available for trade. 
 
According to the number of shares, more than half of the shares in the SCM are controlled by 
major shareholders. This is a general overview, but in reality almost every company has at 
least one major shareholder. Based on ownership information on the Tadawul website, Table 
2.6 shows the number of companies with major shareholder(s) who own 5% or more of 











Banking and financial services 12 0 12 
Petrochemical industries 14 0 14 
Cement 13 1 14 
Retail 14 1 15 
Energy and utilities 2 0 2 
Agriculture and food industries 13 3 16 
Telecommunication and information technology 4 0 4 
Insurance 34 1 35 
Multi-investment 6 1 7 




Figure 2.8: Controlled shares in the SCM (Tadawul 2015) 
 
10Figure 2.8: Controlled shares in the SCM 
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Building and constructions 15 2 17 
Real estate development 7 1 8 
Transport 5 0 5 
Media and publishing 2 1 3 
Hotel and tourism 3 1 4 
Total 156 15 171 
2.9.2 Ownership structure in the petrochemical industries sector 
One of the significant contributions of this thesis is that it is the first detailed study of 
ownership structure in the petrochemical industries sector in Saudi Arabia. This sector 
includes 14 listed companies, each with a different ownership structure. Based on ownership 
information from Tadawul, this sector has generally exhibited a concentrated ownership 
structure, with major shareholders controlling a large portion of shares in every company 
(Figure 2.9). Concentrated ownership controls 54.40% of listed petrochemical company 
shares in the SCM, with only 45.60% available for public trade. 
 
Figure 2.10 shows that 45.6% of shares are free of control, 33.42% are controlled by the 
government, 13.05% are controlled by listed companies and 4.29% are controlled by foreign 
investors. Family ownership is the least common ownership type, with 3.64% of shares. In 







Figure 2.9: Controlled shares in the petrochemical industries sector in the SCM (Tadawul 2016) 
11Figure 2.9: Controlled shares in the petrochemical industries sector in the SCM 
Table 2.6: The number of companies with 5% or more of controlled shares (Tadawul 2016) 
7Table 2.6: The number of companies with 5% or more of controlled shares 
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also plays a major role in this sector because, unlike other countries, listed companies hold a 
large number of shares. In reality, foreign investors and family-owned companies are the 
least important parts of this sector. 
 
Every listed petrochemical company has at least one major shareholder. Based on ownership 
information from Tadawul, Table 2.7 shows each listed petrochemical company and the 




















Alujain 1 7.66 0 7.66 0 0 
Chemanol 




Nama Chemicals 1 7.4 0 7.4 0 0 
Advanced 2 14.32 6.37 7.95 0 0 
SAFCO 2 55.19 12.20 0 42.99 0 
Sipchem 













0 50 0 
16.25 
YANSAB 2 62.92 11.92 0 51 0 
Tasnee 
7 44.25 8.69 
7.21 
0 5.17 6.52 
6.23 
Figure 2.10: The ownership percentage of each type of major shareholders (Tadawul 2016) 
12 Figure 2.10: The ownership percentage of each type of major shareholders 
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Table 2.7 demonstrates variation across companies in the number and size of major 
shareholders. For instance, Nama Chemicals only has one major shareholder with 7.40% of 
controlled shares, while the Government controls 75.70% of shares in SABIC, and Tasnee is 
controlled by seven major shareholders with unequal controlled shares from three different 
sources: the Government, family and foreign investors. These are important findings because 
the structure, size and power of ownership are quite distinct in listed petrochemical 
companies compared to the Saudi Capital Market as a whole. 
2.10 Summary 
This chapter has explored and discussed the social, cultural, political, legal, economic, and 
corporate governance systems and ownership structure in Saudi Arabia. This investigation 
aims to clarify positive and negative impacts of each system to improve the strengths and 
reduce or eliminate the weaknesses of each system. An example of the weakness of the Saudi 
legal system is that it is not adequate in the requirements to provide enough detailed 
disclosure to ensure investor protection. 
Inquiry into the Saudi socio-economic context and corporate governance systems will enable 
better understanding of whether corporate governance is efficient and effective, and will 
make it more useful for firms within the Saudi context. Thus, to respond to the example, the 
Saudi legal system must be strengthened with more laws and regulations which provide 
5.24 
5.19 
Petro Rabigh 2 75 37.50 0 0 37.50 




0 0 0 
5.70 
Table 2.7: Details of major shareholders in the petrochemical industries sector (Tadawul 2016) 
9Table 2.7: Details of major shareholders in the petrochemical industries sector 
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protections for shareholders. This will improve the capital market, both to benefit current 
investors and to attract new ones. 
The next chapter reviews the literature on corporate governance, ownership structure and 
related issues, with an emphasis on studies and cases from developed and developing 
countries with similarities to Saudi Arabia. 
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Chapter 3: Corporate governance 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 discussed the Saudi socio-economic context by providing information about its 
social and cultural, political, legal, and economic systems, and ownership structure. This 
explanation will enable the strengths and weaknesses of these systems to be identified, along 
with the best ways of dealing with them. It also identifies the potential issues and problems 
that have resulted from the way these systems influence the Saudi corporate governance 
system. 
This chapter will review previous studies as they relate to the Saudi context. There are several 
reasons for exploring previous research. First, it is important to gain a general understanding 
of ownership structures and corporate governance, and the relationships between them in 
different settings. Second, it reveals the issues and problems that result from the effects of 
ownership structure on corporate governance systems in these different settings. Third, it 
helps develop a comparison of Saudi corporate governance systems with other systems. 
Fourth, these related topics will help to build the AHP model
 
used in this research. 
However, it is important to note that most studies have focused on the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance that is used in developed, western markets exhibiting 
dispersed ownership. Second, the Saudi Capital Market has concentrated ownership, but the 
US model, despite its different ownership structure, still influences the Saudi corporate 
governance system. Third, there is a distinct lack of literature about the Saudi ownership 
structure and its impact on the Saudi corporate governance system. 
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This thesis will identify gaps in this knowledge by examining the SCM, especially the 
petrochemical industries sector, and the Saudi ownership structure and its impact on Saudi 
corporate governance systems. It will evaluate the adoption of the US corporate governance 
system as a unique setting with different characteristics that must be considered when 
building or improving a local corporate governance system. The adoption of AHP 
methodology is a feature of this thesis, and it may also be considered as an extension of the 
literature. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The second section describes 
ownership structures; the third describes corporate governance systems; and the fourth 
section illustrates the impact of ownership structures on corporate governance systems. The 
influences of each principal player are shown, and their impact on corporate governance 
systems is illustrated. In the fourth section, the AHP model divides corporate governance 
systems into external and internal to illustrate the relationships between ownership structure 
and corporate governance and related problems. The last section summarises this chapter. 
3.2 Ownership structure 
Historically, the ownership concept began very simply, and thus its related issues were also 
simple: the owner provided the money and managed the company. In the early 1930s, Berle 
and Means developed their Modern Corporation Concept in line with technical developments 
and its requirements. This concept established a new era of large-scale production 
technologies that required substantial investment. Berle and Means (1932) segregated people 
into owners and managers. They made a distinction between the owner action and manager 
position, which introduced the concept of a separation between ownership and control. 
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The complexity of separating ownership and control raises some potential issues and 
problems, defined as agency issues (Jensen & Meckling 1976). This variation in ownership 
structures also helps to create new agency issues and problems, due to conflicts of interest 
between the relevant parties. For example, in a dispersed ownership structure, there can be a 
conflict of interest between managers and owners—“agent–principal issues”—where the 
owners’ best interests and managers’ self-interests may contradict each other, with each party 
concentrating on the benefit to themselves. 
Since the development of the Modern Corporation Concept, economies around the world 
have grown and changed, which has contributed to various scenarios of separation between 
ownership and control. For more than 80 years, researchers have examined issues associated 
with the separation of ownership and control in a company (Daily, Dalton & Cannella 2003). 
Many studies in accounting, finance and economics have described firms’ ownership 
structures and reflected on attempts to minimise issues among stakeholders (Berle & Means 
1932; Knight 1971; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983; Grossman & Hart 1986; 
Shleifer & Vishny 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 1999; Coffee 2005; Young et 
al. 2008; Desender 2009; Nguyen, Locke & Reddy 2015; Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera 2016). 
3.2.1 Ownership structure definition 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define ownership structure as the characteristics of equity 
shareholders and their shareholding capacity in any firm where ownership structure depends 
on how a company’s shares are distributed with regard to voting rights and paid capital. 
Knight (1971) identifies ownership as the right to control the company or to choose its 
managers. Ownership can also be defined as “the power to exercise control” (Grossman & 
Hart 1986, p. 694). However, it is not as simple as this because changes in the meaning of 
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ownership over time have produced new types of ownership and related issues where, for 
example, ownership and control are not totally separate; in reality the degree of separation is 
related to the type of ownership structure. 
3.2.2 Ownership structure types 
There are various forms of ownership structures for countries. The type of ownership 
structure depends on local circumstances in the country and the market (Desender 2009), 
including the country’s economic development and legal systems (Claessens, Djankov & 
Lang 2000). According to Coffee (2005) and others, ownership structures are divided into 
dispersed and concentrated (Franks & Mayer 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 
1999; Desender 2009). Coffee (2005) used the size of ownership as the basis for dividing 
ownership structures, so, each structure combines the similarities, characteristics, motivations 
and interests between shareholders. Coffee (2005) contends that there is no best type because 
each type suits a different context. 
3.2.2.1 Dispersed ownership 
A dispersed ownership structure is one in which small portions of shares are distributed 
widely among a large number of shareholders; no individual or group holds a significant 
percentage of shares. A market can also be called a dispersed-ownership market when it has 
large numbers of dispersed-ownership companies. Dispersed ownership is relatively 
uncommon in most world markets, although it dominates developed markets such as the US 
and UK (Roe 1993; Shleifer & Vishny 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 1999; 
Coffee 2005; Kirchmaier & Grant 2005). Coffee (2005) indicates that dispersed ownership 
exists in strong securities markets noted for their rigorous disclosure standards, high share 
turnover, and high market transparency. 
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This structure is the optimal model of the Berle and Means concept of ownership, where 
ownership and control are mostly separate (Means 1931). Figure 3.1 is based on Means’s 
(1931) scenario and Roe’s (2008) view of the relationship between ownership and control. 
The figure depicts a scenario of a dispersed ownership structure where the owner provides 
money to professional managers in return for management achieving the owners’ best 
interests. Managers benefit from managing the company through their salaries and other 
financial incentives. This scenario indicates that there are two main players: the 
owners/shareholders/principals and executive management/agent. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the terms “manager” and “agent” are used interchangeably, as are the terms 
“principal”, “owners” and “shareholders”. 
 
In this relationship between manager and owner(s), managers are the strongest party, and can 
easily become the “rogues of the story” (Coffee 2005), as their positions give them the power 
to make decisions that affect the company, both positively and negatively (Saunders, Strock 
& Travlos 1990), and to control company resources (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 
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Figure 3.1: A dispersed ownership structure  
13Figure 3.1: A dispersed ownership structure 
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the company (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988), thus effectively acting in both owner and 
manager positions. 
The only way shareholders can influence management is by voting in the general assembly. 
In reality, the level of ownership control is governed by level of share ownership, because 
ownership determines voting ability. Collectively, shareholders have some control over 
management because they can concentrate their votes to achieve a particular objective. 
However, the influence of individual shareholders is weak because they do not hold a 
significant number of shares, which limits their voting capacity and dilutes their motivation to 
interfere. 
3.2.2.2 Concentrated ownership 
A concentrated ownership structure exists when a large portion of company shares are 
controlled by one or more major shareholders
12
 and the remainder are distributed among 
minor shareholders.
13
 Major shareholder(s) combine significant control rights with significant 
cash flow rights (Shleifer & Vishny 1997); thus concentrated ownership is the most direct 
way to align cash flow (ownership) and control rights. 
A market can also exhibit concentrated ownership when most listed companies have a 
concentrated ownership structure. Coffee (2005) indicates that a concentrated-ownership 
market is characterised by controlling shareholder(s), a weaker securities market, substantial 
private benefits of control, and lower standards of disclosure and market transparency. Most 
companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership by an individual or a 
shareholder group, the members of which are usually the founders of the company (La Porta, 
                                                          
12
 A major shareholder is one with a significant number of shares in a company, regardless of the nature of the 
shareholder. 
13
 A minor shareholder is a shareholder with a small number of shares in a company. 
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Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 1999). Examples of countries with concentrated ownership are 
Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Sweden and Japan (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 1999; Coffee 2005; Kirchmaier & Grant 2005; Young et al. 
2008; Nguyen, Locke & Reddy 2015). 
However, even in dispersed-ownership markets, there are companies with concentrated 
ownership. For example, the US market is considered to be a dispersed-ownership market but 
it still has some companies with a concentrated ownership structure, such as Microsoft. This 
means that a large portion of these company shares are controlled by families and wealthy 
investors (Roe 1993). 
In a concentrated ownership structure, the main players are the major shareholder(s) who 
combine control rights and ownership, and minor shareholders with small ownership and no 
control rights (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). There are several types of major shareholders in a 
concentrated ownership; each has different characteristics, motivations and interests. La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) illustrate four types of major shareholders: 
family ownership, government ownership, ownership by a widely held financial institution 
and ownership by a widely held corporation. 
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Figure 3.2 is based on the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Roe (2008). The figure 
shows a concentrated ownership structure in which the major shareholder is the founder or 
establisher of the company. When they choose to sell some shares to the public and list the 
company on the capital market, they generally still hold a significant portion of shares. Most 
or all investors who buy shares hold only a small portion. Managers are normally appointed 
by major shareholders who allow them to exercise control rights. This scenario indicates 
there are links between ownership and control, and reveals three players: major shareholders, 
minor shareholders and executive management. 
Major shareholders play a primary role because they have power (Shleifer & Wolfenzon 
2002; Bava & Devalle 2012a) gained from holding substantial shares and voting rights, and 
this influences their behaviour towards the controlled company. For instance, they are more 
likely to participate at different levels in the company where they can be part of the 
management team and/or board of directors; this enables them to participate in the operations, 
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Figure 3.2: A concentrated ownership structure 
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and processes to ensure that managers are acting in the firm’s best interests, as well as 
preventing mismanagement (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). 
For example, the Calisto Tanzi family in Italy is a powerful major shareholder in the listed 
Parmalat Company, which produces dairy products. This family has enormous power because 
they hold both the chair and chief executive officer (CEO) positions (Bava & Devalle 2012a). 
This has enabled them to influence Parmalat’s operations, decision making and policies to 
satisfy their own interests rather than those of others. 
The second party is minor shareholders, whose levels of influence are similar to those of 
small shareholders in a dispersed structure. The third party is management, but it differs from 
the management in a dispersed ownership. Here, the role of managers is less important 
because they are controlled by the major shareholder(s) due to some sort of relationship with 
owners. The gap in interests between major shareholders and management is small. Managers 
can participate in the board of directors or management team because of their direct 
relationship with major shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 1999; Yiyi, Xu 
& Phan 2008). For example, the manager could be a member of the major shareholder’s 
family. 
3.3 Corporate governance systems 
3.3.1 Corporate governance system definitions 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2004, p. 11) defines 
corporate governance as “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders, and provides the structure through which objectives 
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance determined”. The International Finance Corporation (2013) defines corporate 
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governance as “the structures and processes for the direction and control of companies. 
Corporate governance concerns the relationships among the management, the board of 
directors, the controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders”. 
These broad definitions illustrate that corporate governance systems consist of relationships 
between related parties such as the management team, board of directors, major and minor 
shareholders and other stakeholders; a company’s business objectives (in other words, why it 
was established); the procedures, tools and methods of achieving these objectives; 
performance, which includes the structures and processes for directing a company to achieve 
its objectives; and finally, monitoring all these aspects to avoid obstacles that stop a company 
from reaching its objectives. 
3.3.2 The role of corporate governance systems 
In the presence of opportunistic behaviour, agency problems and transaction costs, corporate 
governance systems matter (Hart 1995). Corporate governance systems are designed to solve 
any issue resulting from a conflict of interest between different parties in a company. With 
dispersed ownership, management must perform in the owners’ best interests, which means 
maximising profits and minimising costs; with concentrated ownership, the company must 
satisfy the interests of both major and minor shareholders. 
A corporate governance system helps to manage events between different groups not 
mentioned in the initial contract (Hart 1995). Corporate governance is a controlling system 
that provides checks and balances to managerial behaviour, to limit possible conflicts of 
interest between related parties (OECD 2004). Therefore, a good corporate governance 
system is a factor in long-term success because it increases the firm’s efficiency and growth, 
and enhances investor confidence and trust in the economy as a whole (OECD 2004). 
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3.3.3 Corporate governance systems models 
It is important to note that “there is no single model of good corporate governance” (OECD 
2004, p. 13), because every system is based on local circumstances that make it appropriate 
for that particular environment. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), a good 
combination of legal protection and a degree of concentrated ownership is essential for a 
“good” corporate governance system. Charkham (2008) notes that it is possible to identify a 
system as “good” based on its ability to deal with ineffective management due to an agency 
problem while simultaneously making a corporation attractive to external financiers (Shleifer 
& Vishny 1997). 
With reference to ownership structure, there are two corporate governance systems models: 
the Anglo-American model where ownership is dispersed, and the Continental European and 
Asian (German–Japan) model where ownership is concentrated. 
3.3.3.1 Anglo-American model 
The Anglo-American model is also referred to as the “outsider model”, “one-tier system”, 
“market-based model”, or “shareholder model”. It can be found in common-law countries 
characterised by highly dispersed ownership structures and strong legal systems (La Porta et 
al. 1997, 1998, 2000 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999; Weimer & Pape 1999; 
Roe 2003). The legal system in these countries is oriented towards the protection of 
shareholders. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that the corporate governance system in the Anglo-
American model is strongest because there is an effective protection of minor shareholders 
that reduces or prevents expropriation of the company’s resources. Corporate governance in 
the US and UK markets are examples of the Anglo-American model. 
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In this model, individual shareholders cannot directly affect the firm’s decision making 
(Keasey & Wright 1993) because corporate boards and management teams operate the 
company according to the interests of shareholders and to increase shareholder wealth 
(Weimer & Pape 1999; Fisher & Lovell 2003). The one-tier model of a governing body 
dictates the monitoring process and executive functions of a company (Hopt & Leyens 2004) 
because this governing body, the board of directors, involves executive and non-executive 
directors who create an effective and competitive business environment as part of their role. 
Defects in the relationship between management and shareholders lead to agency issues 
known as vertical agency, or agent–principal problems. In this model, the major defect is a 
conflict of interest between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals), in a situation 
where managers/agents with the largest control over company decisions and processes can 
achieve their own interests at the cost of shareholders/principals. Agent–principal issues 
occur when there is conflict between the best interests of principals and the self-interest of 
managers (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
3.3.3.2 The Continental European and Asian (German–Japan) model 
The Continental European and Asian model is referred to as an “insider model”, “German-
Japan model”, “two-tier system”, “stakeholder model” or “bank-based model”. It can be 
found in civil law countries that have a concentrated-ownership market and poor legal 
systems (La Porta et al 1998, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999). In this 
model, major shareholders directly influence firms’ decisions (Keasey & Wright 1993). The 
German Code and French Civil Code are examples of civil law legal systems (Borisova 2008) 
where codes and statutes provide prescriptions through which society and corporations are 
more highly regulated. Germany, Italy, France and Japan are examples of countries that have 
adopted this model of governance. 
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Unlike the Anglo-American model, this system has a small influence on the capital market 
because the shareholder is just one of the stakeholders, and their interests are only considered 
when companies are making decisions (Monks & Minow 2001). The Anglo-American model 
focuses on the shareholder, whereas the Continental European and Asian model focus on the 
employees and the company as a whole. 
The Continental European and Asian model consists of the continental European (German) 
and the Asian (Japanese) systems. The German model has a two-tier corporate governance 
system whereby two independent boards—supervisory and management—carry out corporate 
governance functions (Fohlin 2005). In the Japanese model, the legal system, employee 
participation, board structure and mechanisms for monitoring managers are similar to those 
of the continental European model (Roe 2003). This model generally supports the long-term 
and stable success of the economy. One of the roles of government is to enact laws and 
regulations to manage the economy and ensure that directors can independently monitor 
management performance. 
In this model, the agency issue can arise because of a conflict of interest between the best 
interests of major and minor shareholders. The agency problem is also known as the 
horizontal agency problem or the principal–principal problem (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Roe 
2008), whereby major shareholders with the greatest control over company decisions and 
processes can influence decisions to achieve their own interests at the expense of minor 
shareholders. There are several ways major shareholders can achieve private benefits from a 
controlled company via related-party transactions. This happens when a major shareholder of 
a listed firm deals with a controlled firm to transfer cash and profits directly into their own 
pockets (Jiana & Wongb 2004). 
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3.4 Ownership structures and corporate governance systems 
The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of ownership structure on corporate 
governance systems in Saudi Arabia. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that corporate 
governance systems are influenced by ownership because the structure of their share 
ownership influences their design and processes. It also influences a company’s objectives 
and how they are achieved, as well as its tools and the monitoring system it uses. 
The following section will discuss the influence of major shareholders on a corporate 
governance system. For the purposes of this study, the focus here will be on the influence 
major shareholders in a concentrated ownership environment. The discussion will expose 
major shareholders’ power to positively or negatively affect company resources and decisions 
to achieve private benefits at the expenses of minor shareholders. Major shareholders having 
this power do not mean they will necessarily influence a company, but they may use it when 
the opportunity is right, or in the absence of laws and regulations. 
This section is divided into two main sections: the first explains the impact of each type of 
major shareholder, including their individual power and ability; the second describes their 
impact on corporate governance systems. Based on the AHP model, corporate governance is 
categorised into internal and external governance systems. A thorough investigation of each 
corporate governance system should demonstrate the impact that major shareholders. 
3.4.1 The impact of major shareholders 
In concentrated ownership, major shareholders play a key role in the company because they 
have the power and ability to influence management and the board (Shleifer & Wolfenzon 
2002; Bava & Devalle 2012b). There are several types of major shareholders in the 
concentrated ownership structure, each having different characteristics, motivations and 
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interests that can influence a company in various ways. The focus on arrangement of major 
shareholders is due to its importance in the petrochemical industries sector in the SCM. 
3.4.1.1 Family ownership 
Family ownership is determined when a company is owned or controlled by one or more 
individuals, groups of family members, or cross-generational groups (Anderson & Reeb 
2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Family relationships may include direct relationships by 
blood or marriage, such as parents, siblings, children and spouses; or indirect relationships, 
such as in-laws, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins, regardless of their surname 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000; Wiwattanakantang 2001; Bertrand et al. 2008). 
Family ownership has several characteristics that make it very significant. First, most firms 
around the world are family-controlled companies (Burkart, Panunzi & Shleifer 2003). In 
Western Europe, for example, more than 40% of large companies have family ownership 
(Faccio & Lang 2002), and more than half of East Asian corporations are extensively family 
controlled (Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000). In Saudi Arabia, family ownership is 
significant: Alajlan (2004) reported that ~70% of existing companies are owned by families. 
Second, the family is “willing and able to wield power over the corporation” (Melis 2005, p. 
479), which enables them to act without constraint. Third, founding families are long-term 
investors because they consider future generations (Anderson & Reeb 2003), and maintain a 
long-term presence in the firm. Fourth, they hold poorly diversified portfolios (Anderson & 
Reeb 2003), and fifth, they often control senior management positions (Anderson & Reeb 
2003; Wang 2006). Thus, controlling family ownership has both positive and negative effects 
on the company. 
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The positive effects are significant. Ownership and control in the hands of family can be 
advantageous (Demsetz & Lehn 1985) because a family can act to mitigate managerial 
expropriation (Demsetz & Lehn 1985) by hiring a relative to monitor the hired manager, 
which can limit most aberrant behaviour by managers. Management earnings are also lower 
in family-owned firms (Jiraporn & DaDalt 2009) because close monitoring by the family 
gives them superior knowledge about the operations and practices of the company (Jiraporn 
& DaDalt 2009). Moreover, a family monitoring system limits a manager’s ability to 
manipulate their earnings. 
There is a link between the financial sophistication of monitors on a board of directors and 
the extent of earnings management (Xie, Davidson & DaDalt 2003) that also results in less 
earnings manipulation (Xie, Davidson & DaDalt 2003). One of the longer-term focuses of a 
family is less earnings manipulation (Jiraporn & DaDalt 2009) because management 
compensation is less likely to be tied to earnings, and thus mangers have less motivation to 
manipulate earnings (Healy & Palepu 2001; Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan 2007). 
Moreover, a family gains its reputation from the firm and vice versa (Alotaibi 2015). 
According to Jiraporn and DaDalt (2009), family owners have significant reputational capital 
invested in the firm, so there are good reasons for maintaining the firm’s reputation; for 
example, it bears its founders’ name; it is considered part of a legacy they want to pass on to 
future generations; and there is a strong relationship between family ownership and firm 
value, giving a family strong incentives to maximise the firm’s value because their wealth is 
closely linked to its welfare (Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Anderson & Reeb 2003). 
Nevertheless, there are negative aspects of family ownership. The family has substantial cash 
flow rights, incentives and power, which enable them to achieve self-benefits at the expense 
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of others (Fama & Jensen 1983; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988; Shleifer & Vishny 1997; 
Anderson & Reeb 2004; Wang 2006; Jaggi, Leung & Gul 2009). Examples of wealth 
expropriation are excessive compensation, related-party transactions and special dividends 
(Anderson & Reeb 2003). A family can achieve these benefits by participating in the decision 
making and reserving important positions in executive management and the board of 
directors for family members (Anderson & Reeb 2004; Wang 2006). However, reserving 
important positions for family members may reduce labour quality because family owners are 
less concerned with qualifications, talent and the competitive disadvantages of placing less-
competent people in their important positions (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Wang 2006). 
Family ownership also affects employee effort and productivity (Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi 
1997; Anderson & Reeb 2003), which influences the value of the company (Morck, Daniel & 
Yeung 2005; Fogel 2006). The family usually does not rely on professionalism, which 
influences leadership succession (Alajlan 2004). Finally, family ownership and control can 
lead to poor firm performance (Anderson & Reeb 2003, 2004; Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan 
2007; Jaggi, Leung & Gul 2009) because families tend to only want to maximise their 
personal utility, and thus may pursue actions that lead to suboptimal policies, resulting in 
poor performance (Anderson & Reeb 2003). 
3.4.1.2 Government ownership 
Government ownership is determined when a government or any of its agencies or companies 
own and/or control a substantial portion of a firm’s shares (Alotaibi 2015). The government 
ownership model is important because it is pervasive around the world and has significant 
impacts on the economic and financial development of a country (Shleifer 1998; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 2002). In effect, government ownership depends on the level of 
development of a country. 
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Levels of government ownership vary across the world, and can range from 0–100% 
ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 2002). Countries such as Japan, US, and 
Germany have restricted government ownership, but in countries such as Italy, France and 
Austria, the government owns significant portions of production. In most developing 
countries, the government owns the necessary and pivotal sectors, generally including the 
main public utilities and services such as telecommunication and electricity companies. In 
socialist countries, the government owns most companies, not just the important sectors. 
Government ownership is common in poor countries and in countries with poor legal systems 
and underdeveloped financial systems (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 2002). 
There are several reasons for a government to participate in the ownership of a company. 
First, privatisation is a common way to partially or fully transform government ownership to 
other types of ownership. Second, the government aims to develop the economy by creating 
new companies. This can motivate business in new sectors, areas and fields where the 
government establishes a company and releases some of its shares to the public. Third, there 
may be political reasons, such as the government entering into partnerships with some 
business owners to earn their support. An example of government involvement is the Saudi 
Arabian program called Saudization, which aims to convert some of the important foreign 
banks and companies to publicly traded companies where the majority of Saudi ownership 
would be the Saudi Government (Ramady 2010). 
There are several reasons why governments participate in the ownership of these companies. 
First, the government has coercive powers that help them to achieve economic, social and 
political goals, but this power can affect company policies, increase monitoring levels and 
enforce recommended policies (Borisova et al. 2012). One form of this coercive power is the 
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government’s ability to legally interfere in a company or a market to achieve its own goals 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 2002; Borisova et al. 2012). 
Second, a government aims to develop the country, especially its economy (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1994; Cuervo & Villalonga 2000; Chen, Firth & Xu 2009; Le & Buck 2011). Third, it 
also aims to emphasise social welfare by resolving the disparity between private and social 
objectives (Shleifer & Vishny 1994). Fourth, it aims to achieve political goals by controlling 
companies to provide benefits to their supporters (Kornai 1979; Shleifer & Vishny 1994). 
Fifth, in some cases the government has an abundance of money and/or can implicitly 
guarantee debt financing for a controlled company (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 
2002; Borisova & Megginson 2011). Sixth, government ownership of foreign companies and 
banks (Saudization program) allows it to interfere in their decision-making process to force 
them to conform to local policies and plans. 
Government participation can have some positive effects. First, it can ensure economic and 
financial development in a country. According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2002), in some countries, the government can participate through its financial institutions to 
encourage both financial and economic growth. Gerschenkron (1962, p. 22) note that “it was 
the government that generally fulfilled the function of industrial banks”. Second, the 
government encourages the development of important sectors in the country. For example, 
most Business Monitor International reposts about Saudi petrochemicals in 2012, 2013 and 
2014 indicated that the Saudi Government seeks to diversify and add value to the portfolio of 
production, and thus plans to grow a manufacturing base by investing in this sector. 
Third, the government maximises social welfare by providing jobs to relieve unemployment 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 2002). Fourth, the government is in a strong position 
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when it has a monopoly on power or externalities (Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Shleifer 1998). 
Fifth, the government may intervene in the economy to avoid undesirable consequences such 
as high inflation rates (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 2002). Sixth, the government 
ensures the provision of social services (Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Shleifer 1998). 
Nevertheless, government participation can have negative impacts. First, “[t]he case against 
state ownership becomes stronger when political considerations enter the calculation” 
(Shleifer 1998, p. 135), because the government places more emphasis on political objectives 
than on economic and social objectives (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 2002). 
Second, there may be influences on the efficiency of a company because of political 
pressures and heavy government intervention. This can result in extremely inefficient 
companies (Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Shleifer 1998). Third, the level of government 
ownership in a company has a strong relationship with firm performance. Wei (2007) found 
that when government ownership is relatively small, no relationship is observed, but when 
government ownership is above 50%, there is a significant and negative effect on a firm’s 
performance. The impact on the firm’s performance is outside the scope of the current (for 
more information, see Wei 2007; Yu 2013; Zhou et al. 2015). 
Fourth, maximising social welfare can be achieved in the name of financial objectives that 
will affect other investors in the company. For example, some plants built by companies, 
such as the Naples plant of the Italian Government-owned steel giant ILVA, never produce 
any goods; they exist solely to keep people on the payroll (Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Shleifer 
1998). Fifth, the government may spend more on their supporters as wages or bribes (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1994; Shleifer 1998). Sixth, the government can fail to make proper decisions; for 
example, it may appoint or hire people to important positions who support it even if they do 
not have the appropriate qualifications or experience. 
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Seventh, government intervention in the running of a company can lead to poor corporate 
governance practices (Bolton & Thadden 1998; Konijn, Kräussl & Lucas 2011). For 
example, the government may appoint directors and CEOs without the necessary 
qualifications or experience (Mathew, Elsie & Joseph 2007; Cornett et al. 2010). Eighth, all 
these negative impacts can contribute to corruption in a country. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2008) show that government ownership and regulations are associated with 
adverse impacts on markets, such as greater corruption, a larger unofficial economy and 
higher unemployment. 
3.4.1.3 Corporate ownership 
Corporate ownership occurs when a large portion of shares in a company are owned or 
controlled by one or more companies. Corporate ownership can be via financial or non-
financial companies, listed or non-listed
14
 and widely held or closely held (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes & Shleifer 1999). This type of ownership is very complex because it is difficult to 
detect the source of the influence (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 1999). For example, 
if a listed company (A) is controlled by another listed company (B), which in turn is 
controlled by a family member, the family influences the decisions of company B, which then 
influence company A. 
Moreover, each type of corporate ownership has a specific impact on the controlled company, 
which makes it very important. Large corporations have similar characteristics to institutional 
ownership as noted by Borisova et al. (2012) and Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011). 
These include the availability of resources, the significance of power, informational 
                                                          
14
 Lack of information makes it difficult to classify the types of non-listed companies; thus they were placed into 
the family-ownership category because it is difficult to distinguish their ownership and the relationships 
between their owners. 
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advantage and strong business relationships (Borisova et al. 2012); this is particularly 
significant when these large corporations work in the same sector or industry as the 
controlled company. 
Corporate ownership has positive and negative impacts on a controlled company. The first 
positive impact is that controlling companies are usually experts in the field and business 
(Pound 1988). Second, the controlled company benefits from the characteristics and features 
of the controlling company, which can enhance its local and international positions (Borisova 
et al. 2012). Third, the controlling company can provide sources, skills, services, information 
and strong business relationships, and it can help increase the capacity of the controlled 
company when they work in the same field. Fourth, the controlling company can in some 
cases act as a monitor (Cornett et al. 2007). 
However, corporate ownership also has negative impacts. First, business relationships can 
direct the voting process. Pound (1988) indicates that the controlling company may vote in 
favour of managers based on their business relationship with them, leaving minority 
shareholders out of the equation. Second, Tessaromatis and Angelidis (2010) shows that 
institutional investors could also be guided or restricted by suboptimal government directives. 
In some cases, the government, particularly when it owns a large portion of these companies, 
directs some of its operations or functions in line with government goals. For example, when 
institutional investors face high resistance from management or shareholders of the controlled 
company, they can directly damage the company’s reputation by “voting with their feet” and 
selling off their shares (Parrino, Sias & Starks 2003; Borisova et al. 2012). Fourth, Coffee 
(1991) shows that agents’ motivations are the main ways through which the success of 
corporate ownership is monitored. Monitoring is subject to the desires of managers, but it 
must be requested. 
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3.4.1.4 Foreign ownership 
Foreign ownership is when a large number of a company’s shares are controlled by foreign 
investors; this ownership can take the form of either foreign direct investment (FDI) or 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI) (Boonyawat 2013). The level of control is the main 
difference between FDI and FPI. When a large portion of shares is owned by FDI, it will 
maintain significant control over the controlled company, but the converse is true in FPI. In 
this study, the focus is on FDI. 
There are several characteristics that make foreign ownership important (OECD 2002). First, 
foreign investment provides access to additional networks, which can increase distribution, 
sales and marketing. Second, foreign investors are usually experts at some level, which 
benefits the domestic company. For example, if a company is from a developed economy, it 
will provide the newest technologies, bring its internal legal systems and help the domestic 
company enter new markets. Third, a foreign investor will support the company’s position in 
a competitive environment. Fourth, foreign ownership enhances the company’s efficiency 
because the foreign owner brings its policies, internal reporting systems and principles of 
information disclosure. 
Foreign ownership has positive impacts. First, the foreign company will transfer experience 
and expertise to the controlled company; second, the controlling company will ensure 
efficient monitoring to make sure they are safe; third, Boardman, Shapiro and Vining (1997) 
suggest that the more concentrated nature of ownership in multinational corporations’ 
subsidiaries may help to reduce agency costs by providing better monitoring and better 
rewards to managers, because the performance of subsidiaries affects the performance of 
their parent companies. 
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There are negative impacts as well. First, the foreign company does not always have the 
ability to monitor the domestic company because of unique cultural and institutional 
circumstances. Second, geographic distance between the foreign company and the domestic 
company may reduce the ability of the foreign company to monitor and access information 
(Boardman, Shapiro & Vining 1997; Wiwattanakantang 1999; Lin & Shiu 2003). Third, it 
may be difficult for the foreign company to compete in the local markets if the domestic 
market has high levels of knowledge, technologies of production, or management (for 
examples, see Dunning 1980, 1988; Blomström 1986; Blomström & Kokko 2003). 
3.4.1.5 Multiple major shareholders 
A listed company may be controlled by more than one major shareholder, with each holding a 
substantial number of shares. These multiple major shareholders could be from similar 
backgrounds, and thus may have almost the same characteristics, motivations and interests; 
they could also be from different backgrounds, with each major shareholder having 
correspondingly different characteristics, motivations and interests. 
There are two scenarios with multiple major shareholders. In the first, all major shareholders 
have an equal distribution of shares, and thus have almost equal power and control over the 
company. In the second, share distribution differs between major shareholders, which results 
in differences in the power and control among major shareholders (Bennedsen & Wolfenzon 
2000). 
There are positive effects of having more than one major shareholder. This ownership 
structure can be a monitoring mechanism because each major shareholder will monitor the 
other. Maury and Pajuste (2005) point out that multiple major shareholders provide an 
efficient check-and-balance monitoring system because each major shareholder is motivated 
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to protect themselves from exploitation (Pagano & Röell 1998). Moreover, each major 
shareholder has some degree of control and power, which makes it hard for one major 
shareholder to work alone; when the shares are evenly distributed, all the major shareholders 
are almost equal, which makes it difficult for each major shareholder to hide exploitation 
from other major shareholders (Maury & Pajuste 2005). It also improves shareholder 
protection. 
In environments with poor protection for shareholders, multiple large shareholders may be 
able to enhance this environment (Bennedsen & Wolfenzon 2000), and to reduce the agency 
issue. According to Gogineni, Linn and Yadav (2010), the second-largest major shareholder 
works to limit agency problems in the company. In addition to controlling the agency issue, it 
can reduce agency costs. Gogineni, Linn and Yadav (2010) report a relationship between the 
amount of share ownership and agency cost, which means that small ownership is associated 
with lower agency costs. 
There are also negative impacts of having multiple major shareholders; there may be 
particular arrangements between major shareholders, called a “controlling coalition”. This 
arrangement will also help major shareholders to share a substantial amount of these cost-
related extractions (Bennedsen & Wolfenzon 2000). Third, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) 
show that if shares are equally distributed among major shareholders, an alignment effect can 
be expected, but if there is an unequal distribution, there will be a “coalition formation 
effect”. A controlling coalition can give major shareholders absolute control over a company. 
3.4.2 The impact on corporate governance systems 
Corporate governance systems can be divided into two broad systems, internal and external 
(Weir, Laing & McKnight 2002), although there are similarities between them (Demsetz & 
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Lehn 1985; Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Guo, Lach & Mobbs 2015). This study aims to 
determine the impact of major shareholders on each element of external and internal 
governance systems. As specified earlier, the AHP methodology is used as a structure for all 
aspects of the research. In this section, the factors in the AHP model are explained and 
illustrated as major themes. Figure 3.3 was created based on methodological requirements of 
rigorous AHP design (Saaty 1980). 
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3.4.2.1 External governance systems 
Corporate governance systems are influenced by external factors classified as general and 
surrounding factors. A corporate governance system is affected first by the general 
characteristics of the country, such as its economic, social, cultural and political systems 
(Kirchmaier & Grant 2005). They can also be influenced by the environment with which the 
company directly interacts, such as the commercial legal systems, risk management 
measures, disclosure and transparency, and managers’ and directors’ responsibilities (La 
Porta et al. 2000; Udayasankar, Das & Krishnamurti 2008). 
In this study, the direct surrounding environment is of interest, and thus the target external 
factors are the legal and regulatory systems, external oversight and external auditors. These 
can be considered as external pressures that effectively and efficiently implement corporate 
governance systems in a company. 
3.4.2.1.1 Legal and regulatory framework 
The legal system and its enforcement have always been considered an essential corporate 
governance mechanism (La Porta et al. 1997; Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari 2015) because they 
influence the corporate governance system of a country and of a company. There is a one-
way interaction between the legal system at a country level and the legal system at a company 
level: a country’s legal system affects companies regardless of their internal corporate 
governance systems, whereas internal corporate governance systems do not affect the legal 
system of a country. 
The origin of the legal system in a country—generally speaking, whether it comes from 
common law or civil law—has had an enormous influence on the emergence of corporate 
governance systems (Denis & McConnell 2003). In Saudi Arabia, the legal system, especially 
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the commercial legal system, is based on civil law (Koraytem 2000; Sourial 2004). Civil law 
is based on three primary legal backgrounds: French, German and Scandinavian. La Porta et 
al. (2000, p. 8) provide details about the origins of the legal systems of most countries. Their 
purpose was to determine how well these legal origins protect shareholders. They found that 
“common law countries have the strongest protection of outside investors”; “French civil law 
countries have the weakest protection”; and “German civil law and Scandinavian countries 
fall in between, although comparatively speaking they have stronger protection of creditors, 
especially secured creditors”. 
Further, legal and regulatory frameworks vary from country to country based on local 
circumstances. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 753) show that “the extent of legal protection of 
investors varies enormously around the world”. Coffee (2013, p. 1268) show that “different 
legal rules create different winners and losers”. However, some countries have been 
influenced considerably by the legal and regulatory frameworks of others. For example, 
Saudi Arabia and Singapore have been influenced by the American model of corporate 
governance (Fallatah & Dickins 2012), so there is a relationship between the origins of their 
legal systems and ownership structure. Corporate governance models are of two main types: 
the Anglo-American model and the Continental European and Asian model (Short et al. 
1998; Jordan & Lubrano 2006; Fallatah & Dickins 2012). 
A large body of literature has examined the importance of law enforcement, which affects the 
legal, financial and economic development of the market. According to La Porta et al. (1998), 
the civil laws of some countries are characterised by weak law enforcement due to social and 
cultural factors. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) indicate that legal systems are just a 
reflection of a wider social stance, and argue that investor protection is influenced largely by 
law enforcement and the structure of a society, which is more important than the existence of 
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laws and regulations. This will also affect the regulatory environment because investors tend 
to stop buying shares when there is insufficient information about companies as a result of 
flexible mandatory disclosure laws and regulations (De-Jong & Semenov 2002). 
Several issues are related to the legal and regulatory framework. First, a weak legal system is 
one of the general characteristics of civil law countries that produce weak regulations of 
corporate governance systems (La Porta et al. 1997; Zattoni & Cuoma 2008). Second, the 
laws and regulations in these countries are characterised by less protection for shareholders 
and ineffective courts (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Third, law enforcement is very weak (La 
Porta et al. 1998). As a result, the purpose of issuing corporate governance laws and 
regulations in civil law countries is to bolster legitimacy rather than to improve governance 
mechanisms (Zattoni & Cuoma 2008). In reality, laws and regulations can only prevent the 
clearest abuses of shareholder rights. Shareholder protection is insufficient because 
shareholders have no guarantee they will get their money back (Zattoni & Cuoma 2008). This 
is an open environment that allows the main players in a company, managers, board of 
directors and major shareholders, to positively or negatively affect the company. In this 
environment, people with opportunistic behaviour can direct the company to achieve their 
own interests. 
The case of Parmalat, which has just one type of major shareholder—family ownership—is a 
good example of the effects of ownership structure on corporate governance systems (Melis 
2005). The Italian corporate governance system was historically categorised as a poor one 
(Buchanan & Yang 2005; Bava & Devalle 2012a): ‘“The Italian corporate governance 
systems were characterised by an inactive takeover market, weak accounting standards, 
limited presence of institutional investors, and low legal protection for investors” (Buchanan 
& Yang 2005, p. 29). There are also several legal issues regarding Parmalat: it did not fully 
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comply with the laws and regulations governing best practice in the Italian corporate 
governance systems (Tobasso 2004; Melis 2005; Bava & Devalle 2012b); it paid no attention 
to the conflict of interest between major and minor shareholders; it failed to capture most of 
the serious areas of misconduct within the company, which led to most of the laws and 
regulations being assessed; and it ignored most of the legal requirements that control related-
party transactions. 
The Saudi context has characteristics that affect every aspect of life, particularly legal system, 
because it originates from Islamic Shariah. While the Saudi legal system allows borrowing 
from different legal systems, these borrowed laws and regulations must not contradict or 
conflict with the principles of Islam. For example, the Laws of Companies 1965 was 
influenced largely by the French Companies Code (Koraytem 2000; Sourial 2004; Alzahrani 
2013). Saudi Arabia is also classified as a civil law country (Alzahrani 2013), and thus the 
share ownership structure of the Saudi Capital Market tends to be concentrated ownership, in 
which the family and the government play a major role. 
The Saudi legal system is characterised by civil laws because it is influenced by countries 
that use civil law. For example, it has weak shareholder protection. The Saudi system is 
considered to be rigid and inflexible (Alzahrani 2013) because there is no room for a judge to 
make a judgement on their own initiative to cover for any apparent gap in the law. Law 
making in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is considered to be an underdeveloped process 
because issuing a new law requires a package of prolonged measures. Although the Saudi 
legal system is based on civil law, Saudi corporate governance systems are influenced largely 
by the Anglo-American model (Fallatah & Dickins 2012), despite some differences between 
the Saudi and US markets. While there are strong business relationships with common law 
countries such as the UK and the US, Saudi Arabia aims to be an attractive location for 
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foreign investment (Alzahrani 2013), which means investment from any part of the world is 
welcome, even from countries such as China who have different legal systems. 
3.4.2.1.2 External oversight 
This section describes the agencies and bodies responsible for corporate governance systems. 
External oversight agencies, which exert an enormous influence over legal and monitoring 
systems, are of several types. The first type is responsible for issuing laws and regulations, 
the second monitors companies, the third issues and monitors companies, and the fourth 
includes special agencies responsible for certain types of companies. 
Oversight agencies have the authority to determine the level of law enforcement, but they 
cannot be effective unless they are independent from any influences and have strong 
authority. Hanson (1987, p. 290) indicates that “the creation of a specific body of 
administrative law is the creation of a separate court system for its enforcement”.  
In Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment is regarded as the main 
monitoring agency, ensuring that firms comply with regulations and national laws (Al-
Kahtani 2013). The CMA is the main monitoring body for all Saudi firms and reports to the 
Prime Ministry. It also formulates codes of practice for companies and oversees their 
implementation. The CMA ensures that business ethics are maintained with the aim of 
enhancing the confidence of investors and ensuring that companies do not engage in illegal 
activities. The CMA also regulates the SCM, which Al-Kahtani (2013) describes as having 
played a major negative role in destabilising the SCM during the recent financial crisis. The 
Tadawul has the sole mandate of supervising and regulating firms listed on the stock 
exchange, and it deals with corporate governance law. 
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The second issue is the multiplicity of agencies. As mentioned previously, there are a number 
of agencies concerned with similar things; this could be positive in that having many agencies 
will ensure that all the requirements for an application are met as each agency looks at one 
aspect. However, this can also be negative in that agencies duplicate roles and perform 
conflicting duties, which is inefficient and lowers the quality of their services; further, if there 
is a lack of communication, they may investigate similar issues and not check important 
requirements, weakening their authority. Almajid (2008) reports that one cause of the Saudi 
stock market underperforming before 2003 was the multiplicity of regulatory authorities. The 
effects of this multiplicity are exacerbated when there are contradictions and duplications 
between agencies. Companies can become confused about which agency to follow, so they 
follow none of them, with the result that agencies examine the same thing several times, 
leading to conflict, duplication of roles and inefficiency (Safieddine 2009). 
For example, the CMA issued the SCGRs for all listed companies in the SCM, whereas the 
SAMA issued the Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia 
for the financial sector, although some of them are listed banks. Thus, Saudi listed banks are 
required to apply both the SCGRs and Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks 
Operating in Saudi Arabia. 
The final issue is special agencies. When a company is government-controlled, the 
government can create an agency that monitors its investment. This can also be done for other 
major shareholders with the ability to hire an external auditor to inspect the controlled 
company, rather than the appointed auditor. In Saudi Arabia, the General Auditing Bureau is 
an independent agency that reports directly to the Prime Minister, who is the King. It was 
created by the Saudi Government to monitor five types of organisations, one of which is any 
institution or company to which the Government contributes capital. 
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3.4.2.1.3 External audit 
This section explains the role of external audits as an external governance system. An 
external auditor is mainly responsible for verifying that financial reports reflect the fair and 
true economic conditions and operating findings of a company. The quality of the audit is 
very important because a mistake can be crucial (Iionescu 2010). Ownership structures 
influence governance systems and audit quality (Mersland & Strøm 2009). Due to the agency 
issue, providing information will reduce any information asymmetry between the manager 
and absentee owners, and this can increase the demand for external auditing (Lin & Hwang 
2010). An external auditor assures the transparency and credibility of financial reports, and 
improves the quality of financial reporting (Boone, Khurana & Raman 2010; Beisland, 
Mersland & Strøm 2015). 
Audit responsibility can be divided into financial audits verifying the annual financial 
statements of a company, and regulatory audits to verify compliance with legal requirements 
(Hüpkes 2006). Moreover, an external audit can assist the supervisory or monitoring agencies 
because it is seen as the “extended arm” of the supervisor (Hüpkes 2006). However, there are 
differences between countries regarding the involvement of external auditors in the 
supervisory process (Iionescu 2010).  
An external audit also raises issues such as independence, disclosure and the role and 
appointment of an external auditor. The first issue is auditor independence—an external audit 
must be both independent and free to express an independent opinion—and the fairness and 
truthfulness of financial reporting. Owners appoint an external auditor to work as their agent, 
who is expected to be independent from those who manage the company. Agency theory 
assumes that it is important to monitor the auditor to ensure their independence and the 
absence of any conflict of interest with management or the company (Culpan & Trussel 
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2005). To ensure that audit independence is achieved, the Saudi corporate governance code 
stipulates that an external auditor should not be a shareholder; should be part of the executive 
board of directors or hold any managerial, consultancy or technical office in the company; 
should be a qualified financial accountant; and should not have any interests in the 
company’s contracts or transactions (Tricker 2015). 
Despite these constraints, some factors could still influence the independence of an external 
auditor. There may be long-term relationships between auditor and client that create 
familiarity and could prevent the auditor discovering or reporting on earnings-management 
behaviour and other irregularities. A client’s size could be an issue because when the audited 
company is large, the client could dominate an individual partner in the auditing firm. Coffee 
(2003a, 2003b) claims this might “inflict liability on the firm”. Finally, audit quality does not 
appear to deteriorate with longer auditor tenure (Mansi, Maxwell & Miller 2004). 
Another issue is disclosure. An external auditor must communicate with all shareholders in a 
general meeting, particularly with minor shareholders, who do not have the power or ability 
to inspect the company. Indeed, there is no accounting or auditing standard that dictates the 
character, frequency, or medium for communication with minor shareholders. Previous 
studies show that disclosure levels are very low in Saudi Arabia, and calls have been made 
for enhanced transparency and disclosure of financial information to shareholders to avoid 
agency problems (Nadzri 2009; Ghoul 2011; Ahmed 2012). Further, Saudi audit committees, 
which are expected to supervise external auditing processes, have been cited as unable to 
perform their duties diligently due to interference, low expertise, lack of independence and 
inadequate jurisdiction to take action (Haniffa & Hudaib 2007). 
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A further issue is the role of an external auditor. As mentioned earlier, auditors fulfil two 
roles. In regulatory audits, the auditor checks compliance with laws and regulations. Fan and 
Wong (2005, p. 37) report that “external auditors play a governance role in East Asia”, and 
that this role is fulfilled even in weak legal systems. The second role is outlined in the 
corporate governance code as giving an assurance to the shareholders and other stakeholders 
that management has presented the financial information fairly (Al-Moataz & Hussainey 
2013). Therefore, an external auditor provides an opinion on the fair representation of 
financial accounts and helps to evaluate the stewardship of management (Mihret & Admassu 
2011). 
The final issue is the appointment of an external auditor. It is important to appoint a 
professional external auditor because this will mitigate agency problems. According to the 
Saudi corporate governance code, external auditors can only be appointed by the general 
assembly of shareholders during the company’s annual general meeting (Al-Moataz & 
Hussainey 2013). External auditors are nominated by an audit committee, which must 
propose five licensed audit firms with a mandate to work in Saudi Arabia, and who are then 
requested to submit a proposal (Farooq & El-Kacemi 2011). 
After reviewing the proposals, the audit committee must nominate at least one company, 
which is then submitted to the general assembly for an ultimate appointment during the 
annual general meeting. However, while this is included in the laws and regulations, in 
practice things are different, as described in Chapter 6. 
3.4.2.2 Internal governance systems 
A company’s corporate governance system can also be influenced by internal factors. Internal 
systems are the procedures and principles aimed at improving the internal governance 
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systems. An internal control mechanism is designed to ensure optimal firm performance 
(Walsh & Sweard 1990). According to Al-Matari, Al-Swidi and Fadzil (2012), listed 
companies have internal governance systems to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of their 
corporate governance systems which are supported by most external monitoring agencies 
such as the CMA, Tadawul, and Ministry of Commerce and Investment. The most important 
internal governance systems are monitoring systems and the board of directors. 
3.4.2.2.1 Monitoring systems 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) (2013, p. 
3) defines internal control as “a process affected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives in the following categories; effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, reliability of financial reporting, compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations”. The company’s internal control system is designed to ensure the efficient 
management of its corporate and business affairs, to make management decisions that are 
transparent and verifiable, to provide reliable accounting and operating information, to ensure 
compliance with the applicable statutes, to protect company integrity, and to prevent fraud 
against the company and financial markets in general (Bava & Devalle 2012b). According to 
the Cadbury Report (1992), internal audit systems help to achieve best practice in corporate 
governance in the company. 
Monitoring systems, as part of internal governance systems in Saudi Arabia, have developed 
a framework that corporate organisations have adopted to promote corporate governance. The 
monitoring systems undertaken by the COSO develop risk assessment procedures, internal 
control systems and a controlled environment. Based on agency theory, managers have a 
strong influence over company resources, and this enables them to increase their personal 
Chapter (3)  Corporate governance 
104 | P a g e  
benefit (AbdulRahman & Ali 2006). In a company without effective monitoring procedures, 
managers are more likely to take actions that deviate from those benefiting shareholders, such 
as earnings management; this can lead to increased agency costs. Based on the COSO 
integrated framework, this study has selected attributes of the monitoring systems which 
involve internal control processes, internal policies, internal auditors, communicating with 
minor shareholders, and interference from others. These internal governance system elements 
are discussed below to illustrate internal governance issues. 
The internal control processes in corporate organisations in Saudi Arabia are internal 
procedures developed by COSO and other agencies to enhance corporate governance. These 
internal control systems involve creating a controlled environment that includes the 
structures, processes and standards that are crucial in developing internal control systems in 
an organisation (Al-Nodel & Hussainey 2010). One of the mandates of COSO as a 
monitoring system is to create a controlled environment (Uwadiae 2015) to enhance 
corporate governance. For most corporate organisations in Saudi Arabia, internal control 
systems are established to promote proper corporate governance and further reduce the 
possibility of fraud in these firms. 
An internal auditor is an important element in developing internal control systems. The 
Cadbury Report (1992) indicates that an internal auditor must establish internal audit systems 
to monitor and evaluate several key controls and procedures in a company. Internal auditors 
are charged with the responsibility for developing and implementing internal control systems 
within an organisation (Mihret & Admassu 2011). Barac and Staden (2009), in their study on 
internal audit quality, report a strong correlation between the soundness of corporate 
governance and the quality of internal audit. Internal auditors, therefore, ensure that an 
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internal review is of high quality (Al-Shetwi et al. 2011) by ensuring proper internal audit 
policies and procedures to guide audit tasks in an organisation. 
Internal laws and regulations, policies and procedures are formulated by the management of 
corporate organisations as part of their monitoring systems. In most Saudi companies, 
internal policies are developed by an internal audit team. Internal laws and policies monitor 
the internal operations of an organisation, thus promoting corporate governance (Magd 
2006). Internal policies might include procedures for carrying out activities such as financing, 
investing and operating. Proper internal control systems reduce the level of risk associated 
with the business. 
Interference from any person outside the system affects the corporate governance 
performance of an organisation. External forces that are likely to influence the operations of a 
system include the government and lenders. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the government 
develops policies that are used by organisations in their internal operations. The corporate 
structures of organisations in Saudi Arabia influence external parties such as the government. 
Influence by external stakeholders affects the performance of corporate governance through 
the policies and laws that directly affect the performance of organisations (Alzahrani 2013). 
Lenders might also interfere with corporate governance structure by influencing performance. 
Information is crucial for making decisions. Minor shareholders can find it difficult to gain 
access to a company to acquire the information they need to make investment decisions 
regarding the company, despite the fact that the company is required to communicate with 
small shareholders. Although minor shareholders for listed companies in Saudi Arabia are 
minor elements in the companies’ corporate structure, they still require proper corporate 
governance (Al-Kahtani 2014). Because those minor shareholders need monitor the corporate 
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performance of these companies, information should be made available in a timely and 
efficient manner to influence their decision making. Proper communication promotes good 
corporate governance in an organisation. 
3.4.2.2.2 Board of directors 
The board of directors is one of the main internal governance systems within a company 
(Pettigrew & McNulty 1995; Garratt 1997). Mizruchi (1983, p. 433) shows that the “board of 
directors is the ultimate centre of control”. For Saudi Arabian corporate companies, the board 
of directors is the management organ. It has legal power, which means it is supported with 
laws and regulations to develop a strategic scheme aimed at implementing supervisory roles. 
Further, it establishes policies on capital structure and reviews the periodic performance of 
the organisation. It consists of several committees, including an audit committee that ensure 
proper corporate governance. 
For classical agency problems a board of directors is an effective device for preventing 
managers from participating in opportunistic behaviour (Fama & Jensen 1983). The literature 
focuses on the role of the board of directors as a monitoring system, which ensures the 
honesty and consistency of directors and prevents them from pursuing their own interests 
(Prentice 1993). There are three main objectives for a board of directors (Zahra & Pearce 
1989; Johnson, Ellstrand & Daily 1996; Forbes & Milliken 1999): to formulate a company’s 
strategic plans; to monitor and control the management team and their performance; and to 
provide a senior management team that offers advice and services. The literature lacks studies 
examining the influence of ownership structure on board roles, functions, independence, 
responsibilities and appointments. 
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Ownership structure has a massive impact on the board of directors and the strength of their 
roles and functions. For example, a major shareholder can exert power to appoint directors to 
the board and management (OECD 2004): “The owners hire boards of directors who, in turn, 
hire managers to perform these duties” (Walsh & Seward 1990, p. 191). As mentioned 
previously, two main corporate governance models have been formed based on ownership 
structure: market-based and bank-based systems (Fallatah & Dickins 2012). Andres, Azofra 
and Lopez (2005, p. 198) argue that “[t]he board of directors is widely seen as being one of 
the most suitable mechanisms to improve corporate governance both in the market-based 
system and in the bank-based systems”. 
These two models suggest two structures for board of directors. The first is a unitary (one-
tier) board of which both executive directors (EDs) and non-executive directors (NEDs) are 
members. The directors on this board are elected by shareholders and are responsible for all 
the firm’s activities (Lynch-Fannon 2005; Fallatah & Dickins 2012; Mallin 2012). This 
structure is popular in concentrated ownership markets in civil law countries such as 
Germany, France, Austria, Netherland, Denmark and other EU countries, and Japan (Falgi 
2009; World Bank 2009; Mallin 2012). 
The second structure is the dual (two-tiered) board, which consists of a supervisory board and 
an executive management board (Maw et al. 1994; Mallin 2012). Supervisory board members 
are appointed by shareholders and others to oversee a company’s business direction. 
Management board members are appointed by the supervisory board to run the business. This 
structure is popular in concentrated-ownership markets in civil law countries such as 
Germany, France, Austria, Netherland, Denmark and other EU countries and Japan (Mallin 
2012; World Bank 2009; Falgi 2009). 
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The OECD (2004, p. 24) asserts that “where board decisions may affect different shareholder 
groups differently, the board should treat all shareholders fairly”. Five factors influence the 
performance of the board of directors: the audit committee; disclosure and transparency; 
directors’ qualifications; board function and process; and board characteristics. 
The first factor is the audit committee. Board committees help enhance board accountability 
and maintain independent oversight over board activities (Harrison 1987). Several types of 
committee have been identified in the corporate governance literature, but the most important 
are considered to be the audit committee, the nomination committee and the remuneration 
committee (Lorsch & MacIver 1989; Brown, Beekes & Verhoeven 2011). The audit 
committee oversees internal controls, maintains reporting quality, ensures sufficient audit 
fees, identifies risks, asks challenging questions and oversees the whistleblowing process 
(Haron, Jantan & Eow Gaik 2005). As mentioned in the external audit section (see section 
3.4.2.1.3), one of the audit committee’s roles is to nominate an external auditor to the general 
assembly. The audit committee investigates all the proposals for external auditors to select 
the best external auditor for the company (Farooq & El-Kacemi 2011). Another role for the 
audit committee is to protect the interests of shareholders and ensure the fulfilment of 
management roles (Haron, Jantan & Eow Gaik 2005). 
The SCGRs require that at least one member of the audit committee is a specialist in financial 
and accounting matters. As defined by the Regulations, the audit committee reviews the 
company’s internal and external audit procedures, and develops control policies that ensure 
proper disclosure of information to stakeholders (Mihret & Admassu 2011). It also monitors 
management to ensure that internal control procedures are complied with. 
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The second factor is disclosure and transparency. Information must be available and 
accessible to directors and shareholders, and it must be accurate, relevant and timely (OECD 
2004, p. 22). Information allows the directors and shareholders to make accurate decisions; 
thus shareholders must have access to “relevant and material information on the corporation 
on a timely and regular basis” (OECD 2004, p. 22). Based on ownership structure, 
shareholders can have different access to information. In a concentrated ownership structure, 
there are representatives of major shareholders on the board, which makes it easier for major 
shareholders to obtain information than minor shareholders. 
As required under the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations, disclosures and transparency 
are achieved by producing reports and releasing information to stakeholders regarding the 
performance of the organisation. The annual report prepared by management and audited by 
an external auditor should disclose the state of affairs in a company. Proper disclosure and 
transparency promote corporate governance in companies, and thus enhance corporate 
performance (Mostafa & Sawsan 2013). Disclosure also helps stakeholders monitor the 
performance of the organisation from outside the business. 
The third factor involves directors’ qualifications. A board of directors should comprise 
individuals with diverse professional qualifications to promote corporate performance. The 
directors must understand business operations and financial information so they can review 
the strategic plans, business operations and financial reports (Lanfranconi & Robertson 
2002). Directors on the board in special committees must have the skills to perform their 
work. For example, the directors in an audit committee must have accounting or finance 
skills, or access to consultants with the requisite skills. 
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It is a requirement in Saudi Arabia that companies disclose directors’ qualifications in the 
annual report as a way of promoting transparency (Fallatah & Dickins 2012). The board 
function is directly influenced by directors’ qualifications, and corporate governance systems 
should consider these qualifications, which are essential in making key decisions in the 
organisation. Prempeh (2002, p. 5) suggests that “appointing authorities should regard a 
prospective nominee’s political credentials as a ‘plus factor’ at best, not as an outcome-
determinative qualification”. 
The fourth factor is board function and process. A board of directors performs various 
functions under committees that are constituted as required by corporate governance 
regulations. These committees help the board carry out its duties as required by the SCGRs. 
The number of members of a board should range from 3 to 10. 
Stiles and Taylor (2001) indicate that corporate governance laws and regulations allow a 
board of directors to review and monitor the strategic plans of a company, but not to 
formulate these plans. However, Clark (1986) shows that a board of directors has formal legal 
powers and responsibilities that enable them to go far beyond their regular roles. For 
example, they can make significant decisions and build strategy for the company (Walsh & 
Seward 1990). This shows that the legal and regulatory framework, which is an external 
governance system, has great influence over the board of directors. The fifth factor is board 
characteristics such as the number of members at meetings. 
3.5 Summary 
Exploring the Saudi Arabian context and identifying its uniqueness is important in light of 
events and cases from similar and different settings. This chapter reviewed prior literature 
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and cases to explain ownership structures and corporate governance systems, and the 
relationships between them.  
This chapter described each of those major shareholders and their positive and negative 
influence in some detail. The discussion of major shareholders indicated the abilities and 
power of each type to positively or negatively influence a company. The chapter explored the 
positive and negative impacts of each element of the corporate-governance systems to 
demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of each element. 
This chapter highlights the importance of taking a country’s specific ownership structure into 
consideration when developing, adopting and preparing local corporate governance systems. 
It is also important to review each element in the system to determine in what way and where 
those major shareholders can interfere with a company. 
The following chapter presents the theoretical framework adopted in this research to illustrate 
the impact of ownership structures on corporate governance systems. Various aspects of 
agency theory are used to understand corporate-governance mechanisms in relation to major 
shareholders and the uniqueness of the Saudi context, and different elements are used to 
illustrate the influence of the external environment. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on ownership structure and corporate 
governance systems to provide a brief background pertaining to ownership structures and 
corporate governance, and to explore the relationship between ownership structures and 
corporate governance systems. The review revealed the influence of ownership structure on 
corporate governance systems, including the abilities and power of major shareholders and 
their influence over every aspect of corporate governance. 
This chapter discusses a theoretical framework that helps to interpret the impact of ownership 
structures on corporate governance systems. Corporate governance is examined from 
different angles to explain the various theories used to study it. Agency theory dominates the 
literature that discusses corporate governance because it was the agency problem that led to 
the emergence of corporate governance (Berle & Means 1932). Most of this literature is 
focused on the Anglo-American model of corporate governance and the relationships 
between managers and shareholders, because most studies have investigated the developed 
market, which has a dispersed ownership structure, and because agency problems are 
between management and shareholders. 
Agency theory has been the traditional approach to explain the relationship between the main 
parties in a company including that between management and shareholders. This research 
expounds on a different aspect of agency theory, where relationships between parties include 
that between major and minor shareholders. This helps to clarify the Saudi context, in which 
ownership is concentrated and the main players are major shareholders. The factors that 
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enable these major shareholders to influence corporate governance systems in Saudi Arabia 
are also explained. 
This chapter is structured as follows: the first section introduces the topic; the second 
explains the theoretical framework of corporate governance; the third discusses and clarifies 
agency theory in both ownership structures; the fourth outlines the factors that result from 
agency conflict; and the final section provides a summary. 
4.2 Theoretical framework for corporate governance 
There are a range of theories for explaining, analysing and understanding corporate 
governance, each of which is based on different perceptions and expectations (Turnbull 
1997). One important aspect of corporate governance is the relationship between managers, 
directors and shareholders. A number of theories has been used to examine the impact of 
corporate governance systems on organisational outcomes, including agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, political economy theory, abuse of power theory, 
resource dependence theory, institutional theory, transaction cost theory and myopic 
institutions theory; there are several reasons for this multiplicity of theories. The development 
of corporate governance systems has been the subject of academic debate in disciplines such 
as law, economics, finance, accounting, management and organisational behaviour, all of 
which have influenced this theoretical underpinning (Mallin 2012). Each discipline has 
examined and used its own methodologies to develop relevant theories to explain, analyse, 
and understand corporate governance systems (Solomon 2010). However, a discussion of 
these theories is beyond the scope of this thesis, which will only focus on agency theory. 
Corporate governance is both a worldwide and a national issue, and each country has 
developed its own suitable corporate governance system. However, some countries have 
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imported or been influenced by a system from a developed country to solve local issues that 
also affect how they operate at the global level. Some international organisations consider 
that corporate governance exists for the benefit of its members and of organisations such as 
the IMF and OECD. These organisations aim to produce general principles of corporate 
governance that are applicable in all countries; for example, the OECD’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance were issued in 1999 and are continuously reviewed and updated, most 
recently in 2015. 
One factor that has led to the development of corporate governance systems is internal 
systems such as law, culture, ownership structure and relationships between companies. As 
each country has its own unique internal systems that influence the development of corporate 
governance, the development stages of local markets make some systems more appropriate 
than others. Mallin (2012) shows that some systems are more relevant to some countries than 
others, so the corporate governance system in the Saudi context will be examined here to 
identify its differences. 
Corporate governance systems are concerned with stakeholders such as managers, directors 
and shareholders. The literature examines the different relationships, roles and behaviours 
between some or all of these parties. For example, agency theory emerged to solve the 
agency problem, which resulted from the separation of ownership and control (Berle & 
Means 1932). The dominant agency problem is the conflict between managers and 
shareholders (Dharwadkar, George & Brandes 2000; Morck, Daniel & Yeung 2005; 
Robertson, Al-AlSheikh & Al-Kahtani 2012). 
This corporate governance problem is based on conflicts of interest between parties such as 
the shareholders and management of a company in dispersed ownership, or between major 
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and minor shareholders in concentrated ownership. This study examines the impact of major 
shareholders on corporate governance systems. There are different views as to how to build 
more effective corporate governance systems, which is why agency theory is used to explain 
and interpret the influence of ownership structure and major shareholders on corporate 
governance systems (Chen & Roberts 2010; Sharma 2013). This chapter also explains the 
factors of power, information asymmetry and moral hazards, and the “comply or explain” 
concept, because they influence agency relationships the most. 
4.3 Agency theory 
One of the most important theories in the context of corporate governance is agency theory. 
Most of the literature concerned with corporate governance has used agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997; Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Dalton et al. 
1998; Shankman 1999; Morck, Daniel & Yeung 2005; Clarke 2007; Brennan & Solomon 
2008; Filatotchev & Boyd 2009; Solomon 2010; Mallin 2012; Tricker 2015). 
Agency theory has had the strongest impact on the development of corporate governance 
thinking, especially in developed countries (Clarke 2004; Solomon 2007; Mallin 2012; 
Tricker 2015) because the agency problem was the key cause of the emergence of corporate 
governance issues (Berle & Means 1932). Most agency theory research has focused on 
developed markets with dispersed ownership structures, where the main agency problems are 
between management and shareholders. The theoretical contribution of this research is to 
investigate the agency problem in developing markets with a concentrated ownership 
structure, and in which the agency problem is among shareholders. 
Berle and Means (1932) introduce the evolution of big business through the Modern 
Corporation Concept. They argue that there are two main parties in a firm: the first party, the 
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shareholder/principal who owns the company, delegates authority to the second party, the 
manager/agent who directs and operates the company on the shareholder/principal’s behalf 
(Mallin 2012). The contractual view of the firm is the central element of the agency problem, 
as developed by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). 
The work of Berle and Means laid the foundations for what was later known as the agency 
problem or agency issue. The basic idea behind the Modern Corporation Concept is 
separation between the ownership and control of a firm. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose a theory of firms based on conflict of interest between 
various contracting parties such as shareholders, corporate managers and debt holders. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976, p. 308) describes the agency relationship as “a contract under which one 
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service 
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”. 
Most corporate-governance research uses and focuses on the contractual perspective between 
managers and shareholders, which aims to resolve agency problems (Fama & Jensen 1983). 
Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) state that using agency theory to describe and analyse 
corporate governance is popular because of the simplicity of agency theory—in which the 
contract is between only two parties, managers and shareholders—and the notion of humans 
as self-interested, advancing their interests at the expense of other parties’ interests. 
A number of goals may be met by understanding agency problems and their suitable control 
mechanisms. First, agency issues between owners and managers may be reduced by aligning 
the interests of agents and principals, because any misalignment of interest between 
management and shareholders, or between major and minor shareholders, can raise agency 
costs (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Tirole 2006). Another goal is to prevent shareholders’ wealth 
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from being expropriated. Agency theory helps identify control mechanisms to align the 
interests of the agent and the principals. At the same time, agents must never misuse the 
principals’ assets (Jensen & Meckling 1979; Fama & Jensen 1983). 
Agency problems can commonly be placed into two broad categories based on their origins in 
either civil law or common law (La Porta et al. 1997), which correspond respectively to 
corporate governance models such as the German–Japanese model and the American Anglo-
Saxon model. Researchers have referred to them as “insider” and “outsider”, “stakeholder” 
and “shareholder”, or “dispersed ownership” and “concentrated ownership” (Lerner 1995; 
Gordon 1999; Rueda 2006; Godfrey & Hatch 2007; Young et al. 2008; Allen, Carletti & 
Marquez 2009). In the first category, the problem is between managers/agents and 
owners/principals, where managers play a vital role. In the second category, the problem is 
between major shareholders/principals and minor shareholders/principals where major 
shareholders are the main players. The following sections will explain these two categories in 
detail while focusing on the second, which most closely describes the Saudi case. 
4.3.1 Principal-agent conflict 
The separation of ownership and control causes several problems. The principal-agent 
problem is considered to be the traditional view of the agency relationship, which is between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In dispersed-ownership companies, 
shareholders (principals) hire professional managers (agents) to act on their behalf, but this 
relationship often results in conflict between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) 
(Figure 4.1). 
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The principal–agent conflict is the traditional view of agency theory, as most research studies 
have been conducted in developed markets, especially the US and UK, where ownership is a 
dispersed structure and conflict is between these two parties (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
There are several issues in the principal-agent problem. Berle and Means (1932) claim that 
managers can use corporate assets to achieve their own goals rather than those of 
shareholders, while shareholders cannot monitor managers. Although principals and agents 
engage in cooperative behaviour, they have different objectives and interests (Eisenhardt 
1989a). For example, managers are opportunistic and may not act in the best interests of 
owners (Ross 1973; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989a). 
Owners (principals) cannot monitor all the decisions made by managers on their behalf. Letza 
et al. (2008) note that owners cannot verify what a manager is actually doing because it is 
“difficult or expensive” for the principal. They also cannot verify the appropriateness of the 
work done on their behalf. Agency cost is a significant issue. Eisenhardt (1989a, p. 61) points 
out that the main issue in principal-agent theory is a trade-off between two costs: a) “the cost 
of measuring behaviour” and b) “the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the 
agent”. 
According to Dombrowski (1996), four general types of agency problems plague 





















Figure 4.1: Principal–agent conflicts (Young et al. 2008, p. 200) 
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have a common goal to present a united front and an integrated program. It is difficult for 
managers to serve more than one master at a time when there is no unified goal. This 
substantially increases the opportunities for managers to ‘play’ one principal against another. 
Second, with multiple agents, principals must consider differences in a manager’s 
preferences, capabilities and interactions, which will help in designing effective inducements 
and monitoring programs. Third, designing effective incentive programs is one of the main 
elements that help to align the interests or preferences of agents and principals. These 
incentive programs must be sufficiently attractive to encourage agents to cooperate. 
However, the incentive programs depend on how well principals understand differences in 
their managers’ preferences, capabilities and interactions. 
Fourth, information asymmetry creates a gap between the agent and principal, which makes it 
difficult for a principal to monitor all agent activities to ensure compliance and guard against 
wrongdoing: “[t]he greater number of principals and agents involved, the greater likelihood 
that coordination difficulties and the differing interests of agents will frustrate the attainment 
of the principals’ goals” (Dombrowski 1996, p. 181). 
Understanding agent–principal issues will enable appropriate mechanisms of control to be 
suggested that will prevent or reduce them. The principal can limit agent abuse or 
manipulation by creating incentive programs for managers that will limit any aberrant 
activities by the agent (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Coffee (2005) suggests relying on indirect 
mechanisms such as equity compensation or stock options for short-term financial 
manipulation and accounting gamesmanship to incentivise management. 
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However, Coffee (2005, p. 203) argues that “[t]here is a ‘dark side’ to option-based 
compensation for senior executives: in the absence of special controls, more options mean 
more fraud”. Denis, Hanouna and Sarin (2006) found a significant positive relationship 
between a firm’s use of option-based compensation and securities fraud allegations being 
levelled against them. This leads to the fundamental question of the effectiveness of such 
control mechanisms, because facilitating transparent measures of firm performance and 
making information about them available to the public will increase the effectiveness of 
control mechanisms (Prowse 1994; Dharwadkar, George & Brandes 2000). 
In that setting, the principal-agent problem is dominant with respect to corporate governance, 
but not in most of the world’s markets, because most have concentrated ownership structures. 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) showed that most of the world’s largest 
companies in developed and developing markets have at least one major shareholder. This 
means there is another type of agency problem: that between major shareholders and minor 
shareholders, rather than between shareholders and managers (Cronqvist & Nilsson 2003). 
4.3.2 Principal–principal conflict 
The second problem in the agency relationship is principal–principal conflict, which occurs 
when ownership is concentrated. In this ownership structure, the major shareholders play a 
corresponding role (Coffee 2005). Principal–principal theory focuses on an additional 
relationship, that between major shareholder(s)/principal(s)) and minority shareholders 
(principals). Figure 4.2 shows that there is a relationship between management and major 
shareholders, as well as relationships between major and minor shareholders.  
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A concentrated structure is a more universal ownership structure because most of the markets 
around the world have a large number of companies with major shareholder(s). La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) report that the 27 richest countries have concentrated 
ownership structures because ~64% of large firms in these countries have major shareholders. 
Concentrated ownership structures exist in developed and developing countries (La Porta et 
al. 1998; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer 1999). Japan, Germany, Italy and Sweden 
have concentrated ownership structure (Zingales 1994; Franks & Mayer 1997; 
Wiwattanakantang 2001; Cronqvist & Nilsson 2003), and so to do some of the largest US 
companies (Demsetz 1983; Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988). 
Concentrated ownership structures also exist in emerging economies. Lins (2003) reports that 
22 emerging economies including Turkey, Malaysia, Brazil and the Philippines have at least 
one major shareholder in 58% of their listed firms. This shows that principal–principal 
conflict is the dominant problem in most companies in the world due to ownership structure. 
According to Young et al. (2008), principal–principal conflict results from concentrated 
ownership where there is less separation between ownership and control. This type of 
ownership structure can lead to serious agency problems due to conflicts of interest between 

























Figure 4.2: Principal–principal conflicts (Young et al. 2008, p. 200) 
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concerns is the ability of the major shareholder. Agency conflicts between major and minor 
shareholders are far greater than classic agency conflicts between management and 
shareholders (Gorton & Schmid 2000; Lehmann & Weigand 2000; Andres 2008; Dittmann, 
Maug & Schneider 2010; Engelen 2015). 
A major shareholder can misuse their controlling power to direct the company so as to meet 
their private interests. Coffee (2005) claims that major shareholders in a concentrated 
ownership are unlike shareholders in a dispersed ownership situation because they have 
greater opportunities than other shareholders: they can, for example, monitor the company 
and change managers, and they can pressure managers to gain private benefit (Burkart, 
Gromb & Panunzi 1997; Dharwadkar, George & Brandes 2000; Holderness 2003; Young et 
al. 2008). 
It is worth noting that several studies have identified the proportion of shares that define a 
shareholder as “major” or “dominant” shareholder; for example, holding 10–50% of shares 
with voting rights can identify a shareholder as “dominant” (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer 1999; Dharwadkar, George & Brandes 2000). While 
there is no agreed percentage of shares that indicates that a shareholder is considered to be 
“major” or “dominant”, there may be a shareholder who owns less than 10% but still controls 
the company. Therefore, whether a shareholder is “major” or “dominant” is based on their 
degree of control over the company.  
The major shareholder’s abilities can be used positively or negatively. Positively, a major 
shareholder enhances monitoring because of their direct supervision over management and 
the power to replace managers (Coffee 2005). Major shareholders have more incentive to 
supervise management because underperformance may reduce their wealth; supervising 
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management costs less for major shareholders than minor shareholders (Barclay & 
Holderness 1992; Holderness 2003). Major shareholders may be considered “insiders” 
because they are close to management and may be members of the board or executive team; 
in contrast, minor shareholders are not as close to management, and therefore can be 
considered “outsiders”. This classification of insiders and outsiders means it is difficult for 
outsiders to monitor management, but it is easy for insiders. Finally, close and transparent 
supervision of major shareholders may help minor shareholders (Barclay & Holderness 1992; 
Holderness 2003). 
Negatively, however, major shareholders may expropriate company resources at the expense 
of others. There are many forms of private benefit that major shareholders look for, such as 
transfer pricing (via related-party transactions) or benefits in terms of personal satisfaction 
and reputation (Hart 1995). 
Further, the control of power and the type of major shareholder has a major influence on 
company resources. Major shareholders may be families, government bodies, institutional 
investors and others. Thus, for example, control rights could be used by a member of the 
family to protect their interests, regardless of the other shareholders (Jiang & Peng 2011). 
Table 4.1 contrasts agent–principal conflict and principal–principal conflict (Young et al. 
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 Principal–agent conflict Principal–principal conflict 
Goal 
incongruence 
Between fragmented, dispersed 
shareholders and professional 
managers 
Between controlling and minority 
shareholders 
Manifestations 
Strategies that benefit entrenched 
managers at the expense of 
shareholders in general (e.g. 
shirking, pet projects, excessive 
compensation and empire building) 
Strategies that benefit controlling 
shareholders at the expense of 
minority shareholders (e.g. 
minority shareholder expropriation, 





Formal constraints (e.g. judicial 
reviews and courts) set an upper 
bound on potential expropriation by 
majority shareholders. Informal 
norms generally adhere to 
shareholder wealth maximisation 
Formal institutional protection is 
often lacking, corrupt or 
unenforced. Informal norms 
typically favour the interests of 





Active as a governance mechanism 
“of last resort”. 
Inactive even in principle. 
Concentrated ownership thwarts 
notions of takeover 
Ownership 
pattern 
Dispersed – holding 5-20% equity is 
considered “concentrated 
ownership”. A shareholder with a 
5% equity stake is regarded as a 
“block-holder”. 
Concentrated – often more than 
50% of equity is held by controlling 
shareholder. Often structured as a 
“pyramid” where cash-flow rights 
are greater than ownership rights. 
Boards of 
directors 
Legitimate legal and social 
institutions with fiduciary duty to 
safeguard shareholders’ interests. 
Research focuses on factors that 
affect day-to-day operations such as 
insiders vs. outsiders, background of 
directors, committee structures, etc. 
In emerging economies, boards 
often have yet to establish 
institutional legitimacy and thus are 
ineffective. 
Research indicates they are often 





Professional managers who often 
have made their way up through the 
ranks or are hired from outside after 
extensive search and scrutiny of 
qualifications. Monitored internally 
by board of directors and externally 
by the managerial labour market. 
Typically family members or 
associates. Monitored mainly 
through family consensus or self-




4.3.3 Influential factors 
Factors that enhance agency conflicts include power, information asymmetry, moral hazards, 
adverse selection, cost, and “comply or explain”; these are discussed below. 
Table 4.1: Principal–agent conflict vs principal–principal conflict (Young et al. 2008, p. 202) 
10Table 4.1: Principal-agent conflict versus principal-principal conflict 
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4.3.3.1 Power 
Power provides opportunities for the “controlling figure”
15
 to make both positive and 
negative decisions. The concept of power has been applied, verified, criticised and developed 
in several stages for more than 40 years (Raven 1992; Saam 2007; Raven 2008). Lewin 
(1944, 1951) defines power as “the possibility of inducing forces of a certain magnitude on 
another person” (Raven 1992, p. 3). Raven (1992, 2008) defines social power as the 
“potential for such influence”. In other words, controlling figures can influence controlled 
figures using the available resources. This led Raven to define “influence” as “a change in the 
belief, attitude or behaviour of a person—the target of influence, which results from the 
action, or presence, of another person or group of persons—the influencing agent” (French & 
Raven 1959; Raven 1992; Persson, Roland & Tabellini 1996; Raven 2008). 
There are different sources of power. Raven (2008) identifies that power stems from six 
bases: informational, reward, coercion, legitimate, expertise and referent. Informational 
power is the ability to give and receive necessary and valuable information (Raven 2008). 
Here the controlling figure exercises power by channelling or withholding necessary and 
valuable information to others’ control actions. Reward power is where the controlling figure 
offers rewards and motivation to controlled figures, as long as they comply with the 
controlling figure’s requirements (Raven 2008). For example, the leader provides positive 
incentives such as pay, promotion, or recognition. 
Coercive power is where the controlling figure threatens the controlled figure with negative 
or undesirable consequences if they fail to comply with the requirements (Raven 2008). An 
                                                          
15
 A “controlling figure” could be a manager in dispersed ownership structure or a major shareholder in a 
concentrated ownership structure. 
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example of this is when an employee completes undesirable work or fails to reach expected 
outcomes and the leader exercises punishment such as demotion or termination. 
Legitimate power comes from the ability of the regulator to require behavioural changes from 
the controlled, and the controlled complies. Raven (2008) provides linguistic constructions 
called modals as signals of legitimate power, such as “obliged” or “obligated,” “should,” 
“ought to,” or “required to”. Expert power is where the controlling figure has the necessary 
knowledge, talent and/or skills and who may be supported by informational power. The 
controlling figure believes that the controlled figure has some insight or information into the 
best situation to follow in particular circumstances. 
Referent power comes from personal traits and characteristics, or seeing the agent as a model 
that the target would want to emulate, as someone to whom others defer to or who is 
associated with people of influence. A leader high in referent power is generally liked and 
admired by others because of individual personality. These leaders can command awe, 
respect and loyalty. This admiration and identification with the leader influences others to act 
on the leader’s suggestions. 
4.3.3.2 Information asymmetry 
Information is a very valuable element in decision making because every party in the 
company needs information to make appropriate decisions. Information asymmetry means 
there is variation in gaining information, as when one party has access to information while 
another party does not (Tirole 2006). Owners require information to evaluate management 
performance; in the absence of information, it is difficult for an owner to completely 
supervise, monitor and evaluate the actual actions and performance of management (Fama 
1980).  
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Based on ownership structures, information asymmetry can be between different parties. In 
dispersed ownership structures there is an information gap between management and 
shareholders, which means management can access information as well as withhold it from 
shareholders. In a concentrated ownership structure, information asymmetry can be between 
major shareholders and minor shareholders, so the party with information can use it for their 
own interests. Foucault argues that knowledge is power (Rouse 2005). There are several 
disadvantages to information asymmetry: it can lead to agency issues such as moral hazards 
and adverse selection (Brealey & Myers 1991; Hoque 2006), and to an increase in costs. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that information asymmetry between a company and its 
shareholders raises the cost of increasing external funds. 
Corporate governance systems can play a key role in solving information asymmetry and 
reducing its impact (Elbadry, Gounopoulos & Skinner 2015). One advantage of corporate 
governance systems is that they ensure that all parties have access to information, which 
helps them make appropriate decisions. Best practice in corporate governance results in high 
levels of confidence and trust for shareholders because these practices will control and 
manage agency problems (Elbadry, Gounopoulos & Skinner 2015). In fact, corporate 
governance systems that aim to increase disclosure result in decreased incentives to gain 
private information (Diamond 1985; Verrecchia 2001; Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Whalen 
2007). For example, an effective board of directors can reduce information asymmetry in the 
company because monitoring the board influences the quantity and quality of disclosure 
(Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Whalen 2007). 
4.3.3.3 Moral hazard 
Due to differences between the interests of management and shareholders, or major and 
minor shareholders, the party with power and control may exhibit opportunistic behaviour to 
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the detriment of the other party. A primary source of moral hazard is information asymmetry 
between parties (Holmstrom 1979). Having access to information as well as self-interest may 
result in insufficient effort being exerted, more time being devoted to spurious activities, 
spending on extravagant investments and lax cost controls (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Tirole 
2006; Engelen 2015). 
Moral hazard generally means difficulties with inducing agents to supply optimal levels of 
productive inputs when their actions cannot be directly observed or contracted for by the 
principal. For example, a researcher works on a complex private project on company time; so 
a moral hazard occurs when management cannot detect what this researcher is really doing 
(Eisenhardt 1989a). Moral hazard is the direct transfer of information between market 
participants (Leland & Pyle 1977). According to Holmstrom (1979), it is important to 
explicitly include a reference for monitoring information. 
One way to reduce or prevent moral hazard is via legal systems that motivate the controlling 
party and limit their abilities (Ross 1977). Corporate governance systems can be a solution 
for moral-hazard problems. As mentioned before, they play a key role in solving information 
asymmetry and reducing its impact (Elbadry, Gounopoulos & Skinner 2015); for instance, in 
Germany, managerial complacency and entrenchment are considered important problems 
because current local corporate governance systems have not solved them (Hackethal, 
Schmidt & Tyrell 2005; Sudarsanam & Broadhurst 2012; Engelen 2015). 
4.3.3.4 Adverse selection 
Adverse selection is a misrepresentation of ability by the agent (Eisenhardt 1989a). Akerlof 
(1970) argues that being able to distinguish between good quality and bad quality is essential 
in most aspects of the business environment. Adverse selection is one of the problems 
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stemming from information asymmetry (Hoque 2006). This is more common in situations of 
agent–principal conflict when, for example, owners want to select an appropriate manager to 
run their company, but it could also be present in principal–principal conflict, when 
management or directors are selected because the dispersed owners have little or no influence 
in the selection process. An example of this is when, in family ownership, the person selected 
is a family member regardless of their qualifications or ability to do the job. In government 
ownership, appointment to the board of a controlled company can constitute a form of 
promotion. 
Brehm and Scott (2004) point out that where the abilities and preferences of management are 
not known, and when directors and members of a supervisory board and their actions are not 
entirely observed, this can lead to a moral hazard, and to misunderstandings and a lack of 
trust and confidence on the part of shareholders. Moreover, due to adverse selection, these 
issues and problems cost the minor shareholder in both structures types because managers 
can increase their private benefits such as building empires and enjoying perquisites (Tirole 
2001). One key solution is to increase the level of disclosure. Many studies have shown that 
company value may increase through amelioration of the adverse selection problem faced by 
uninformed traders (Williamson 1988; Simon 1997; Hoque 2006; Becker-Blease & Irani 
2008). 
4.3.3.5 Cost  
Agency costs rise when there is a misalignment of interest between management and 
shareholders, or between major and minor shareholders (Jensen 1986; Shleifer & Vishny 
1997; Tirole 2006). Unlike in situations of dispersed ownership, major shareholders have the 
ability and interest to effectively control management, which limits managerial indiscretion 
and entrenchment (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Shleifer & Vishny 
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1986; Engelen 2015). Their purpose is to achieve private benefits of control at the expense of 
minor shareholders. 
Several issues increase the costs associated with agency problems. First, with regard to the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problem, agency costs will rise as the proportion of shares 
held by outside shareholders increases and scatters (Khan 1999). Second, agency costs are 
increased by “the cost of measuring behaviour” and “the cost of measuring outcomes and 
transferring risk to the agent” (Eisenhardt 1989a, p. 61). Third, monitoring these and other 
issues will always be costly because the cost of monitoring is sometimes reflected in the price 
shareholders will pay for shares (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Differences in interests between 
parties in a company need to be monitored to ensure that company interests will be achieved. 
There are several ways to limit agency costs. First, company policies must be influenced by 
the interests of dispersed owners (Shleifer & Vishny 1986, 1997; Johnson et al. 2000; 
Anderson & Reeb 2003; Engelen 2015). For example, increasing shareholders’ rights will 
reduce the cost of capital as shareholders’ out-of-pocket monitoring costs are reduced 
(Lombardo & Pagano 2002) or idiosyncratic risks are lowered (Merton 1987; Himmelberg, 
Hubbard & Love 2004; Giannetti & Simonov 2006). Second, monitoring systems must be 
built from different perspectives (Fama & Jensen 1983); for example, separating decision 
management from decision control. Third, managerial opportunism must be mitigated to 
minimise agency costs (Hudaib & Haniffa 2006; Solomon 2010). 
Fourth, corporate-governance mechanisms can be used to institute governance structures that 
will establish a set of legal frameworks. Corporate governance systems can involve the 
monitoring process, legal elements and the board of directors (Berle & Means 1932; Fama 
1980; Fama & Jensen 1983; Solomon 2007; Bebchuk & Weisbach 2010; Conyon & He 2011; 
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Chen, Lu & Sougiannis 2012; Al-Janadi, Rahman & Omar 2013). Corporate governance 
systems enhance board structure by reducing the number of executive board members, which 
increases the board’s independence. 
4.3.3.6 “Comply or explain” 
Companies comply with laws and regulations to sustain their legitimacy (Enrione, Mazza & 
Zerboni 2006; Seidl, Sanderson & Roberts 2013). Suchman (1995, p. 574) argue that 
“legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions”. In other words, this allows a company to report that their actions are 
desirable, proper and appropriate. Seidl, Sanderson and Roberts (2013) show that corporate 
governance regulations derive legitimacy and power because they are generally considered as 
“best practice”. This best practice is expected to positively influence management in a 
company (Seidl, Sanderson & Roberts 2013). 
The concept of “comply or explain” is one way of imposing corporate governance 
regulations. This concept means that complying with corporate governance regulations is not 
mandatory; a company can either comply with laws and regulations or explain why it does 
not (Keay 2014). The essence of this concept is a “disclosure obligation” to inform investors 
(MacNeil & Xiao 2006, p. 487). The “comply or explain” concept provides flexibility in the 
application of regulations and an assessment of compliance with them (Seidl, Sanderson & 
Roberts 2013). MacNeil and Xiao (2006) claim that the concept of should be made 
operational to encourage companies to develop optimal governance practices. 
There are two issues in the concept of “comply or explain”. The first is the quality of the 
explanation (Keay 2014). In most cases, merely having an explanation for not complying 
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with regulations has become more important than its quality. The second issue is the power of 
the legal authority, because if a company provides an explanation, this will exempt it from 
actually applying the laws and regulations. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter addressed the theoretical framework used to explain agency issues and different 
views of agency problems. Agency theory was used to explain the relationship between major 
and minor shareholders, where the main issue is a conflict of interest between the relevant 
parties. In a dispersed ownership structure, conflict is between management and shareholders, 
where management holds strong decision-making power and actually controls the company. 
In a concentrated ownership structure, conflict is between major and minor shareholders, 
where major shareholders hold power. Moreover, major shareholders are supported by 
influential elements that enable them to exercise their power, and this exacerbates the conflict 
of interest. The elements of power, information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, 
cost and “comply or explain”, can be used to support major shareholders or oppose minor 
shareholders. 
The next chapter explains this study’s research methodology, including the philosophical 
paradigms, research approaches, conceptual design, research planning, samples, ethical 
considerations, pilot tests and final instruments, and how primary and secondary data were 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed agency theory because the agency issue constitutes the main 
source of corporate governance problems. Agency theory describes the relationships among 
different parties in a company. The dominant view of agency theory focuses on the 
relationship between management and shareholders that occurs in dispersed-ownership 
markets. This research explores the SCM, which is characterised by a concentrated ownership 
structure in which the agency relationship involves major and minor shareholders. 
This research also sheds light on influential factors such as power, information asymmetry, 
opportunistic behaviour, adverse selection, cost and the “comply or explain” concept, that 
enable major shareholders to interfere in a company’s decisions and processes to achieve 
their private interests at the expense of minor shareholders who do not have these 
opportunities. 
This chapter addresses the underpinning philosophical assumptions and explains the 
methodology and methods used when collecting primary and secondary data. This study aims 
to obtain an insight into the respondents’ perceptions of Saudi corporate governance systems 
by examining the internal and external corporate governance system of the petrochemical 
industries sector in the Saudi Capital Market. 
This study incorporates quantitative and qualitative approaches to gain a comprehensive 
picture of corporate governance systems in Saudi listed petrochemical companies. One of the 
features of this study is the use of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), a quantitative tool 
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to gather data and structure research aspects. This research also includes semi-structured 
interviews as a qualitative method to acquire deeper perceptions of participants and obtain 
further meaning for the AHP results. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents the philosophical paradigms of 
this research; the third explains the conceptual design and research planning, including an 
explanation of the data collection methods; the fourth presents the sample; the fifth outlines 
ethical considerations based on the University of Wollongong’s ethical guidelines; the sixth 
describes pilot testing of the collection methods and how any issues highlighted were 
addressed; the seventh discusses the final instrument; the eighth indicates the importance and 
limitations of the methods: and the last section presents a brief summary of the chapter. 
5.2 Philosophy 
This section discusses the underpinning philosophy and research paradigm. Research 
philosophy is defined as a reflection on how a researcher thinks about developing knowledge, 
and how to transform theory into knowledge by appropriate manipulation of data (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill 2012).  
This research methodology is based on philosophical assumptions that relate to ontology (the 
nature of reality) and epistemology (the way of obtaining knowledge) (Dillard 1991; Jones, 
Romano & Ratnatunga 1995). According to Chua (1986, p. 604), “the issue of ontology lies 
prior to and governs subsequent epistemological and methodological assumptions”.  
Gaffikin (2008, p. 8) provides Figure 5.1 to illustrate the foundations of knowledge, and 
argues that the methods used can be determined by a methodological approach that depends 
on the adopted epistemology, which in turn depends on the ontological position. 
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5.2.1 Ontology 
Ontology is generally defined as the relationship between an object and the knower, but it has 
also been defined as a study of the nature of reality and existence (Dillard 1991; Crotty 
1998). Gaffikin (2008) explains that ontological assumptions are designed to define the 
fundamental nature of existing things, and Chua (1986) describes ontology as beliefs about 
physical and social reality. 
are two ontological positions. One ontological assumption is that reality is “out there”. This 
realism argues that reality is external and objective, and exists independently of the 
individual; the knower is just a discoverer of this objective reality. An alternative assumption 
is that the world is constructed socially; in other words, social reality is objectified through 
human interaction (Chua 1986). Chua maintains that “the ‘stream of consciousness” has no 
meaning or discrete identity until human beings turn their attention (self-reflect) on a segment 
of this flow and ascribe meaning to it” (1986, p. 613). This means that through the process of 
continuous social interaction, meanings and norms become objective and (inter-subjectively) 
    
Figure 5.1: Foundations of knowledge (Gaffikin 2008, p. 8) 
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real. Nominalism counters that reality is equivocal, and thus each individual interprets it 
uniquely (Chua 1986; Dillard 1991; Goles & Hirschheim 2000; Gaffikin 2008). 
5.2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology is defined as “a way of understanding and explaining how we know what we 
know” (Crotty 1998, p. 3). Bryman (2016) suggests it is concerned with what can be 
considered as acceptable knowledge by a discipline, and therefore epistemology is the 
process of knowing (Dillard 1991). Gaffikin (2008) indicates that epistemology is the 
structure, origin and criteria of knowledge.  
Based on these ontological assumptions, two assumptions can be made for epistemology, 
positivism and constructionism (Chua 1986; Dillard 1991; Gaffikin 2008). Positivism 
proposes that knowledge exists independently of any consciousness and can only be based on 
the empirical observations of social reality. A positivist researcher sees “knowledge of the 
physical and social world as gained through an accumulation of activities by “observers” 
searching for consistencies and causal relationships” (Dillard 1991, p. 11). The final aim of 
the researcher is to find “universal laws” that allow them to generalise results, as with the 
physical and natural findings made by scientists (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012). 
Anti-positivism, constructionism or interpretivism asserts that knowledge is imposed on an 
object by the subject (Crotty 1998), and therefore an anti-positivist researcher rejects the view 
that knowledge exists objectively or is imposed subjectively, arguing instead that it is 
constructed (Crotty 1998). Due to the relativistic nature of the social world, the only way to 
understand it is through personal investigation and experience, and from the perspective of 
individuals who are directly involved in the activities under investigation (Hopper & Powell 
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1985; Crotty 1998). From an anti-positivist perspective, generalisation is not a fundamental 
matter (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012). 
5.2.3 Methodology 
Methodology can be defined as the framework of the means for gaining knowledge, and by 
which it investigates and evaluates methods of inquiry (Gaffikin 2008). Methodology offers a 
choice of valid research tools that are considered appropriate for gathering evidence, and for 
carrying out specific investigations (Chua 1986; Dillard 1991). The chosen methodology is 
built on the foundations of epistemology and ontology (Gaffikin 2008). Crotty (1998, p. 3) 
proposes that “the theory of knowledge is embedded in the theoretical perspective and 
thereby in the methodology”.  
Researchers can adopt an ideographic or nomothetic approach, or both, but this depends on 
their previous philosophical assumptions. The ideographic approach focuses on subjective, 
historical and individual accounts of actions and events (Dillard 1991), and on “actors studied 
in their everyday world” (Chua 1986, p. 615). A small sample using different research 
methods must be used to gain different perceptions of the phenomenon and analysis, from 
which they will seek to understand “what is happening” (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012). 
The nomothetic approach involves a systematic protocol and technique for gaining 
knowledge of the social world (Dillard 1991). Chua (1986, p. 608) indicates that “data 
collection and analysis are focused on the ‘discovery’ of rigorous, generalizable relations”. 
The researcher generally seeks associations or causality, which requires large samples, survey 
methods, and statistical and mathematical methods of analysis. Chua (1986) points out that 
research begins with a statement of hypotheses followed by a discussion of empirical data, 
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and concludes with an assessment of the extent to which data “support” or “confirm” the 
hypothesis.  
Figure 5.2 presents the philosophical assumptions underlying subjectivism and objectivism 
(Dillard 1991, p. 11). It illustrates the differences between them in terms of the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological perspectives explained above.     
 
5.2.4 Philosophical assumptions of the research 
The aim of this research is to investigate and provide a general understanding of the impact of 
ownership structures on the corporate governance systems of petrochemical companies listed 
in the SCM. This research benefits from objectivism and subjectivism in terms of the nature 
of the data collected and analysed, because primary data are collected through AHP 
questionnaires and interviews and secondary data through a range of sources including 
archival data, laws and regulations, websites and newspapers. 
The subjectivist 
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The researcher believes that reality is socially constructed—in this case specifically, through 
the perceptions of those directly involved in corporate governance in Saudi Arabia—and thus 
the epistemological assumption here is anti-positivist. Both techniques assume that 
knowledge is gained through personal experiences and corporate governance practices, so 
this research sought the direct views and opinions of those involved in the external and 
internal governance systems. This study does not examine or try to predict relationships 
between different variables to understand a social phenomenon; rather, it attempts to gain 
first-hand knowledge from employees of Saudi listed petrochemical companies, regulators 
from the CMA and other individuals who are directly involved with corporate governance 
systems. 
The ontological and epistemological assumptions of this research led the researcher to use 
both ideographic and nomothetic methodological approaches because they help to create a 
comprehensive picture of the Saudi corporate governance system of listed petrochemical 
companies. This research uses qualitative methods, including interviews with relevant 
participants to determine their perceptions of the related issues. It also uses a nomothetic 
methodological approach because the AHP questionnaire is a mathematical method of data 
collection and analysis. The purpose here is to obtain and analyse data that can be used to 
interpret any similarities or differences in practices that emerge. The specific research 
methods adopted, the AHP questionnaires and the semi-structured interviews are now 
described. 
5.3 Research approach 
Research in the social sciences can use one of three research approaches—a qualitative 
approach (inductive), a quantitative approach (deductive) or a mixed approach (Veal 2005; 
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Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012)—each of which involves specific procedures, techniques 
and methods. Understanding these research approaches supports the choice of the appropriate 
research method. 
First, a qualitative approach can be defined as “an array of interpretive techniques which seek 
to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the 
frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world” (Van 
Maanen 1983, p. 9). The objective of a qualitative approach is to collect data rather than to 
determine outcomes (Merriam 2009). The main concern in this approach is meaning, which 
indicates how people create a detailed perspective of personal experience, and how they 
create a sense of their experiences (Merriam 2009). 
A qualitative approach has features such as flexibility and variety of interpretation, which 
help to understand phenomena, and “it focuses on naturally occurring, ordinary events in 
natural settings” (Miles & Huberman 1994, p. 10). This approach attempts to describe the 
effects of current practices by developing a deep understanding of the topic through different 
instruments (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002). Examples of qualitative methods 
include case studies, observation, interviews and focus groups (Creswell 2014).  
Second, a quantitative approach can be defined as “entailing the collection of numerical data 
and as exhibiting a view of the relationship between theory and research as deductive, a 
predilection for a natural science approach (and of positivism in particular), and as having an 
objectivist conception of social reality” (Bryman 2012, p. 62). A quantitative approach aims 
to build empirical models and hypotheses related to a particular area. The measurement 
process in this approach is very important because data are placed into a numerical system to 
examine relationships. Therefore, the objective findings of this approach help to understand 
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the relationships between variables or to predict results. Moreover, comparing numerical 
differences, which can be achieved by statistical measures (Glitz 1997), offers a significant 
level of understanding of relationships. Examples of quantitative methods include 
questionnaire surveys, tests and measures, and experiments (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 
2002). 
There are differences between inductive and deductive approaches. The first is the 
relationship of hypotheses to the research; the second is that an inductive approach tries to 
discover a deep understanding of the meaning of a phenomenon as it occurs in daily practice. 
In contrast, a deductive approach tries to make objective, scientific and statistical findings.  
The mixed-method approach can be described as using qualitative and quantitative methods 
in single study (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012). This approach helps to reduce any 
potential bias and enhances the reliability and validity of the results (Denzin 1989; Patton 
2015). The current study uses an AHP questionnaire, which is quantitative, and semi-
structured interviews, which are qualitative.  
One of the important issues in the mixed method approach is the order in which the different 
methods are app;ied: at the same time (parallel) or at different times (sequential) (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill 2012). There is need to nominate an arrangement because one method 
may influence the other. In this research, data from the two methods were collected in 
parallel to build a comprehensive picture of the impact that ownership structures have on the 
corporate governance systems of listed petrochemical companies in the SCM.  
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5.4 Conceptual design and research planning 
5.4.1 Data sources 
This research uses both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data are those are 
observed or collected directly by the researcher, such as surveys, observations and interviews; 
these data are more consistent with the research objectives because they are built, designed 
and collected to answer research questions for a particular research project (Ghauri & 
Grønhaug 2005). 
Secondary data are those that were observed or collected in related studies and reported in 
books, journals, conference papers, media, newspapers and the internet. They are useful for 
finding information relating to research questions and they provide a better understanding and 
explanation of research problems and settings (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2005). 
Primary and secondary sources are used in this research. Three direct primary data techniques 
are used (see Section 5.4.2) along with relevant examples, cases, laws, regulations and 
arguments. The use of both sources assists in understanding the concept of ownership 
structures and corporate governance systems, and the relationship between them. It also 
allows different settings that may be similar to Saudi Arabia to be examined; for instance, 
Italy has similar patterns of ownership structures, which makes it a useful example to 
investigate regarding the influence of ownership structures on corporate governance systems. 
5.4.2 Data collection techniques 
This research aims to explore the impact of ownership structure on the corporate governance 
system of listed petrochemical companies in the SCM. The choice of appropriate techniques 
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and procedures is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of this issue (Kirk & Miller 
1986). 
The interview is used as a template that contains a number of techniques for data collection. 
It is a well-developed tool that helps to examine institutions and their influence on people, 
organisations and markets (Greenwood & Suddaby 2006; Lounsbury 2007; Lok 2010). An 
interview is where personal contact occurs between the interviewer and the interviewee 
(Miller, Salkind & Miller 2002). 
Due to the complex impact of ownership structure on the corporate governance system of 
listed petrochemical companies in the Saudi Capital Market, three data collection techniques 
are used to collect primary data to explore the Saudi situation: demographic questions, the 
AHP and semi-structured interviews. Other data are collected from supportive sources such 
as archival data, Saudi laws and regulations, websites and newspapers. The following 
sections explain each of these techniques and the reasons behind their selection  
5.4.2.1 Demographic questions  
This method involves asking standardised questions that cover socio-biographical details 
such as age, gender and education. They are used to identify quantifiable subsets within a 
given population because they reveal some of the characteristics and attributes of 
participants. There are two advantages to gathering this information: it demonstrates the 
knowledge and expertise of the participants (necessary because completing AHP 
questionnaires requires experienced people), and participants’ characteristics and attributes 
may be linked with their responses to other types of questions.  
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5.4.2.2 The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
The AHP was developed in the 1970s by Thomas Saaty (Saaty 1980; Palmer 1999). It 
considers multi-criteria methodology for decision making because it reflects the way people 
think and behave. This method accelerates thought processes and broadens consciousness to 
include more factors in the decision-making process than would ordinarily be present (Saaty 
1999). It has proven to be a very effective decision analysis tool (Harker 1987). 
AHP can be defined as “a mathematical theory of value, reason and judgement, based on 
ratio scales for the analysis of multiple-criteria decision-making problems” (Eakin & 
Bojorquez-Tapiá 2008, p. 124). According to Saaty (1987, p. 161), “the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) is a general theory of measurement”. Podvezko (2009) indicates that AHP is 
mathematically grounded, so the physical and social domains can be measured using AHP 
(Saaty 1980, 1994a). In other words, AHP is a valuable tool when handling qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of data (Saaty 1980; Kurttila et al. 2000; Hafeez, Zhang & Malak 2002). 
AHP can be used when making complex and unstructured (Partovi 1994) decisions. Ali and 
Al Nsairat (2009, p. 1056) point out that “it can reduce complex decisions to a series of one-
on-one comparisons by assisting with identifying and weighting selection criteria, analysing 
the data collected for the criteria and expediting the decision-making process”. The decisions 
described by these criteria do not fit into a linear framework because they contain physical 
and psychological elements (Mian & Dai 1999). AHP can provide a better, easier and more 
efficient identification of selection criteria and their weighting. 
6 AHP is one of the most widely used, studied and refined decision-making techniques 
available (Samari et al. 2012). Saaty (2008) reports that the AHP method has been used in 
numerous settings and fields such as accounting and auditing, environmental fields, 
Chapter (5)  Methodology 
145 | P a g e  
urbanisation processes, public administration, and in military and political applications. It 
has also been used in many scientific studies in various accounting and auditing fields 
(e.g. Arrington, Hillison & Jensen 1984; Harper 1988, Schniederjans & Garvin 1997; 
Frezatti et al. 2011; Knott & Steube 2014). 
6.2.1.1.1 The Analytic Hierarchy Process methodology 
The AHP methodology is applied in four stages (Saaty 1980, 1987, 1999). Stage one involves 
understanding the structure of problems to build the AHP model; stage two collects data 
through pairwise comparisons; stage three determines the priority weights of individual 
factors; and stage four analyses the priority weights. These stages are used to structure and 
organise most of the research aspects in this study. 
I. Structuring problems and building the AHP model 
Secondary data are used to gain a comprehensive understanding of the problems and their 
relationships. This helps to hierarchically structure and formulate the AHP model as required 
for the analysis (Saaty 1980). There is a special structure for developing the hierarchy, which 
involves different levels of objective, criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives. Vargas (1990) 
shows there are three non-sequential interrelated phases (Figure 5.3): 
a) Level and element identification 
b) Concept definition 
c) Question formulation. 
To build and design an AHP model, deep experience, knowledge and an understanding of 
each problem and how the elements reflect them is required (Saaty & Vargas 1991) to ensure 
homogeneity between them. Saaty (1987, p. 162) argues that “the elements of a hierarchy are 
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grouped in clusters according to homogeneity and a level may consist of one or several 
homogeneous clusters”.  
These elements should then be defined and clarified to formulate the questions. The hierarchy 
of the structure of elements and levels must be tested to ensure that the questions reflect the 
problems. If the elements are not properly reflected in the questions, the research must 




After determining and defining the elements, the next step is to design and build a hierarchy 
that includes the first level, which is the objective or overall goal, followed by criteria and 
sub-criteria, which are used to reach the last level—alternatives (Saaty 1980, 1987). The 
hierarchy can be designed with a top-down or bottom-up structure. 
In this research, secondary sources are reviewed so that the concepts and relationships 
between the corporate governance system and ownership structure in Saudi Arabia and other 
countries can be fully understood. Based on this investigation, the elements are determined 
Identification of Levels 
and Concepts 
Definition of Concepts 
Question Formulation 
Hierarchy Evaluation 
Figure 5.3: The relationships between the phases of structuring hierarchy (Vargas 1990, p. 3) 
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and defined, and the resulting hierarchy is built and modified several times to ensure it is 
homogeneous and reflects the problem. 
The primary aim here is to investigate and improve the corporate governance system 
operating in the SCM. This overall objective can be divided into examinations of the external 
and internal governance systems. External governance systems are concerned with 
governance issues that are external to the company and over which the company has no direct 
influence. In external governance systems the sub-criteria are the legal and regulatory 
frameworks, external oversights and external auditors. Each of these sub-criteria is followed 
by factors on the lower and last level. Internal governance systems are concerned with 
governance issues that are inside a company and over which the company has direct 
influence. In internal governance systems the sub-criteria are the monitoring systems and 
board of directors, each of which is followed by factors on the lower, final level. The 
hierarchy in Figure 5.4 identifies significant factors influencing corporate governance 
systems. 
Figure 5.4 was created for this research based on the AHP methodology requirements (Saaty 
1980), which is the hierarchy proposed for this research. The last phase in this stage is to 
formulate questions with which the decision maker will evaluate the factors; this aspect is 
explained in detail in Section 5.8. 
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II. Pairwise comparisons 
The second stage involves a pairwise comparison where elements are compared in pairs to 
determine the level of importance of each element. In the AHP, expert estimates can be 
converted from qualitative to quantitative. Podvezko (2009, p. 182) suggests that “the 
comparison is qualitative and easy to perform”. According to Vargas (1990), when experts 
Figure 5.4: The proposed hierarchy for the AHP process in this study 
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answers the questions, they transform the information available into paired comparisons, in 
which the importance of one criterion is compared with another, and this determines the level 
to which the priority belongs. 
According to Vargas (1990, p. 2) “the comparisons are performed for the elements in a level 
with respect to all the elements in the level above”. An expert must first establish priorities 
for their main criteria by judging them in pairs to determine their relative importance (Saaty 
1987). The expert then compares every criterion in the second level of the hierarchy, while 
pairwise comparisons continue for each sub-criterion in the third level, down to the last level, 
which are the alternatives (Saaty 1987). After this, all pairwise comparisons in a matrix are 
generated, but the size of the matrix depends on the number of criteria (Saaty 1987). 
This stage is the data collection phase, which aims to collect data to determine the weights of 
all the elements. These are formatted to make them easier for participants to compare. 
Participants are asked to compare elements in the criteria, sub-criteria and factors at each 
level, with respect to corporate governance systems and ownership structures in the SCM.  
III. Priority weights 
The third stage in the AHP process is weighing the priorities. It can be considered as a 
processing stage because it depends mainly on the AHP software, which makes the 
calculations easy to carry out. It first ensures that the data collected for every element and 
from all participants are complete, and then calculates the consistency ratio. Judgements can 
be made on the importance of all the elements, and priorities can be computed for the 
hierarchy tree as a whole; although priorities can be recalculated throughout, with or without 
changing the judgements (Saaty 1990). 
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The first step in this research is to ensure that every participant has completed all the 
comparisons; the second step is to enter the answers from the AHP questionnaires into the 
Expert Choice software; and the third step is to view the consistency ratio to ensure that all 
the answers are valid. When all previous steps have been confirmed, it is possible to move to 
the next stage. 
IV. Synthesis 
A final evaluation of the decision alternatives’ performance on the basis of the lowest-level 
criterion in the hierarchy (Lirn, Thanopoulou & Beresford 2003) is considered to be the final 
stage, because it aims to give an overall score for each option by combining the option score 
with the weight of the criterion. A synthesis is used to weigh the eigenvectors by the weights 
of the criteria such that a sum of all the weighted eigenvector entries corresponds to those in 
the next lowest level of the hierarchy (Al-Harbi 2001).  
The software enables the results to be presented in different forms, which is a significant 
advantage. The nature of the AHP results is statistically descriptive, not inferential, because 
they are the expert’s perceptions of the evaluated factors. This means that the research does 
not claim to offer solutions or determine how high the quality of the corporate governance 
systems should be. This study uses three types of results: detailed synthesis, summarised 
synthesis and sensitivity analysis, all of which are shown in numerical and graphical forms. 
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Figure 5.5 shows the operational process as highlighted by Saaty (2008, p. 85); it also shows 
the main characteristics of the application of AHP, and details of the process of the AHP 
methodology. 
5.4.2.2.2 Scale comparison  
According to Vargas (1990, p. 2), “this process of comparison yields a relative scale of 
measurement of the priorities or weights of the elements”. The AHP method has a nine-point 
scale for evaluations (Saaty 1980, 1994b, 2000, 2008) that covers the entire spectrum of 
Establish preliminary evaluation perspectives 
Select evaluation indictors 
Questionnaire design 
Questionnaire collection 
Set up comparative matrix in pairs 









Figure 5.5: The operational process of the AHP (Saaty 2008, p. 85) 
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comparisons (Vaidya & Kumar 2006), and is therefore used to evaluate dimensions and 
criteria, and factors and alternatives. According to Saaty (1980), the nine-point scale is 
widely used as a standard rating system for applications of AHP. 
If a participant evaluates a criterion at point 1, this indicates that the two elements selected 
have equal significance, but if they evaluate it at point 2–9, one of the elements is more 
significant than the other with respect to the research aim. Table 5.1 shows the meanings of 
each number in the nine-point scale. 
  
Figure 5.6 is an example of the nine-point scale included in the AHP questionnaire. 
Participants are required to compare the importance of factor A with factor B. There are three 
scenarios. In the first, if two factors (A and B) are evaluated with equal importance, 
participants choose (1). Second, if factor A is more important than factor B, they choose a 
number between 2 and 9 from the left depending on the factor’s level of importance (as in 
Table 5.1). Third, if factor B is considered more important, they choose a number from 2 to 9 




1 Equally The two factors are equally important 
2 Equally to moderately The factor is equally to moderately important 
3 Moderately The factor is moderately important 
4 Moderately to strongly The factor is moderately to strongly important 
5 Strongly The factor is strongly important 
6 Strongly to very strongly The factor is strongly to very strongly important 
7 Very strongly The factor is very strongly important 
8 Very strongly to Extremely The factor is very strongly to Extremely important 
9 Extremely The factor is Extremely important 
A 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 B 
Table 5.1: The nine-point scale (Saaty 2008, p. 86) 
 
 
11Table 5.1: The nine-point scale Figure 5.6: The nine-point scale in the questionnaire format 
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5.4.2.2.3 Consistency Ratio 
The consistency ratio (CR) acts like a measurement to check the consistency of judgements 
made by participants (Saaty 1994a, 1994b; Cheng & Li 2002; Ishizaka & Labib 2009). The 
consistency test computes the consistency level of each matrix (Cheng & Li 2002). This 
distinctive characteristic of AHP enhances the robustness of collected data because it 
monitors the consistency of the data. The CR is one of the advantages of AHP, but it is also 
considered to be the main concern in the AHP method. 
The CR illustrates the level of consistency of the pairwise comparisons, which causes the 
researcher to reflect on whether to consider the results to be consistent or whether to conduct 
the pairwise comparisons again. Saaty (1980) suggests a range of acceptable CRs; beyond 
that range, the pairwise comparisons need to be redone to achieve the required consistency. 
The CRs in this study are within the range of acceptability. 
Saaty (1980) indicates that the CR has to follow a particular numerical scope of [0.0 to 0.1] 
(Table 5.2); acceptable CR values are based on the sizes of the matrices. For example, the CR 
value for a 3 × 3 matrix is 0.05, for a 4 × 4 matrix, 0.08 and for larger matrices, 0.10 (Saaty 
1994b; Cheng & Li 2002; Ishizaka & Labib 2009). If the CR value is less than the acceptable 
values, the weighted results are consistent and valid, but if the CR value is larger than the 
acceptable values, the results are inconsistent and require further analysis. 
It is not uncommon to obtain inconsistent judgements during pairwise comparisons because 
of an inaccurate assessment or lack of understanding of the element, so if the consistency 
ratio is larger than the set values, the participant must revaluate the pairwise comparison until 
the CR becomes less than the set values (Figure 5.5). 
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5.4.2.2.4 AHP software 
A number of commercial and free software programs exist to carry out computations specific 
to the AHP methodology. Most of these programs offer the same results, some in different 
forms. One popular commercial AHP software program is Expert Choice (Knott & Steube 
2014). This software, developed by Expert Choice Inc., is used by various public and private 
organisations, such as the US Government and large corporations, to make complex decisions 
(Palmer 1999).  
The data acquired in this research via AHP questionnaires are analysed using Expert Choice 
software because it synthesises the pairwise comparison matrix, prioritises each element, 
calculates the CR and evaluates the consistency of the pairwise comparison matrix (Al-Harbi 
2001). It also provides results for each participant and a combined group or total participants 
in a variety of formats including detailed and summarised results.  
5.4.2.2.5 AHP advantages and disadvantages  




Value of CR Result/Action 
≥ 0.1 Pairwise judgement requires re-evaluation 
< 0.1 Judgement consistent and acceptable 
= 0.0 Theoretical best fit judgement 
Table 5.2: The numerical scope of CR  
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Advantages Disadvantages 
1 
Deals with both qualitative and quantitative 
criteria (Leung & Cao 2001)  
1 
Difficult for participants to transform verbal 
expressions to numbers because they may 
have different numerical interpretations 
(Markala & Jumpponen 2006); they may, 
for example, become confused when 
choosing between importance level 3 or 4 
because they are very close together 
2 
Does not use syllogisms, but allows for 
dependence and feedback, and making 
numerical trade-offs to arrive at a synthesis 
or conclusion (Saaty1987) 
2 
The pairwise judgements can be ambiguous 




Is a cluster and nonlinear method that 
allows the weights of criteria to be 
determined at a particular hierarchical level 
with respect to those at a higher level 
(Podvezko 2009) 
3 
The 1–9 scale limits the relationships 
between the weightings (Markala & 
Jumpponen 2006) 
4 
Simplicity and robustness are the success 
elements of AHP; it is easy to implement 
and can handle complex problems 
(Banuelas & Antony 2004) 
5 
The consistency ratio is an advantage 
because it calculates the consistency level 
of each comparison (Cheng & Li 2002) 
6 





Table 5.3: The advantages and disadvantages of AHP  
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5.4.2.3 Semi-structured interviews  
The interview is the most commonly used method in qualitative research (Burgess 1997) 
because it involves a conversation between two or more people where the interviewer asks 
questions to elicit facts, opinions, perceptions, thoughts or ideas about a specific topic: 
“[i]nterviews are ways of listening to and gaining an understanding of people’s stories” 
(Bolderston 2012, p. 68). A semi-structured interview is used in this research to gain a deep 
understanding of how ownership structure influences the corporate governance systems of 
Saudi listed petrochemical companies. 
5.4.2.3.1 The purpose of using interviews 
Interviews are used to collect reliable and relevant evidence related to the research questions 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009) and to the methodological assumptions of the research. 
Qualitative research methods are used because they explore and study social phenomena, 
offer a rich description of social phenomena and enable social phenomena to be explained 
(Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2011). 
Qualitative research is also a useful tool for filling any gaps that occur in quantitative analysis 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012), and is an effective approach for understanding complex 
phenomena (Eisenhardt 1989b). A semi-structured interview enables details, insights and 
understanding of perceptions, beliefs, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, experiences, processes, 
behaviours and the predictions of participants directly related to the topic (May 1997; Smith 
1981; Bolderston 2012). A semi-structured interview technique also results in explanations 
and interpretations that either support or refute the results reached through other techniques.  
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5.4.2.3.2 The interview types  
Interviews can be categorised based on their format or the structure of their questions. 
According to Bolderston (2012), interviews can include face-to-face, group, telephone, email 
or internet interviews. Bolderston (2012) also determined that interviews should include 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured questions (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree 2006; 
Merriam 2009). 
This research uses face-to-face interviews and semi-structured interview questions. Face-to-
face interviews are chosen because they lead to a congenial atmosphere (Bryman 2012) 
allowing rapport between the interviewer and interviewee, which increases interest and 
confidence in the project (Barriball & While 1994). The interviewer can motivate the 
interviewee—which is difficult using a questionnaire (Gordon 1980—with interaction and 
clarifications. Moreover, the face-to-face interview, unlike telephone or email interviews, 
captures body language such as facial expressions (Bryman 2012). 
The interview questions are semi-structured to elicit more qualitative information (Clarke 
1999). Moreover, a semi-structured format focuses on the research topics, while being 
flexible about course tajeb by the interview (Merriam 2009). It also follows a less rigid 
format (Clarke 1999) because it contains structured open-ended questions that allow the 
interviewer to raise more interceptor questions,
16
 and it the interviewer to probe for more 
information and clarification of answers (Barriball & While 1994).  
The semi-structured format is also well suited to exploring the perceptions and opinions of 
interviewees with regards to complex and sensitive issues, and the set questions can be varied 
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 Interceptor questions or unstructured questions are questions asked based on the answers of the participant or 
others. 
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depending on the professional, educational, and personal history of a participant (Barriball & 
While 1994). It is also a good method with participants for whom English is not their first or 
second language (Barriball & While 1994). 
5.4.2.3.3 The interview process 
One way of acquiring interview skills is by understanding the interview process. According 
to Kvale and Brinkmann (2015), the craft of conducting research interviews could be learned 
by knowing something about the process from texts and other advice, putting it into practice, 
reflecting on the process and revisiting the texts. This section clarifies the actual interview 
process used in this research, which is developed based on texts, advice and pilot interviews. 
i. Interview questions 
The most important part of the interview process is formulating the interview questions. This 
section discusses three issues related to interview questions: their formulation, sources and 
topics. Formulating interview questions raises issues such as selecting open-ended questions, 
which allow the interviewee to say whatever they want about an issue and to tell a story in 
their own words (Bolderston 2012); these questions aim to elicit more than ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
answers. 
Next, the questions must be clear, short and understandable (Bolderston 2012); thus they 
must be clear in language and constructed to be accessible by interviewees. The words and 
terminology must be unified to ensure consistency between the research methods; in this 
study, the words and terminology are defined and explained in the aid documents. Finally, the 
questions are not directly related to a particular company or organisation, which prevents 
interviewees from disclosing information that might present their company in a negative 
light. 
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Interview questions emanate mainly from the research objectives and problems, but they are 
also based on the literature and studies related to corporate governance systems and 
ownership structures in general, and those in developing countries and the Saudi context. 
These sources include data gathered from supportive sources such as reports from boards of 
directors, as well as local and international cases and examples such as the Parmalat case, the 
Enron case and the Mohammad Al Mojil Group
17
 case. 
The interview questions cover four main topics: (1) general questions about Saudi corporate 
governance systems and ownership structure; (2) external governance systems; (3) internal 
governance systems; and (4) improvements in external and internal corporate governance 
systems. They are harmonised with the AHP questionnaires and research objectives and 
problems. 
The interview questions were reviewed and revised several times to ensure they are valid. 
Bolderston (2012, p. 69) claims that ‘it is well worth taking the time to get them right’, so in 
general, interview questions should be understandable, easy, accessible and focused on the 
research; they should not be complex or leading, have too many requirements, or be 
ambiguous or unclear. The reason for ensuring the quality of the questions is to ensure that 
participants provide accurate information that helps answer the research questions.  
ii. Interview language  
The official language in Saudi Arabia is Arabic, although English is used as the business 
language. The documents involved in the interview were written in English and translated 
into Arabic. Each version was revised and reviewed several times with respect to the 
language to ensure that clarity and meanings were not lost. Before the pilot test, a draft copy 
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was passed to a number of English- and Arabic-speaking people to check the grammar and 
meaning, and pilot tests were conducted with English- and Arabic-speaking participants. 
Finally, the answers were translated into English. 
The interviews were conducted in Arabic because it is the language of the country in which 
the study took place. A great deal of effort was taken to avoid any significant language 
barriers and to account for differences in the level of sophistication in the use of English 
between the interviewees. This should reduce any bias, which can be minimised by using 
simple, clear, short and precise questions, and avoiding technical, vague and colloquial 
language (Choi & Pak 2005). 
It was expected that interviews would be conducted with non-Arabic-speaking participants 
because there are many non-Saudi and non-Arabic-speaking employees in most companies in 
Saudi Arabia; so as specified, the interviews were finalised in Arabic and English, and the 
non-Arabic-speaking participants were interviewed in English.  
iii. Timing 
The length of an interview depends on the nature of the research questions and the research 
strategy (Rowley 2012). The timing must be appropriate: there are negative consequences if 
interviews are too long or too short. For example, spending a longer time with an interviewee 
can result in a deeper relationship (Bolderston 2012), which could lead to ‘drowning in a sea 
of data’ (Rowley 2012), whereas spending a short time can provide reasonable data, but the 
interviewee may not answer the questions fully. 
The interviews consisted of demographic questions, AHP questionnaires, and semi-structured 
interview questions, but they also involved other aspects such as explaining the AHP method 
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and raising ethical considerations. The target interviewees were at senior levels in their 
companies and organisations, so they did not have much time to participate in the interview 
process. Data collection took place at the end of one financial year and the beginning of the 
next financial year, which are very busy periods for financial departments. There are also 
other useful tools; for example, a recorded interview takes less time because the interviewer 
takes fewer notes, but in practice, most interviews were not recorded, which extended the 
time a little. 
Selecting the right length of time for interviews also required planning, so after formulating 
the initial interview sections, each interview was planned to take 45 minutes. The second 
stage required testing the timing through pilot interviews. These ranged from 40 minutes to 
one hour and 40 minutes, after which it was deemed that a one-hour interview would be 
appropriate. 
iv. Preparing the protocol 
The interview protocol is a summary of most of the research aspects, and it may include the 
purpose of the study and the steps to be followed (Bolderston 2012). A protocol is also 
required by the Ethics Committee of the university within which this was conducted, and it 
must include the following oral and written elements:  
- Research title 
- Research purpose  
- Researchers  
- What we would like to do 
- Sample of the research questions 
- Possible risks, inconveniences and discomforts 
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- Findings and benefits of the research  
- Ethics review and complaints  
v. Managing the interview 
Before conducting the interviews the protocol and all required documents, such as questions 
and aid documents, were prepared. Various issues influence the management of interviews 
(Bolderston 2012), but the main role of the interviewer is focusing on the research issues and 
questions because the discussion could turn to other topics. Moreover, interviewees are given 
the required information so they are aware of their rights and responsibilities, instructions for 
doing AHP and definitions of the terms used. 
The location should be private and quiet, and allow for uninterrupted conversation. All the 
interviews were conducted in the participants’ offices, which were private and quiet, but 
distractions such as telephone calls, mobile devices and the entrance of other employees 
could not be entirely eliminated. However, the interviewees were aware of this and tried their 
best to reduce distractions, or allowed the interview time to be extended. 
The plan was to audiotape all interviews and also take notes. Thus it was important to check 
the recording equipment beforehand. Since the participants volunteered their time, the 
interviewer was keen to start and finish within the agreed period, but if there was to be an 
extension, then permission would need to be granted by the interviewee.  
vi. The interview analysis 
Analysis is considered to be a continuous process. Cresswell (2014) suggests that data 
analysis is spiral, commencing at the beginning of the research and growing continuously to 
the end. The interviews in this study were analysed at three levels. First, while preparing the 
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AHP questionnaires and semi-structured questions, an initial image of the analysis process 
was created. Second, there was a brief analysis after each interview, which allowed the 
discovery of any practical issues to improve future interviews. Third, a basic analysis helped 
facilitate the final analysis of the project as a whole. A thematic coding system was used for 
the semi-structured interviews.   
- The thematic coding system 
A coding system was used to organise the collected data into themes to give them meaning 
that would eventually align with the aims and objectives of the research (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane 2006). According to Braun and Clarke (2006), there are six phases of thematic 
analysis, which may be similar to other qualitative research methods. 
The first phase is ‘familiarising yourself with your data’, where the researcher prepares and 
reads the data. For example, the data is transcribed and translated, and then there are several 
rounds of reading and noting in order to identify ideas. The second phase is ‘generating initial 
codes’ based on readings; codes of interesting features of the data are created systematically 
from the entire data set. Boyatzis (1998, p. 1) defines a ‘good code’ as one that captures the 
qualitative richness of a phenomenon. The data must then be gathered based on these codes. 
The third phase is ‘searching for themes’, where all the relevant codes are gathered into 
potential themes. Boyatzis (1998, p. 161) explains a theme as ‘a pattern in the information 
that at minimum describes and organises the possible observations and at maximum interprets 
aspects of the phenomenon’. The fourth phase is ‘defining and naming themes’, which is an 
‘ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, 
generating clear definitions and names for each theme’ (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 87). 
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The fifth phase is ‘reviewing themes’. It is important to create a thematic map that shows the 
links and relationships among the codes and themes. They must be reviewed to finalise new 
links or relationships. The sixth phase is ‘producing the report’. Writing the final report is the 
last phase of the analysis because it links the themes and codes to the research question and 
literature. This should not be left to the end, because ‘writing is an integral part of analysis, 
not something that takes place at the end, as it does with statistical analyses’ (Braun & Clarke 
2006). 
There are several important things to note. First, there are two ways to determine themes in a 
thematic analysis: they can be pre-determined before entering the analysis stage or found 
after reading the interviews (Braun & Clarke 2006). This research uses both methods. This is 
a benefit of the AHP methodology because the elements in the AHP model
18
 were used as 
themes. However, other important issues were found when reading the interviews that had 
not been captured in the AHP model. 
Second, thematic analysis is not a linear process, so it does not move from one phase to 
another. It is a recursive process in which it is better to go back and forth between phases as 
needed (Braun & Clarke 2006). The analytical process develops over the study period, which 
‘should not be rushed’ (Braun & Clarke 2006), so that the researcher can obtain the best 
possible outcomes. 
Third, it is possible to complete the coding manually, by reading and noting the codes and the 
themes used in the research, or automatically, by putting the data into a software program that 
links the data to the codes and themes (Braun & Clarke 2006).  
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vii. Avoiding “cherry picking”  
Specific criteria were used to avoid ‘cherry picking’ in this study.
19
 The themes were 
structured based on links or relationships to the AHP factors, and the issues could be 
classified as important depending on their relationship to the research topic. Quotes were 
taken to demonstrate these issues, but their importance depended on their links to the issue, 
their importance to the interviewee and their repetition by the interviewees. Several cases 
highlighted differences of opinion about an issue. The findings from the interviews are 
supported by AHP results to highlight consistent results. 
5.4.2.4 Supportive data sources 
In addition to the primary data collection techniques, this research used a number of 
supportive data sources that were very beneficial as they revealed the actual situation for 
Saudi listed petrochemical companies and corporate governance systems. They also explored 
most of the existing corporate governance systems in these listed companies and the SCM, 
identified deficiencies in aspects of the corporate governance systems and assisted in most 
aspects of the research, such as building interview questions.  
5.4.2.4.1 Archival data  
Archival data are those that already exist publicly or privately, such as financial information 
gathered for reporting purposes as a result of completed activities. This type of data is 
collected before investigating the research objective, which facilitates the other data 
collection methods. 
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goal. 
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The archival data in this research were collected from board of director reports produced by a 
company to present its financial and non-financial indicators. In the SCM, the SCGRs require 
that from 2009, listed companies include in their annual reports a section called ‘Board of 
Directors Report’. Companies are also required to disclose important financial and non-
financial information about various matters, along with certain information to the public via 
their own website or the Tadawul website. 
5.4.2.4.2 Laws and regulations 
A number of laws and regulations relate to corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. There are 
also specific laws and regulations that relate to corporate governance systems on which the 
CMA relies, as others that relate to corporate governance for particular groups. For example, 
the SAMA issues corporate governance principles for the financial sector in Saudi Arabia. In 
addition to Saudi laws and regulations, corporate governance regulations, laws and codes 
from other countries helped focus this research (e.g. the ICGCs and SOX).  
5.4.2.4.3 Websites 
Websites are an important source of information because most companies and agencies use 
them to provide information additional to their annual reports. These company websites 
provide more information about various aspects of the company, such as the board of 
directors, executive management, major shareholders and subsidiaries. This information can 
be accessed easily and for free. In this research, important information was accessed through 
websites. The CMA website has extensive information about laws, regulations, 
communication and news; the Tadawul website has information about listed companies, their 
annual or part-yearly reports, news and major shareholders. The websites of a number of 
other organisations, such as the SAMA, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and SOCPA 
also offer valuable information.  
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5.4.2.4.4 Newspapers 
Newspapers contain opinions and views of specialists in economics, finance and accounting 
about corporate governance systems in Saudi Arabia. These can help to strengthen the 
background of the research. Moreover, there is news that relates to many aspects of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia (e.g. trading suspensions, sanctions, appointments and changes in 
company management). 
5.5 The sample  
Sampling is the process of selecting groups, people or cases for the research project 
(Graziano & Raulin 2007). Since it is difficult and expensive to collect data from an entire 
population due to their size and dispersion, the goal is to find a representative sample (or 
subset) of a particular population. Neuman (2014) indicates that this sort of sample will 
represent the population and is a more manageable group to work with than the whole 
population or a pool of cases. 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) suggest that data collection using theoretical sampling can help a 
researcher identify concepts and themes pertinent to a research problem. Hussey and Hussey 
(1997) list three points as the basis of a good sample: random choice, which means that every 
participant has an equal chance of being selected; a sample size sufficient for the 
investigation being undertaken; and minimisation of bias. 
The sample in this study is the same for the AHP method and the semi-structured interview, 
so that the AHP results can be compared to the semi-structured interviews.  
5.5.1 Sample plan  
The most important question is how participants should be selected. Rowley (2012, p. 264) 
points out that ‘the findings of your research depend critically upon your selection of 
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interviewees’. Participants in this study were selected based on their insight into, and 
understanding of, the research issues (Bolderston 2012). That is, they were expected to have 
the necessary knowledge, expertise and experience of corporate governance systems in Saudi 
Arabia; to be fairly homogenous and share critical similarities related to the research question 
(DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree 2006); and were employees in organisations related to the Saudi 
listed petrochemical companies, the CMA or external auditing firms. 
One of the main factors is gaining access to potential participants (Rowley 2012) because 
without access, there will be no data. However, as the participants belong to the highest levels 
of management, access was an issue for this study. Participants should be willing and 
available at suitable times (Bolderston 2012), so interviews were carried out over a three-
month period. If interviewing the highest manager became impossible, the interview request 
went to the next level of management. For example, if the CFO was not available during that 
time, the Deputy CFO was asked to be interviewed. Some companies have an employee who 
is responsible for their corporate governance system, so they have the relevant experience and 
knowledge.  
5.5.2 Sample size  
This section addresses the question of how many participants should be included. Neither of 
the methods used specify a particular number of participants. The AHP technique is very 
flexible with regard to sample size because it examines the opinions of a decision maker, who 
could be one of many participants: ‘[p]airwise comparisons are obtained through surveying 
either the whole population or a sample of decision-makers’ (Lirn, Thanopoulou & Beresford 
2003). However, semi-structured interviews are a qualitative research method; Bolderston 
(2012) notes they are unlike quantitative research, which requires a large number of 
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participants. There is no ideal number of interviews or cases, but 4–10 is often deemed 
satisfactory (Eisenhardt 1989b). 
The industry participants in this research came from three types of organisation including one 
from each of the 14 petrochemical companies listed in the SCM. The participants must be in 
the highest level of financial management who can set, approve and oversee the overall 
internal governance systems of the company. The interviews involved either the CFO or his 
most highly ranked representative. 
The regulatory agency is the CMA, which is responsible for corporate governance systems in 
Saudi Arabia. It includes a corporate governance department, which has two divisions. Three 
participants were selected from the corporate governance department: one was the head of the 
department and two were the heads of the two divisions. 
External auditing firms were used as external consultants, so one participant was chosen from 
each of the four largest firms responsible for corporate governance. The participants worked 
as either partner or manager of the corporate governance department in the audit firm. This 
brought the total number of participants to 21. The participants’ organisations were located in 
Riyadh, Jubail, Damam, Khobar, Jeddah, Yanbo and Rabig. 
5.6 Ethics 
Ethical considerations are an important issue in qualitative research because they tend to 
involve personal and interpersonal issues. In-depth interviews explore people’s perceptions 
and experience, and thus are naturally more intrusive than quantitative approaches (Patton 
2015). With qualitative methods, the researcher is in a powerful position in relation to 
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individuals because the researcher controls what information is gathered and how it is 
recorded, interpreted and reported (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002). 
5.6.1 Ethics procedures at the University of Wollongong 
The systems and regulations at the University of Wollongong state that if research involves 
human participants, ethics approval must be obtained, and there are certain procedures that 
must be followed to gain this approval. The research team must complete and sign a Human 
Research Ethics Committee (HREC) application, which includes eight sections: 1) general 
information about the research and the research team; 2) financial support for the research; 3) 
the research methods and analysis; 4) ethical considerations; 5) risks and benefits; 6) 
participants; 7) the consent process; and 8) confidentiality and privacy. Other documents such 
as the Participant Information Sheet, consent form, interview questions and any other 
document supplied to participants must also be attached to the application. 
5.6.2 Ethics approval  
The HREC reviewed the application and other documents for this study several times to 
clarify the rights and responsibilities of participants. An example of a missing element was 
that the interview was planned to be ‘anonymous’ but that nothing had been included in the 
Participant Information Sheet to inform the interviewees about confidentiality and privacy; as 
a result, the Participant Information Sheet was changed to include sentences such as ‘[t]o 
assure the confidentiality and privacy, the provided information will not cross to any other 
participants inside or outside the organisation’. Finally, after several reviews, on 14
 
August 
2014, the HREC approved the application. 
Later on there were new documents and changes to the interview questions, such as a new 
section containing demographic questions. AHP instructions and an AHP comparison scale 
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were also included. Moreover, after the pilot test the length of each interview was changed to 
one hour. The amended application was submitted and approval was granted on 16 October 
2014.   
5.6.3 Ethical issues during the interviews 
This study did not experience any ethical issues because it followed the university’s 
requirements and guidelines. The participants were informed both in writing and verbally 
about their rights and responsibilities, and signed consent forms without reservations or 
objections. The data were collected, saved and utilised in this research in accordance with 
previous agreement by the participants. There were no impediments, amendments or changes 
to the data provided by the participants, and no issues that influenced the rights or 
responsibilities of the participants at any stage of this research.  
5.7 Pilot test  
When the final draft of an interview is developed, it must be tested by a number of experts, 
academics and other relevant people (Jacob & Furgerson 2012). The pilot test is a significant 
stage before the actual data are collected because it validates the quality of the interview 
sections and its documents. Pilot interviews assess the timing, validity, appropriateness, 
clarity and completeness of the contents with respect to the subject domain and purpose 
(Barriball & While 1994). Some issues can be badly worded or the questions confusing, both 
of which influence the validity of the process (Seidman 2012). Therefore, the pilot test aims 
to identify the need for any changes and modifications to improve the quality of the interview 
process. It is important to note that pilot interviews took place after the HREC had approved 
the interview plans and questions. 
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There is no ideal number of pilot tests. Rowley (2012) suggests there may be only one, or the 
number can be unlimited, but several pilot interviews should always be conducted before the 
study (Bolderston 2012). In this research, pilot interviews were conducted with four 
volunteers from the University of Wollongong: a male academic from the Engineering 
Faculty, a female academic from the School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, a male 
Saudi PhD student from the Financial Mathematics School, and a PhD student in accounting. 
5.7.1 Identified issues  
Some issues emerged from the pilot interviews, which ranged from 40 minutes to 1 hour and 
40 minutes. The planned time of 45 minutes proved too short because the AHP method had 
not been used before, so the participants asked more questions. Not all the participants had 
read all the documents, which were provided in advance so as not to confuse or distract them 
during the interview; some terms were not defined; and there were typing errors in the 
questions. 
Some interviewees gave useful answers because most of the questions and aid documents 
were clear and understandable. The AHP technique was clearly introduced and explained. 
The ethics documents were presented clearly.  
5.7.2 Possible changes and implications 
All emerging issues were considered, and the optimal interview time was set at one hour. It 
was determined that important information including definitions of terminology would be 
provided both in writing and verbally, and that typing errors would be fixed. 
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5.8 The final instrument  
Preparing the final instrument was an onerous task that required attention to different aspects 
such as clarity, ethics and language. In the final instrument, each participant would be handed 
three types of documents: aid documents that clarified and described the method and terms; 
ethics documents that outlined the rights and responsibilities of the interviewer and 
interviewee; and questionnaires that included demographic questions, AHP questionnaires 
and semi-structured interview questions. 
5.8.1 Explanatory documents (aid documents)20 
These explanatory documents were designed to ensure the participant understood and 
comprehended the topic and the methods. The first document was a cover sheet with a 
general overview of each section in the interview. The second document contained 
instructions for the AHP questionnaire; an introduction to the AHP method; and examples of 
how to complete AHP, which is rarely used in PhD research and involves some specialised 
techniques. The third document was an AHP comparison scale with information about 
relative importance. The fourth document provided a list of definitions for how particular 
terms would be used in the interviews, because some terms have different meanings. 
5.8.2 Ethics21   
The ethics documents were submitted to inform the participants of their ethical rights and 
responsibilities. The first document was the Participant Information Sheet containing general 
information about the research, sample questions, the findings and benefits of the research, 
possible risks, communication details, ethics review and complaints procedure. The second 
document was a copy of the ethics approval explaining that the research instrument had been 
                                                          
20
 Appendices B, C, and D. 
21
 Appendices E, F, G, H, and I. 
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tested by the University of Wollongong HREC, to gain the confidence and trust of the 
participants. The third ethics document was a consent form to be signed by the participants to 
show they agreed with what they had read and understood their rights and responsibilities. It 
also included a question about audiotaping the interview. 
5.8.3 Demographic questions22  
Every participant was handed a document containing seven demographic questions; some 
questions were multiple choice; others required a specific answer. 
5.8.4 The AHP questionnaire23 
The AHP questionnaire contained eight questions divided into three parts: general, internal 
governance systems and external governance system. Each part was handed to the participant 
separately. The AHP questionnaire commenced with a brief introduction to AHP, followed 
by the questions, each of which involved a pairwise comparison. 
5.8.5 Semi-structured interview questions24 
The third section in the interview contained 11 open-ended questions divided into four 
sections: general, internal governance systems, external governance system and 
improvements. There were three forms of questions based on the interviewee groups. 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter discussed the methodology used in the research process. It included the research 
philosophy, which requires the researcher to open their mind to possibilities that could enrich 
and enhance their research skills and confidence in using appropriate methodologies. Based 
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 Appendices J and K. 
23
 Appendices L and M. 
24
 Appendices N and O. 
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on the researcher’s ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions, this 
research adopted qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
Adopting qualitative and quantitative research methods results in increased opportunities to 
understand people’s experience. This interview tool was used as a template for data 
collection, and it included demographic questions, an AHP questionnaire and semi-structured 
interview questions. Data were collected from three types of organisation: listed 
petrochemical companies, the corporate governance department in the CMA, and external 
auditing firms. Twenty-one participants were included. All interviews were conducted in 
person. 
The next two chapters report on and analyse the findings from the three stages of data 
collection. Both chapters are structured based on the AHP model to ensure consistency 
between the results and findings. Chapter 6 presents the results obtained from the 
demographic questions and AHP questionnaires, and Chapter 7 describes the results of the 
semi-structured interviews.   
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Chapter 6: Results and Findings (1) 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the philosophical assumptions underpinning this research and 
elucidated the approaches used to gather primary data. It clarified how a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches is used, including the design and process of data 
collection, the demographic survey, the AHP methodology, and semi-structured interviews. It 
also provided information on the sample, ethical considerations, pilot tests, and final 
instrument. 
The results and findings are presented, described, and analysed sequentially in this chapter 
and the next, with this chapter describing and analysing the results and findings of the 
demographic survey and the AHP method.  
The first section describes the use of demographic questions to identify quantifiable subsets 
within a given population and provide general personal information. The second section 
describes the use of AHP questionnaires to reach the most important systems, categories, and 
factors via participant evaluation of elements from the proposed framework for corporate 
governance systems. The results of the semi-structured interview questions are discussed in 
the following chapter.  
This chapter is organised as follows: the next section outlines the interviews and information 
about the interviewees, the following section shows the findings and analysis, and the final 
section summarises this chapter.  
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6.2 Information about the interviews 
The interviews were divided such that every component of the interview and its documents 
were handed out separately to ensure that every participant received all components of the 
interview, read each one, understood the requirements and focused on one component at a 
time. Each interview consisted of an introduction, ethics considerations, a consent form, 
demographic questions, three components of AHP and semi-structured interview questions.  
The documents contained a written explanation, which was backed up by an oral explanation 
to ensure that each participant received the information required, even if they had not read the 
documents. Ethical considerations are an important aspect of interviews because they outline 
the rights and responsibilities of every participant. The Participant Information Sheet 
demonstrated that the study had been assessed by the Ethics Committee at the university, and 
that if any ethical issues arose the participant could contact the researcher, supervisors, and/or 
Ethics Committee. Every participant was asked to sign a consent form that confirmed that 
they knew and understood their rights and responsibilities. 
Participants were free to complete an interview or refuse to attend; they were free to raise 
questions about any issue at any time during the interview; and their identities are not 
disclosed nor is any of their personal information used at any time. Sufficient time was set 
aside to fully conduct the interview to ensure that every participant had time to read and 
understand the questions, and ask for an extension of time if required. 
6.3 Information about the interviewees 
Data were collected by interviewing relevant people, most of whom were senior employees 
responsible for corporate governance systems in their organisation. There were 21 
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participants. The sample categorised participants as insiders or outsiders according to their 
relationship with a petrochemical company, to gain a comprehensive view of corporate 
governance in the petrochemical industries sector in the SCM. 
The outsiders—interviewees from outside the Saudi listed petrochemical companies—were 
of two types. The first type included employees from the corporate governance department in 
the CMA, and the second type included employees responsible for corporate governance 
systems in external auditing firms. There were seven outside participants: three from the 
CMA and four from external auditing firms. 
The insiders were senior employees from Saudi listed petrochemical companies. This 
research focused on the highest level of financial management who were responsible for 
setting corporate governance systems in their company. One participant from each of the 14 
Saudi listed petrochemical companies was interviewed. These inside participants had diverse 
roles, but they all worked at senior levels of their companies’ financial departments, such as 
CFOs, or as heads of the accounting department. 
Outsiders typically expressed views and opinions on external matters of corporate 
governance systems within their area of expertise, but they were also asked to express views 
on internal corporate governance systems. The insiders were also asked about internal and 
external corporate governance systems. This enabled the researcher to understand how each 
group saw the work of the others, to increase the depth of analysis in this study. 
6.4 The analysis and findings 
The following sections outline the analysis and findings regarding the demographic questions 
and AHP questionnaires. 
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6.4.1 The demographic questions 
The participants were asked seven demographic questions to provide the general 
characteristics and attributes of the sample, and to demonstrate their knowledge and 
expertise. The questions varied between multiple choice and straight answers; they were 
general questions seeking no specific personal information such as names, jobs, or 
organisations. Participants were only asked about gender, age, nationality, education, 
specialisation, and years of experience in the current position and in financial or accounting 






(95%) Male &  
(5%) Female 
(20) Male &  
(1) Female 
Age 
(57%) 30-39,  
(19%) 40-49,  
(19%) 50-60, &  
(5%) 20-29 
(12) 30-39,  
(4) 40-49,  
(4) 50-60, &  
(1) 20-29 
Nationality 
(90%) Saudis,  
(5%) Indian, &  
(5%) British 
(19) Saudis,  
(1) Indian, &  
(1) British 
Education 
(57%) Bachelor,  
(29%) Master,  
(5%) PhD, &  
(9%) Other 
(6) Bachelor,  
(12) Master,  
(1) PhD, &  
(2) Other 
Specialisation 
(67%) Accounting,  
(14%) Finance,  
(14%) Engineering, &  
(5%) Law 
(14) Accounting,  
(3) Finance,  
(3) Engineering, &  
(1) Law 
Years of experience in 
the current position 
(10%) 0-5,  
(23%) 6-10,  
(42%) 11-15,  
(10%) 16-20,  
(10%) 21-25, &  
(5%) 26- more. 
(2) 0-5,  
(5) 6-10,  
(9) 11-15,  
(2) 16-20,  
(2) 21-25, &  
(1) 26- more. 
Years of experience in 
financial or accounting 
fields 
(14%) 0-1,  
(33%) 2-3,  
(19%) 4-5,  
(10%) 6-7  
(14%) 8-9,  
(10%) 10- more. 
(3) 0-1,  
(7) 2-3,  
(4) 4-5,  
(2) 6-7  
(3) 8-9,  
(2) 10- more. 
Table 6.1: Summary of the demographic results 
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6.4.1.1 Gender 
The first demographic dimension is gender. Figure 6.1 presents the results obtained from the 
gender question in the demographic section; 20 were male and one was female. Gender 
diversity is an important topic because of its influence on the work. These results indicate that 
the workplace under investigation has very low diversity. 
 
6.4.1.2 Age 
The second demographic dimension is age. 12 participants (57%) were between 30 and 39 
years old; four (19%) were between the ages of 40 and 49; four (19%) between 50 and 60; 




















Figure 6.2: Age groups of the participants 
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Figure 6.2 illustrates the diversity of ages in the sample. Thirteen participants were less than 
40 years old, which is more than half the sample. This reflects the relatively young Saudi 
population as a whole.  
6.4.1.3 Nationality 
The third demographic dimension is nationality. Figure 6.3 indicates that 19 participants, or 
90%, were Saudis, and the remaining 10% consisted of other nationalities (one British and 
one Indian person). 
 
This shows there was a very low diversity of nationalities in the sample. This is considered an 
advantage as it is likely that most participants would thus be aware of the unique elements of 
the Saudi context. 
6.4.1.4 Education 
Figure 6.4 shows that 12 participants (57%) had a master degree, six (29%) had a bachelor 
degree, two participants (9%) selected ‘Other’ as their level of education, and one participant 







Figure 6.3: Nationalities of the participants 
26Figure 6.3: Nationalities of the participants 
Chapter (6)  Results and Findings (1) 
182 | P a g e  
 
Thus, most participants had a high level of education. The one who chose ‘Other’ may have 
misunderstood the question, or may have had a degree of lower standing. For example, this 
participant wrote ‘chartered accounting’ as their profession. A chartered accountant would 
normally have at least a bachelor degree. Nonetheless, at least 95% of the sample has a 
bachelor degree or higher. 
6.4.1.5 Specialisation  
Figure 6.5 shows that 14 (67%) participants wrote ‘accounting’ as their specialisation. Three 
(14%) wrote ‘finance’ and another three wrote ‘engineering’ as their specialisation. One 














Figure 6.4: Education levels of the participants 
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This shows that most participants had specialisations related to corporate governance, and 
three had an unrelated specialisation (engineering).  
6.4.1.6 Years of experience  
Participants were asked two questions about their years of experience. The first question 
asked the number of years they had spent in financial or accounting-related jobs. Table 6.1 
shows that nine (43%) participants were in the ‘11–15’ years category. The ‘6–10’ category 
was second with five participants (24%). Three categories, ‘0–5’, ‘16–20’ and ‘21–25’ years, 






Experience (years) Number of participants Percentage 
0-5 2 10% 
6-10 5 23% 
11-15 9 42% 
16-20 2 10% 
21-25 2 10% 
26-30 1 5% 
31-35 0 0% 
36-40 0 0% 









Table 6.2: Years of experience in accounting and finance 
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This shows that 16 of the total sample had worked in accounting- and finance-related jobs for 
less than 15 years. No participants had worked for more than 30 years, which is consistent 
with their ages. 
The second question was about the number of years spent in their current position. Table 6.2 
shows that seven participants (33%) were in the ‘2–3’ years category. The ‘4–5’ year 
category had four participants (19%). The ‘0–1’ and ‘8–9’ years categories each had three 





Majority of the participants had been in their current position for less than 10 years, and 14 
had worked less than five years in their current position. This is unsurprising, as most 
participants were relatively young, many of the companies were new at the time of the data 
collection, and corporate governance has only been recognised in Saudi Arabia since 2006.  
6.4.1.7 General interpretation 
These collective demographic results offer characteristics and attributes of the sample
25
, one 
of which is the knowledge and expertise of the participants. For example, an accurate 
valuation of the elements in the AHP comparisons depends on a participant’s level of 
                                                          
25
 It is important to be aware that the interpretation and explanation are limited to the sample. 
Years in current position Number of participants Percentage 
0-1 3 14% 
2-3 7 33% 
4-5 4 19% 
6-7 2 10% 
8-9 3 14% 
10 or more 2 10% 
Total  21 100% 
Table 6.3: Years of experience in current position 
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knowledge and experience. To determine this, factors such as education, specialisation and 
years of experience are considered. 
The results indicate that the participants are likely to have had an acceptable level of 
knowledge and expertise because most had graduate and postgraduate degrees, and many of 
them declared accounting, finance and law—which are related to their jobs and to the 
research topic—as their area of specialisation. 
Moreover, more than half had over 10 years’ experience in finance-related jobs, and most 
mentioned in interviews that they had attended conferences, training sessions, lectures and 
seminars about corporate governance, locally or internationally. This shows that most 
participants had an acceptable level of knowledge and expertise in corporate governance.  
However, some factors affected their knowledge and experience. Some had non-financial 
qualifications: three had specialised in mechanical engineering. Nineteen participants had less 
than 10 years of experience in their current position, and most were young, with 13 being less 
than 40 years old. Finally, corporate governance is a new topic in Saudi Arabia, and thus 
some companies in the petrochemical sector may lack experience in its implementation.  
Another significant factor is the participants’ backgrounds. Most were Saudis, which means 
they were familiar with the Saudi setting; moreover, most had spent more than two years in 
their current position, which can be considered enough time to know about corporate 
governance in the Saudi context.  
The Saudi context has some influence on the characteristics and attributes of the sample. 
First, the average age of the Saudi workforce is low, which explains the low average age of 
most participants. Based on the Labour Force Survey 2015 2nd Half Report (General 
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Authority for Statistics 2015), 71.8% of the Saudi workforce is 15–44 years old. Second, the 
large number of Saudi participants may be a fulfilment of the ‘job-Saudization program’, 
which mandates that companies must hire Saudis rather than foreigners. This might also be 
the reason for having non-financial employees in the finance sector. 
Third, women are under-represented in this research because the Saudi Government supports 
segregation between males and females in most public and private schools and workplaces, 
and thus finance may not be a suitable working environment for Saudi women. Also, Saudi 
women are less likely than men to work far from home, and the headquarters of 
petrochemical companies are inside factories, which are normally far from the cities. 
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6.4.2 The AHP questionnaire  
The AHP method was used to determine the importance of the elements, systems, categories 
and factors in the proposed framework for corporate governance systems (Figure 6.6). The 
AHP method transforms a qualitative response into quantitative results that can be analysed, 
and it eliminates any bias from subjective value judgements to provide consistent and robust 
results. The aim is to reach the most important elements to ensure the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the corporate governance system.  
 
Figure 6.6: The AHP model 
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The AHP questionnaire was based on the AHP model (Figure 6.6). It involves eight 
parts/questions
26
 covering three sections; these include general, external, and internal 
governance systems. In each question, there are several pairwise comparisons that ask the 
participant to evaluate and assign a relative value of importance to each element. The nine-
point scaling system suggested by Saaty (1980) is used as a basis for valuing each element. 
This pairwise comparison continues through all levels of the hierarchy.  
The AHP results are read in a specialised way. In a detailed synthesis, every part is equal to 
100% regardless of the number of elements involved in the comparisons. In other words, the 
total remains 100% whether the comparison involves two, three, four or more elements, and 
each element comprises a portion of this 100%. To calculate the average of each element in 
every question/part, 100% is divided by the number of elements. For example, the first 
question includes two elements, so the average is (100%/2 = 50%); the seventh question 
includes five elements, so the average is (100% / 5 = 20%). 
In the summarised synthesis and sensitivity analysis, the total of all lower-level factors must 
equal 100%. The sum of the factors in one category is the weight of this category. The sum of 
the categories in one system is the value of this system. The sum of the systems is the value 
of the overall goal, which is the corporate governance system. The weight of the overall goal 
should be 100%. To calculate the average, 100% is divided by the number of factors, 
systems, or categories. There are 22 lower-level factors, so the factor average is (100% / 22 = 
4.55%). The AHP model has five categories so the average is (100% / 5 = 20%). There are 
two systems included in the AHP model, so the average is (100% / 2 = 50%) 
                                                          
26
 “Part” and “question” are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
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The Expert Choice software calculates the priority values, measures the consistency ratio for 
every part, for each group, and all groups (overall), and provides a variety of types of 
synthesis. So the results can be shown for each group or all groups combined. In addition, 
Expert Choice software allows the researcher to manipulate the data to visualise any 
variances between the actual scenario and new scenarios. 
The following sections are organised as follows. The first section describes CR; the second 
shows the results in a detailed synthesis for the eight parts and for each group; the third 
presents a summarised synthesis for the eight parts and for all groups; and the fourth section 
shows the sensitivity analysis in two scenarios.  
6.4.2.1 Consistency Ratio  
The consistency of these judgements is checked by the CR measure, which also ensures the 
robustness of the collected data. CR has a particular numerical scope of 0.0 to 0.1 to monitor 
any inconsistency within the data (as mentioned in Table 5.2).  
Expert Choice software was used to calculate the CRs for each comparison and for all 
participants (Table 6.4). All but one CR was below 0.1. The CR of the outsiders for the third 
part was 0.16, which is slightly larger than 0.1; since this pairwise comparison is not major it 
will be used. This slightly elevated CR highlighted in Table 6.4 could be due to several 
factors. First, most participants considered AHP to be a new method of collecting data 
because it is not commonly used in PhD research or in the corporate governance context. 
Second, there may be an effect of translation because the AHP questionnaire and aid 
documents were written in English and then translated into Arabic. Third, being at senior 
levels may have meant participants did not always have time to read and fully understand the 
AHP instructions and aid documents. 
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Outsiders Insiders Overall 
Part one 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Part two 0.02 0.00177 0.00111 
Part three 0.16 0.00659 0.0051 
Part four 0.00392 0.00713 0.01 
Part five 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Part six 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Part seven 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Part eight 0.03 0.00979 0.00868 
All parts 0.04 0.01 0.01 
6.4.2.2 Detailed synthesis   
This section presents and analyses the detailed results for the eight parts. Each part is 
separated into outsiders and insiders to identify any differences between them. After 
revealing the results of each part, the initial analysis section describes and compares the 
results of the two groups, and compares this with the average for that part. 
6.4.2.2.1 Corporate governance systems  
In the first part of the AHP questionnaire, participants were asked to compare external 
governance systems with internal governance systems to judge their relative importance. 
 Outsiders 
Figure 6.7 shows that the external participants ranked external governance systems as first 
with 59.6% of the total weight, followed by internal governance systems with 40.4% of the 
total weight. 
Table 6.4: Consistency ratios of all parts 
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 Insiders  
Figure 6.8 shows that the internal participants weighed the external governance systems 
factor as 76.3% of the total weight, followed by the internal governance systems with 23.7% 
of the total weight.  
 
 External systems versus internal systems  
These results indicate that both groups believed that external governance systems play a 
major role compared to internal governance systems, a view that was supported in the 
interviews. Most interviewees argued that external factors are important and must be 
considered when setting and developing corporate governance regulations. 
Specifically, outsiders valued external governance systems as moderately important systems, 
with very small differences from how they valued internal governance systems. They 
Model Name: E&I External par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
External Governance Systems .596
Internal Governance Systems .404
 Inconsistency = 0.
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 11/03/2015 7:30:58 PM
Model Name: E&I Internal par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
External Governance Systems .763
Internal Governance Systems .237
 Inconsistency = 0.
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 11/03/2015 7:47:47 PM
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Figure 6.8: Insiders’ priorities for corporate governance systems 
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weighed both systems near the average percentage, which indicates that even external 
governance systems are important, but that the external and internal governance systems are 
seen as complementing each other. In other words, achieving best practice for a corporate 
governance system depends on both systems. 
Insiders have a different view. They believe external governance systems are extremely 
important and internal governance systems are much less important. This indicates that 
insiders rely on external governance systems to achieve best practice in corporate 
governance. In the interviews, insiders indicated that internal governance systems are built on 
external systems, so they only adhere to external requirements.  
6.4.2.2.2 External governance systems 
In the second part of the AHP questionnaire, the participants were asked to compare between 
the main categories of external governance systems, including the legal and regulatory 
framework, external oversight and external auditor.  
 Outsiders 
External oversight was ranked as the most important category, representing 51.6% of the total 
weight. This was followed by the legal and regulatory framework category, with 30.4%. 
Finally, the external auditor category was ranked third, with 18%. Figure 6.9 presents the 
priority weightings for the external governance systems categories. 
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 Insiders  
Insiders placed the legal and regulatory framework category first, with 44.1% of the total 
weight; the external oversight second, with 37.9%, and the external auditor third, with 17.9%. 
Figure 6.10 shows the priority weightings for the external governance systems categories. 
 
 External Categories 
There was no consensus between groups in selecting the most important category. The 
outsiders believed that external oversight agencies have a major effect on external 
governance systems, while the insiders believed that laws and regulations and their related 
issues are major influences. However, both groups gave the external auditor the lowest 
importance, significantly below the average. In the interviews, both groups believed an 
external auditor has specific roles and tasks and there is no need to extend them. 
Model Name: E&I External par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >External Governance Systems
External Oversight .516
Legal and Regulatory Framework .304
External Auditor .180
 Inconsistency = 0.02
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 5:19:27 PM
Model Name: E&I Internal par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >External Governance Systems
Legal and Regulatory Framework .441
External Oversight .379
External Auditor .179
 Inconsistency = 0.00177
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 18/03/2015 12:51:56 PM
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The outsiders stated that there must be collaboration between external agencies because they 
regulate and monitor related issues through laws and regulations. This indicates that 
collaboration will reduce some of the issues in the laws and regulations, such as contradiction 
and duplication. They also believed that laws and regulations are sufficient to ensure effective 
corporate governance, although they may need some development. The insiders believed that 
the legal and regulatory framework and external oversight have similar effects in achieving 
best practice, ranking them closely.  
6.4.2.2.3 Legal and regulatory framework 
In the third part of the AHP questionnaire, the participants were asked to compare the main 
factors of the legal and regulatory framework category to determine the priorities of each 
factor. These factors included missing laws and regulations, lack of interpretation, lack of 
enforcement, and conflict and duplication.   
 Outsiders 
Figure 6.11 shows the priority weightings for these factors, arranged as follows: the lack of 
enforcement represents 33.4% of the total weight; the lack of interpretation represents 33.1%; 
conflict and duplication represents 20.7%; and missing laws and regulations represents 
12.8%.  
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 Insiders  
Figure 6.12 shows internal participants’ priority weightings of these factors: 27.4% for lack 
of interpretation, 26.8% for missing laws and regulations, 24.1% for lack of enforcement, and 
21.7% for conflict and duplication.   
 
 Laws and regulations 
The groups arranged these factors differently. The outsiders arranged their weightings in line 
with the previous parts because they believed the main issues in laws and regulations are the 
lack of an enforcement factor and an interpretative factor. They rated conflict and duplication 
in third place, and missing laws and regulations as the least important. 
Model Name: E&I External par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >External Governance Systems 
         >Legal and Regulatory Framework
Lack of Enforcement .334
Lack of Interpretation .331
Conflicts and Duplicates .207
Missing Laws and Regulations .128
 Inconsistency = 0.16
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 5:34:50 PM
Model Name: E&I Internal par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >External Governance Systems 
         >Legal and Regulatory Framework
Lack of Interpretation .274
Missing Laws and Regulations .268
Lack of Enforcement .241
Conflicts and Duplicates .217
 Inconsistency = 0.00659
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 11:37:08 PM
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They believed that laws and regulations need improvement, and that external oversight issues 
are important, placing conflict and duplication third. They ranked the missing factor as less 
important, which supports their claim that ‘the laws and regulations are enough’. 
The insiders’ results indicate that all these factors are almost equal, and even the percentages 
of each factor are around the average (25%), with only small differences. However, the way 
these factors are arranged can provide insights because, unlike outsiders, insiders believed 
that all the factors are important, giving a slight emphasis to interpretations and missing laws 
and regulations.  
6.4.2.2.4 External oversight  
The fourth part is a comparison between the factors in the external oversight category, which 
includes layers of agencies, special agencies, agency conflict and duplication, and agency 
authority. 
 Outsiders 
Figure 6.13 shows that the outsiders ranked the agency authority factor as being the most 
important, representing 44.4% of the total weight. This is followed by agency conflict and 
duplication factors with 22.4%; the layers of agencies factor is 19.4%, and the special 
agencies factor is 13.8% of the total weight.  
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 Insiders  
Figure 6.14 shows that the insiders ranked the agency authority factor first with 41.6%, 
followed by the layers of agencies factor with 23.6%, the special agencies factor with 22.2%, 
and agency conflict and duplication with 12.7%.  
 
 External agencies 
Both groups ranked the agency authority as the most important factor with the highest 
percentages. The agency authority factor has a strong link with the enforcement factor 
because when an agency does not have a strong authority, it will not enforce its laws and 
regulations. Both groups believed that lack of enforcement is an important factor, but they 
arranged the next three factors differently. 
Model Name: E&I External par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >External Governance Systems 
         >External Oversight
Agency Authority .444
Agencies Conflicts and Duplicates .224
Layers of Agencies .194
Special Agencies .138
 Inconsistency = 0.00392
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 7:47:14 PM
Model Name: E&I Internal par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >External Governance Systems 
         >External Oversight
Agency Authority .416
Layers of Agencies .236
Special Agencies .222
Agencies Conflicts and Duplicates .127
 Inconsistency = 0.00713
      with 0  missing judgments.
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The outsiders chose agency conflict and duplication second due to the lack of communication 
and cooperation between agencies. However, as there are layers of agencies, they believed 
this may to some extent help to fully apply the laws and regulations. For example, if an 
element is duplicated between agencies, there will be some assurance that one of the agencies 
will ensure that this element is applied. Finally, outsiders saw special agencies as not being 
influential, so they gave this the lowest significant percentage. 
In contrast, insiders believed that the layers of agencies and special agency factors had a 
similar influence, rating them very closely in percentage; they also believed they exert a very 
low influence because of conflict and duplication between agencies.  
6.4.2.2.5 External auditor   
The fifth part of the AHP questionnaire determines priorities for the main factors in the 
external auditor category. Here the participants were required to compare auditor 
independence, the role of an external auditor, disclosure and appointment. 
 Outsiders 
Figure 6.15 shows the results of the outsiders’ pairwise comparisons. The disclosure factor 
was ranked at 37.6%, auditor independence at 25.9%, the external auditor’s role at 19.9% and 
the appointment factor at 16.6%. 
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 Insiders  
Figure 6.16 shows the insiders’ pairwise comparisons. Auditor independence was 41.4% of 
the total weight, the disclosure factor was 28.4%, the external auditor was 15.9% and the 
appointment factor was 14.3% of the total weight. 
 
 External auditor 
Both groups generally viewed the external auditor as the least important category in external 
governance systems. In fact, in most interviews a discussion took a place at the point in the 
AHP questionnaire that asked, ‘Does disclosure lead to more auditor independence or does 
auditor independence lead to more disclosure?’ There are different opinions about what 
comes first: the disclosure or the independence. Based on the AHP results, outsiders believed 
Model Name: E&I External par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >External Governance Systems 
         >External Auditor
Disclosure .376
Auditor Independence .259
Roles of the External Auditor .199
Appointment .166
 Inconsistency = 0.02
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 7:49:43 PM
Model Name: E&I Internal par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >External Governance Systems 
         >External Auditor
Auditor Independence .414
Disclosure .284
Roles of the External Auditor .159
Appointment .143
 Inconsistency = 0.01
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 11:40:24 PM
Figure 6.15: Outsiders’ priorities for external auditor 
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Figure 6.16: Insiders’ priorities for external auditor 
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that disclosure comes first whereas insiders believed the auditor independence comes first. 
These results indicate that both groups see these two factors as important compared to other 
factors. 
The appointment and roles of external auditors were seen as less important, with very low 
percentages, mainly because most participants believed an external auditor has different roles 
and functions. Insiders had no issues with appointing a new external auditor or re-appointing 
a current one; indeed, one interviewee claimed that “if the external auditor causes me a 
headache, the auditor will be kicked out and another auditor will be appointed”.   
6.4.2.2.6 Internal governance systems  
The sixth part compares the internal governance systems, monitoring systems and board of 
directors to prioritise each category. 
 Outsiders 
The pairwise comparison of the main categories of internal governance systems indicates that 
the board of directors was rated at 59.9% of the total weight of internal governance systems, 
whereas monitoring systems represented 40.1% (Figure 6.17). 
 
Model Name: E&I External par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >Internal Governance Systems
Board of Directors .599
Monitoring Systems .401
 Inconsistency = 0.
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 7:51:08 PM
Figure 6.17: Outsiders’ priorities for internal governance systems 
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 Insiders  
Insiders prioritised monitoring systems with 64.6% of the total weight, and gave 35.4% for 
the board of directors (Figure 6.18). 
 
 Internal governance systems  
It is important to note that the two groups viewed the two categories of internal governance 
systems differently. The outsiders ranked both categories similarly, which means they 
believed both are important and compatible with each other, and have similar influences. The 
outsiders gave more emphasis to the board of directors category because a board establishes 
and receives reports about the monitoring systems. In other words, the board controls 
monitoring systems and can structure them as it sees fit. Boards are supported by the SCGRs, 
according to which a board of directors is required to set the internal control process as part 
of the monitoring system. 
However, insiders had a different view, as shown by their ascribing monitoring systems 
higher importance than the board of directors. They believed that the monitoring systems 
involved, and thus somewhat constrained, the role and functions of the board of directors.  
Model Name: E&I Internal par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >Internal Governance Systems
Monitoring Systems .646
Board of Directors .354
 Inconsistency = 0.
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 11:41:43 PM
Figure 6.18: Insiders’ priorities for internal governance systems 
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6.4.2.2.7 Monitoring systems  
In the seventh part, participants were asked to compare the main factors in monitoring 
systems; these include internal control processes, internal auditor, interference of others, 
internal policies and communicating with minor shareholders. 
 Outsiders 
Outsiders ranked the internal auditor in first place with 34.8%, the internal control process 
second with 27%, internal policies third with 21.9%, communicating with minor shareholders 
fourth with 8.4%, and interference from others at fifth, with 7.9%. Figure 6.19 shows the 
weightings for these factors. 
 
 Insiders  
Figure 6.20 shows the weightings given by the insiders: internal control processes was 
37.5%, the internal auditor was 28.7%, internal policies was 19.8%, interference by others 
was 8.2%, and communicating with minor shareholders was 5.9%. 
Model Name: E&I External par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >Internal Governance Systems 
         >Monitoring Systems
Internal Auditors .348
Internal Control Processes .270
Internal Policies .219
Communicating with minor shareholders .084
Interference of Others .079
 Inconsistency = 0.05
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 7:52:42 PM
Figure 6.19: Outsiders’ priorities for monitoring systems 
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 Monitoring systems 
The weightings indicate that both groups divided the monitoring system category into two 
sections: the first contained important factors such as the internal auditor, internal control and 
internal policies. The participants weighted these factors as average and more important, but 
each group arranged the factors differently. The outsiders prioritised the internal auditor, 
whereas the insiders prioritised the internal control process. 
Who actually manages who is debatable: the outsiders believed an internal auditor presides 
over internal control whereas the insiders believed the internal control process manages 
internal auditor roles and functions. Regardless, both groups put the internal policy factor in 
third place as being of average importance. 
The second section included the factors given low importance, such as communicating with 
minor shareholders and interference of others. Both groups believed they dealt similarly with 
all shareholders, and there was no interference by anyone inside or outside the company. 
Therefore any interference may only be through the board of directors. 
Model Name: E&I Internal par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >Internal Governance Systems 
         >Monitoring Systems
Internal Control Processes .375
Internal Auditors .287
Internal Policies .198
Interference of Others .082
Communicating with minor shareholders .059
 Inconsistency = 0.02
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 11:43:35 PM
Figure 6.20: Insiders’ priorities for monitoring systems 
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6.4.2.2.8 Board of directors 
The eighth part asked participants to compare the main factors in the board of directors 
category to prioritise each category. These factors include board characteristics, board 
functions and processes, audit committees, disclosure and transparency, and directors’ 
qualifications. 
 Outsiders 
Figure 6.21 shows how outsiders weighted the pairwise comparisons: disclosure and 
transparency at 39.4%, directors’ qualifications at 21.9%, audit committee at 18.9%, board 
functions and processes at 13.1%, and board characteristics at 6.6%. 
 
 Insiders  
Figure 6.22 shows how insiders weighted the pairwise comparisons: the audit committee was 
30.9%, disclosure and transparency was 27.2%, directors’ qualifications was 19%, board 
functions and processes was 14.7%, and board characteristics was 8.2%. 
Model Name: E&I External par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >Internal Governance Systems 
         >Board of Directors
Disclosure and Transparency .394
Director's Qualifications .219
Audit Committee .189
Board Functions and Process .131
Board Characteristics .066
 Inconsistency = 0.03
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 7:54:23 PM
Figure 6.21: Outsiders’ priorities for board of directors 
44Figure 6.21: Outsiders’ priorities for board of directors 
 
Chapter (6)  Results and Findings (1) 
205 | P a g e  
 
 Board of directors 
The groups had different views on the importance of the board of directors’ category, and 
they arranged the factors differently. Outsiders emphasised disclosure and transparency far 
more because they thought it positively or negatively affected every aspect of the board of 
directors, whereas directors’ qualifications and the audit committee were ranked similarly. 
They rated board functions and processes and board characteristics as being of very low 
importance. In their interviews, outsiders relied on the insiders to set and specify the 
functions and processes of the board and board characteristics. 
However, the insiders saw the audit committee and disclosure and transparency as most 
important because they are the main elements in a board of directors. An audit committee is 
the key monitor of a company because it sets the systems and receives reports about most 
aspects of the company. Directors’ qualifications, and board functions and processes were 
rated similarly. Finally, board characteristics received very low weightings, which indicates 
that insiders did not believe they are influential.   
Model Name: E&I Internal par 001
Priorities with respect to: Combined
Goal: Corporate Governance
      >Internal Governance Systems 
         >Board of Directors
Audit Committee .309
Disclosure and Transparency .272
Director's Qualifications .190
Board Functions and Process .147
Board Characteristics .082
 Inconsistency = 0.00979
      with 0  missing judgments.
Page 1 of 13/03/2015 11:44:53 PM
Figure 6.22: Insiders’ priorities for board of directors 
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6.4.2.3 Summarised synthesis 
The software synthesises and determines the priority weights for all factors with respect to 
the overall goal, which here is corporate governance systems. The weights of all factors are 
presented for all participants. Figure 6.23 shows the results provided by the software; these 
results will also be shown in the AHP model. 
 
 
In Figure 6.24, these factors are structured as the main hierarchy (AHP model). The results 
from Figure 6.23 are placed as lower-level factors, and the results of the factors gathered 
under each category are summed to obtain the weightings of the categories. The sum of the 
results of these categories is then the total percentages of the main systems to which they 
belong. 
Model Name: E&I  ALL par 001
Synthesis: Summary
Combined instance -- Synthesis with respect to: Goal: Corporate Governance
     Overall Inconsistency = .01
Agency Authority .113
Lack of Interpretation .106
Lack of Enforcement .101
Conflicts and Duplicates .082
Missing Laws and Regulations .080
Layers of Agencies .066
Special Agencies .061
Internal Control Processes .047








Board Functions and Process .018
Roles of the External Auditor .016
Appointment .016
Board Characteristics .012
Interference of Others .010
Communicating with minor sharehold... .008
P g  1 of 11/03/2015 6:44:11 PM
Figure 6.23: Combined priorities for all lower factors with respect to corporate governance 
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The total weights from all participants were greatly influenced by the number of insiders, of 
whom there were twice as many as outsiders. However, when the results from the combined 
participants and those from insider participants are compared, differences are seen. 
In this section the factors and categories are compared to the average percentages. At the 
lower level, there are 22 factors and the total percentage is 100%, so the average is 4.55%. At 
the next level there are five categories and the total percentage is 100%, so the average is 
Figure 6.24: Combined priorities for all lower factors with respect to corporate governance in AHP Model 
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20%. At the top level there are two main systems, which means the average is 50%. Finally, 
the overall goal, which is corporate governance systems, should be 100%. 
The combined results for all participants indicate that external governance systems are more 
important than internal governance systems (see Figure 6.24). For external governance 
systems, the legal and regulatory frameworks category and the external oversight category 
are higher than average; in contrast, the external auditor category was the least important in 
the entire level of external and internal governance systems. This indicates that both groups 
believed that laws and regulations, and the issuer of those laws and regulation, have an 
enormous influence over the corporate governance system. 
However, both groups believed that the external auditor category was least important, and 
therefore an external auditor has very little influence over a corporate governance system. 
Surprisingly, this indicates that auditor independence may have a weak influence because it 
ranked about average. 
These results show that internal governance systems have very low importance values 
because they rely on the external governance system. This is supported by the lower-level 
factors and values of these categories. All the lower-level factors and categories have very 
low values compared to the average, except for the internal control process, which is larger 
than average but with small differences, because the internal control process limits the role 
and functions of employees and directors. 
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6.4.2.4 Sensitivity analysis 
The Expert Choice software enables the researcher to envisage scenarios and assumptions 
based on participants’ answers, and to determine any variations in the lower-level categories 
and factors. The percentages of external and internal governance systems can be changed, 
which will change the percentages of lower-level categories and factors; this analysis is 
carried out on the total results from all participants. Two scenarios are analysed in this 
research, and the results of both are then compared with the actual results and average values. 
The sensitivity analysis is a vital feature of the AHP methodology and the Expert Choice 
software. This type of analysis gives the chance to examine ‘what if’ simulations. The actual 
results revealed that most participants focused on external governance systems, giving very 
little attention to internal governance systems. This analysis identifies any variation in the 
results between the actual and new results for the lower-level categories and factors. This is 
important because the institutional functioning of corporate governance can easily change 
over time. 
6.4.2.4.1 First scenario 
The first assumption is to make the external governance systems and internal governance 
systems equal in priority weightings at 50% each. Figure 6.25 shows the new values of the 
lower-level factors resulting from changes in the systems. To show these results in an 
understandable way, they will be shown in the AHP hierarchy (Figure 6.26).  
In the case of making the external and internal governance systems equal, most factors in the 
legal and regulatory framework and external oversight categories are higher than average, 
except for the three factors shown below. The results indicate that these two categories and 
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their related factors are still important, although the external auditor category and its factor 
still have very low values of importance. 
 
Due to an increase in the internal governance systems, the importance of most categories and 
lower-level factors were raised. However, even though the internal governance systems 
increased, four factors are still less than the average by significant differences. This indicates 
that the changes in the internal governance systems have not influenced the categories and 
factors in the internal governance system.   
Figure 6.25: Priorities for the first assumption 
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6.4.2.4.2 Second scenario 
The second assumption is to make the weights of the internal and external governance 
systems opposite to the actual scenario. This was also applied to the total results of all 
participants. If the internal governance systems were 25% and the external governance 
systems 75%, in this scenario the internal governance systems are 75% and the external 
governance systems 25%. Figure 6.27 shows the new values of the lower-level factors, which 
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Figure 6.26: Priorities for the first assumption in AHP model 
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As specified, the result will be shown in the AHP model format (Figure 6.28). In the external 
governance systems, all lower-level factors and categories are below average, whereas most 
of the lower-level factors and categories in the internal governance systems have higher-than-
average values. Moreover, three factors are below average, which means they are of very low 
importance and not influential based on evaluations of the total number of participants. 
Figure 6.27: Priorities for the second assumption 
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This scenario presents two notable observations: first, even if the internal governance systems 
are very important, there are still factors that are lower than average. Second, in the actual 
results, the internal governance systems were low in importance but some of their factors 
were rated higher than average, which did not occur in this scenario, in which all factors in 
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Figure 6.28: Priorities for the second assumption in AHP model 
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6.4.2.4.3 Comparing scenarios 
In this section the actual results will be compared with the previous two scenarios and the 
average to explore any differences caused by the changes. Table 6.5 includes the actual 
results, the results from the first and second scenarios, and the average of each level. The 
following three columns are the differences between the results of the three scenarios and the 
averages. 
Based on these changes, both the external and internal governance systems have gone 
through three levels of importance, from more important to equally important and less 
important.  
The differences between the actual results and the two scenarios are normal because their 
importance decreased with the decline in importance of the main systems. Thus the 
differences with averages were expected but they are in the opposite direction to what was 
expected. However, in the legal and regulatory framework category the differences between 
averages show that even though the external governance systems declined by large 
percentages, this category declined by small percentages. For example, the difference 
between the actual results and the average is 16.90%; thus the difference expected with the 
second scenario would have been -16.90%, but it was actually -8%. This means that the legal 
and regulatory framework category is an important category even in the other scenario. 
The external oversight category is different because the differences in the second scenario 
decreased more than in the actual results. In fact, the value of this category was less when the 
external governance systems had low importance. The external auditor category was less 
important in the actual results and remained the same in all scenarios. 
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Factor 
Results (%) Average 
(%) 
Differences (%) 
Actual First Second Actual First Second 
External governance systems 76.40 49.9 25 50 26.40 -0.1 -25 
Legal and regulatory framework 36.90 24.40 12.10 20.00 16.90 4 -8 
External oversight 28.20 18.60 9.30 20.00 8.20 -1 -11 
External auditor 10.30 6.80 3.30 20.00 -9.70 -13 -17 
Lack of interpretation 10.60 7.00 3.50 4.55 6.05 2 -1 
Lack of enforcement 10.10 6.70 3.30 4.55 5.55 2 -1 
Conflicts and duplicates 8.20 5.40 2.70 4.55 3.65 1 -2 
Missing laws and regulations 8 5 2.60 4.55 3.45 1 -2 
Agency authority 11.30 7.40 3.70 4.55 6.75 3 -1 
Layers of agencies 6.60 4.40 2.20 4.55 2.05 0 -2 
Special agencies 6.10 4.00 2 4.55 1.55 -1 -3 
Agencies conflicts and duplicates 4.20 2.80 1.40 4.55 -0.35 -2 -3 
Auditor independence 4.20 2.70 1.40 4.55 -0.35 -2 -3 
Disclosure 2.90 1.90 0.90 4.55 -1.65 -3 -4 
Appointment 1.60 1.10 0.50 4.55 -2.95 -3 -4 
Role of the external auditor 1.60 1.10 0.50 4.55 -2.95 -3 -4 
Internal governance systems 23.60 50.1 75 50 -26.40 0.1 25 
Monitoring systems 12.70 25.60 38.40 20.00 -7.30 6 18 
Board of directors 11.90 24.50 36.90 20.00 -8.10 5 17 
Internal control process 4.70 9.56 14.30 4.55 0.15 5 10 
Internal auditor 3.70 7.50 11.20 4.55 -0.85 3 7 
Internal policies 2.50 5.10 7.60 4.55 -2.05 1 3 
Interference of others 1 2 3 4.55 -3.55 -3 -2 
Communicating with minor 
shareholders 
0.80 1.40 2.30 4.55 -3.75 -3 -2 
Audit committee 3.30 6.80 10.20 4.55 -1.25 2 6 
Disclosure and transparency 3.20 6.60 9.90 4.55 -1.35 2 5 
Director’s qualifications 2.40 4.90 7.40 4.55 -2.15 0 3 
Board functions and process 1.80 3.70 5.60 4.55 -2.75 -1 1 
Board characteristics 1.20 2.50 3.80 4.55 -3.35 -2 -1 
 
 
Table 6.5: Results of all seniors and differences with averages 
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The low-level factors of the external governance systems were normal, while the actual 
results around the second scenario were the opposite. Three factors have different results: the 
lack of interpretation, the lack of enforcement, and the agency authority; they are not normal 
factors because there are large positive differences in the actual results. However, in the 
second scenario their differences were small compared to the average. Thus the legal and 
regulatory framework category is important because its factors have a huge influence.  
The internal governance systems, monitoring systems and board of director categories have 
values that are lower than average but with large differences, whereas in the second scenario, 
importance increased but with large differences. This means they will play a larger role in the 
very important internal governance systems. Most of the lower-level factors in the internal 
governance systems are either normal or close to normal, but audit committee and disclosure 
and transparency have a high value in the second scenario. 
6.5 Summary  
This chapter outlined the results and analysis for two sections of the interview conducted with 
21 participants: the demographic results and AHP results. The demographic results show that 
the sample characteristics was generally dominated by young, male, Saudi participants, most 
of whom had graduate degrees or higher, along with related specialisations and few years of 
work experience. 
The Expert Choice software provides AHP results in two different formats. The detailed 
results show the importance of each category and the factors for each group. The summarised 
results show the results for both groups for all lower-level factors. Another feature of Expert 
Choice is that it allows manipulation of the data to help imagine new scenarios and thus 
perform a sensitivity analysis. There are differences between the outsiders’ and insiders’ 
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views in most of the categories and factors, which were reflected in how they ranked the 
factors. In general, the AHP results confirm that external governance systems were more seen 
a more important than internal governance systems. 
In the external governance systems, both groups gave the legal and regulatory framework and 
the external oversight high ranking and thus they were considered to be important categories. 
However, they ranked external auditing as the least important category. In the internal 
governance systems, the groups differed in their ranking of the categories and gave the lower-
factors very low importance in both categories. 
The next chapter outlines and analyses the results from the third section, the semi-structured 
interviews. It also defines the coding system used, and provides quotes from the interviews 
that support the results. 
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Chapter 7: Results and Findings (2) 
7.1 Introduction  
The interviews were divided into three sections: demographic questions, an AHP 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. The previous chapter outlined the first and 
second sections, where the demographic characteristics and their combination affected the 
responses to the questions. Expert Choice software presented the AHP results in detailed and 
summarised syntheses to determine the priority weights for all systems, categories and factors 
with respect to the overall goal for all participants. Sensitivity analysis was also undertaken, 
deploying another feature of the software. 
In this chapter, the results from the third section of the interview, the semi-structured 
interview questions, are analysed and presented. The questions were divided into four 
sections: general, external governance systems, internal governance systems and 
improvements. An interview is an important way of gathering in-depth information; this 
study asked questions to acquire participants’ opinions, views and experience about these 
four areas. 
The results and findings are arranged based on specific procedures, and a specific coding 
system was designed for the thematic analysis. The results and findings of this section are 
determined by their relationships with AHP factors. There are two main results: the first 
concerns major issues related to the AHP model and important issues that were raised but not 
apparent in the AHP model; the second deals with minor issues that are not directly related to 
the focus of the study but do provide supporting information. While there are 
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interconnections between the issues, separating them into groups gives a clearer 
understanding. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The next section provides information about the 
interviews; the third provides information about the participants; and the fourth shows the 
findings and analysis from the semi-structured interview questions. This section is further 
divided into three sub-sections that explain the coding system, discuss the major issues with 
open-ended questions and address minor issues raised by asking open-ended questions. The 
fifth section is the chapter summary. 
7.2 Information about the interviews 
The third data collection technique in the interview template is a semi-structured interview 
used to gain information and perceptions about the effect of ownership structure on corporate 
governance systems within the SCM, particularly in listed petrochemical companies. The 
participants were asked only broad questions about their views, opinions, and experience 
regarding the influence of ownership factors on corporate governance systems; to ask a 
question about the company or organisation where they were employed would have been 
culturally inappropriate in Saudi Arabia. 
In this section, each participant was asked to discuss their perceptions of general corporate 
governance systems, external governance systems, internal governance systems and any 
improvements in these. Each section focuses on a particular aspect of Saudi corporate 
governance systems in general, or in the participants’ companies. Participants were given 
time to read the questions beforehand to ensure they understood them and had any concerns 
clarified. Each group of participants in the semi-structured interviews was asked the same 
questions. 
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7.3 Information about the interviewees 
The previous chapter outlined the participants’ characteristics. Table 7.1 shows the codes 
used for the participants to maintain their privacy and confidentiality. The names, positions 
and organisations of the participants were replaced with codes that have no connection to any 

































Table 7.1: Demographic information 
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7.4 The finding and analysis 
The following sections outline the analysis and findings from the semi-structured interviews. 
7.4.1 The thematic coding system 
A thematic coding system is used in this research to help determine the meaning of the 
gathered data. There are six phases of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006) (Table 7.2). 




In the initial phase the data were prepared and read. Some 
of the interviews were audiotaped and others were 
recorded by taking notes. The data were transcribed by 
transferring recordings and notes to a clear written form. 
As most of the interviews were in Arabic, data were 
translated into English by a certified translator. It was 
then necessary to become familiar with the data. The 
notes taken while reading the interviews were the first 
step in the analysis; they were also used for coding and 
constructing the thematic system.  
2 Creating codes Creating and defining codes and themes required using 
the AHP model
27
 before collecting data. These codes and 
themes were pre-determined based on the factors of the 
AHP model. Several rounds of reading and data notation 
were needed to identify the important and less important 







5 Reviewing themes 
The AHP themes were built and reviewed several times 
before the data collection stage. For other themes, the 
recursive characteristics of the thematic analysis required 
the researcher to review and revise the data several times 
to capture all the possible features within them.  
6 
Final report 
The final report is the last phase of the analysis, where the 
findings and results are linked to the research question 
and literature. The final reports aligned the objectives of 
the research to the results and findings section where the 
results are shown and explained, and to the discussion and 
conclusion, which links the research aspects together.  
                                                          
27
 See Figure 5.4. 
Table 7.2: The six phases of thematic analysis 
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7.4.2 The structure of the thematic coding system 
The thematic coding system was developed to understand how and why ownership structure 
influences Saudi corporate governance systems, especially in listed petrochemical companies. 
The AHP model was the key element of the coding system. Figure 7.1 presents the structure 
of the coding system. 
The findings from the semi-structured interviews are divided into major and minor issues. 
The major issues are those with some relationship to the AHP model, so they are divided into 
the AHP model and important issues. In the AHP model, the factors and sub-factors are used 
as themes; these include external governance systems, which include the legal and regulatory 
framework, external oversight, and external auditor and internal governance systems that 
cover internal issues and the board of directors. 
Other important issues, such as the uniqueness of Saudi Arabia and its ownership structure, 
are linked to the research, but they were not in the AHP model. These issues could be where 
interviewees were unable to classify them as either external, internal or both, such as 
development, and disclosure and communications. 
Minor issues include best practice, evaluation and whistleblowing; they have no direct link to 
the research or the AHP model, but they are useful for the overall aim of this research. For 
example, they may be used to support the recommendations in Chapter 8. 
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7.4.3 Semi-structured interviews  
The semi-structured interviews enabled the researcher to explore the corporate governance 
system in Saudi Arabia, specifically in the context of the petrochemical companies listed in 
the SCM. This technique helps to explain some of the AHP results because the collected 
dataset was very large, confusing and puzzling; this made the results difficult to interpret and 
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participants said whatever they wanted to say. Some answers were unrelated to the topic, 
which meant refocusing the discussion, and the huge amount of data collected resulted in 
very detailed explanations. 
In the semi-structured interviews, participants were asked to answer 11 open-ended questions 
based on the AHP model. These questions were divided into four sections: general, external 
governance systems, internal governance systems and improvements. Some of the questions 
differed based on the group to which an individual belonged. Participants from the CMA 
were asked questions about the SCM; those from the external auditing firms were asked 
about the listed companies for which they work; and those from listed petrochemical 
companies were asked about their companies and the petrochemical sector in general. 
There were also ‘interceptor’ questions based on the answers to previous questions, or based 
on the answers from other participants; these questions were asked in a way that respected the 
privacy and confidentiality of other participants. Some participants did not understand a 
question, which required changing the words or formulations; therefore, due to time 
constraints, there were few interceptor questions. 
7.4.4 Semi-structured interview findings 
The results from the semi-structured interviews were divided into major issues and minor 
issues, based on the coding system. 
7.4.4.1 Major issues 
Identifying whether an issue was major was based on its links to the AHP model. There were 
two main sub-groups of major issues: the AHP model and important issues. The AHP factors 
in the model were used as large themes: external governance systems, which include legal 
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and regulatory frameworks; external oversight; and external auditors and internal governance 
systems, which include internal issues and the board of directors. The answers given in the 
semi-structured interviews help to illustrate and explain the AHP results.  
7.4.4.1.1 AHP model 
 External governance systems  
External governance systems consist of a legal and regulatory framework, external oversight 
and external auditor. 
o Legal and regulatory framework 
Most participants from all three groups agreed that laws and regulations are important. In 
fact, in the combined results of AHP, participants ranked the legal and regulatory frameworks 
as the most important category, at 36.9%. They considered it essential for issuers and appliers 
because they must both know and understand all the laws and regulations related to setting or 
developing corporate governance systems at the national country and company levels. 
The first question was ‘What factors are important when designing and improving 
corporate governance regulations?’ Most participants supported the importance of laws and 
regulations; in fact 15 out of 21 clearly designated laws and regulations as an important 
factor. Others responded with more detail about issues such as missing laws and regulations 
about independence or qualifications. A few participants did not specify laws and regulations, 
and they did not say whether they were important, which excluded them as supporters or 
opponents. There follows some responses by supporters of the laws and regulations from all 
groups. CMA1 points out: 
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“Legal environments are an important factor that should be considered while 
setting or developing the current regulations.” 
EA3 concurred and identified: 
“Legal and social environments of Saudi Arabia.” 
As important factors in corporate governance, most insiders noted that the internal 
governance systems of a company are built on external laws and regulations, as specified by 
PC1: 
 “The first factor that needs to be considered is the CMA regulations.” 
PC9 noted 
“The most important factor is the corporate governance regulations issued by the 
Capital Market Authority.” 
These responses indicate strong support for the importance of the ‘legal and regulatory 
framework’ from all groups; thus it can be argued that it is essential for both issuers and 
appliers. Participants provided more information to support this, but they also indicated that 
there are issues that influence the current legal and regulatory framework. 
- Lack of interpretation  
Most participants referred to the lack of interpretation of laws and regulations as a lack of 
clarity. Laws and regulations that are not clear is a core problem because the applier does not 
always understand their requirements and therefore does not understand their objectives, and 
this will create problems. This view is supported by the combined results of AHP. The 
participants stated that lack of interpretation is the most important factor influencing legal 
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and regulatory frameworks. EA3 stated that an important factor when designing and 
improving corporate governance regulations is: 
“Clarity in all internal and external systems.” 
In addition to the previous question, most interviewees repeatedly suggested a need for more 
explanation, interpretation and clarification. CMA3 suggested: 
“I repeat and emphasise the importance of dealing with related-party 
transactions, and that should be clearly specified to ensure [that] its negative 
impacts are stopped.” 
PC6 noted: 
“Laws and regulations need more explanation and interpretation.” 
However, there is another view about the clarity of laws and regulations: one insider said that 
clarity is a problem because laws and regulations are not read or understood. PC9 had been 
asked an interceptor question: ‘There are problems in understanding the laws of the CMA 
or they are unclear; do you agree?’ He replied: 
“Actually, no. I think that the defect is in people not in the regulations. In other 
words, we need to carefully read and get help from specialists to clarify these 
laws.” 
He justified his comments: 
“The CMA representative told us that you have lawyers in the company. And why 
can’t you take advantage of them to interpret and clarify these laws for you?” 
These results show that most interviewees agreed with the lack of clarity in the laws and 
regulations, which was supported by the AHP results. Identifying the current situation will 
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facilitate more solutions; for instance, the CMA should regularly investigate the laws and 
regulations to find any limitations, and if companies are not complying appropriately, they 
need to seek further clarification. For instance, they should communicate with the CMA for 
further interpretation or explanation, or they could expand the explanation in their internal 
governance systems to compensate for any shortcomings in the laws and regulations. 
- Lack of enforcement  
The enforcement factor is an important element in achieving the objectives of legal and 
regulatory frameworks. In the SCGRs, there are compulsory regulations that apply to every 
company and voluntary regulations with respect to which companies that do not comply must 
explain why. The combined results of AHP placed the lack of enforcement factor second, 
while most interviewees supported the lack of enforcement and gave supporting reasons. 
Interviewees also pointed out that there are a number of issues that influence the enforcement 
of the SCGRs, with most external auditing firm interviewees stating that the Saudi culture 
should be considered, not just for the commercial legal system but for all legal systems. EA2 
noted: 
“In most cases we could have good laws and regulations but they are not 
enforced, and that applies in many areas not only the economic ones.” 
The second issue is the gradual process of rule enforcement that is also related to Saudi 
culture. For laws and regulations to be congruent with the cultural context and to reach full 
compliance, they must be enforced gradually. One approach to gradual enforcement is the 
concept of compliance or explanation, but it must be specified clearly. EA4 noted: 
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“Saudi Arabian culture should take into consideration the gradient in rules 
enforcement and consider the principle of either ‘comply or explain’.”  
The third issue is that corporate governance regulations derive power from other laws and 
regulations. As some CMA interviewees identified, the articles enforced in the SCGRs are 
those that are enforced in the Corporate Laws or Listing Rules 2004. This is one of the 
benefits of interaction and overlap between laws and regulations. CMA1 indicated: 
“Per my information, there are changes; amendments and development will be 
made on the corporate laws, which will help to enforce most of the elements in the 
corporate governance regulations.” 
The enforcement concept differs between voluntary and compulsory laws and regulations: if 
they are not enforced, no organisation will apply them. The Saudi context is a very important 
element in the enforcement process because knowing the local situation will enable 
organisations to have a relevant plan for enforcement. 
- Conflicts and duplicates  
Several commercial laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia are related to corporate governance 
laws and regulations, but they must be consistent and must complement each other. The 
summarised AHP showed that all participants ranked conflict and duplication as third, with 
an importance of 8.2%. The issuer’s understanding of the laws and regulations will reduce 
duplication and contradictions when setting or developing laws and regulations. CMA2 
noted: 
“Objectives behind understanding such legal requirements are to avoid 
duplications and contradictions in rules or agencies.” 
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In fact, these laws and regulations are issued by different agencies, and each agency views 
governance from a different angle. These interactions and overlapping laws and regulations 
led some interviewees to suggest that there must be unity between the laws and regulations 
that are related to governance. PC6, for example, pointed out the need for: 
 “[u]niting laws and regulations between them and the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry.” 
Moreover, due to the multiplicity of agencies and views, the chances of duplication or 
contradiction are very high. This results in delays or disruption in the development of laws 
and regulations. CMA2 stated: 
“There might be delays in some updates to agree the best suitable solutions with 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.” 
Surprisingly, this interaction and overlapping between laws and regulations can also benefit 
corporate governance systems in that a monitoring agency considers the legal requirements as 
a minimum for compliance. EA1, when asked an interceptor question about the overlap 
between SCGRs by CMA and the Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating 
in Saudi Arabia by the SAMA, responded: 
“Mostly, the people follow the one that is stronger which is good in a way. If you 
are a bank, you have to do more than what CMA said, which are CMA and SAMA 
– which are not bad but I think one agency is not able to do everything.” 
Another benefit of interaction and overlapping is enforcement; SCGRs benefit from other 
laws. CMA1 noted: 
Chapter (7)  Results and Findings (2) 
231 | P a g e  
 “Per my information, there are changes; amendments and development will be 
made on the corporate laws, which will help to enforce most of the elements of the 
corporate governance regulations.” 
- Missing laws and regulations  
The combined results of AHP showed that the missing laws and regulations factor ranked as 
one of the least important factors. The CMA participants indicated that the laws and 
regulations are sufficient at present, although there is room for some development. They also 
believed that SCGRs were issued on a general basis for all companies, and they assumed that 
every company needs to cope with the existing system and add its own specific laws and 
regulations. 
In contrast to the AHP results, interviewees described gaps in the laws and regulations; for 
instance, PC2 stated: 
“The Saudi Capital Market is an emerging market that requires further laws and 
regulations.”  
There are other specific examples of areas that demonstrate an incomplete framework of laws 
and regulations, one of which is ownership structure. In the SCGRs, there is no single article 
related to ownership structure. PC1 answered the question about identifying the major 
shareholder by saying: 
“There is no article or regulation that demands that the company know its 
owners.” 
Another example is transparency and disclosure. PC11 highlighted: 
“[There is a] need to increase regulations related for more transparency and 
disclosure.”  
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A final example is the qualifications of relevant employees; EA1 declared that one of the 
missing laws and regulations is: 
“Qualification criteria of the relevant people who are managing.” 
The absence of laws and regulations means there are no boundaries within which a company 
must work, which may lead to adverse consequences. EA1 continued: 
“At the moment, the board is able to pick and choose who they want and they are 
aligning the people to their vision.” 
o External oversights  
The combined AHP results show that all participants ranked external oversight as the second 
most important factor, with 28.2%. There was a range of arguments about the importance of 
external agencies because they are the issuers of laws and regulations. Insiders claimed that 
laws and regulations are more important than external oversight agencies, whereas outsiders 
placed more emphasis on external oversight agencies than on laws and regulations. 
- Agency Authority 
According to the combined AHP results, agency authority is the most important factor at a 
lower level. Agency authority is a very important issue because it influences the enforcement 
of laws and regulations. EA1 stated that one important factor for designing and improving 
corporate governance regulations for Saudi Arabia is: 
“The power of the supervision.” 
One issue that influences the level of agency power is changes in power over time; for 
instance, the CMA scrutinises a company carefully at the time of listing, but very weakly 
thereafter. EA1 stated that: 
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 “If you are a new listed company, CMA will take a very good look who is on the 
board and who is etc. Then they will give you the licence. But post listing, the 
monitoring becomes very weak.” 
Another issue is reliance on management and owners. EA1 explained: 
“If you are good businessman, you have credibility and you will make money that 
is influencing the decision more than the ethics and values of the governance.” 
These issues have a significant influence over a company, especially when management 
exhibits opportunistic behaviour. Agencies may rely on trust, but this may lead to misuse of 
company resources and adverse relationships between major and minor shareholders. There is 
a need for continuous investigation to reduce or prevent negative consequences. 
- Coordination between agencies 
There is a number of external oversight agencies, most of which focus on elements of 
corporate governance, and this results in layers of agencies. Coordination between agencies 
consists of some sort of cooperation between external agencies, such as collaboration 
between the CMA and Ministry of Commerce and Industry regarding laws and regulations 
concerning corporate governance. CMA1 indicated: 
“When developing new regulations, we send them to external organizations to 
obtain opinions.” 
There is also coordination between external oversight agencies and external auditors, such as 
where the CMA cooperates with external auditors by asking them to investigate a company’s 
internal systems. EA3 stated: 
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“Yes, we have been asked for that by the CMA or SAMA…, to provide audits and 
observation services on some corporations concerning their internal control 
system and their corporate governance system.” 
There must also be collaboration with international agencies. PC4 suggested: 
“There must also be cooperation between the CMA and GCC board of directors 
and GCCBDI
28
 to acquire expertise from the most similar countries.” 
This is still not enough, because most participants recommended more harmonisation and 
cooperation between agencies. The following quotations are examples from all types of 
participants. CMA1 suggested that: 
“There should be coordination related to the layers of agencies.” 
EA2 said: 
“There must be collaboration and coordination with other agencies such as the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry and SOCPA.”  
PC7 noted that: 
“CMA [is] working together with SOCPA.” 
Furthermore, insider participants suggested more cooperation between the CMA and external 
auditors. PC9 suggested the CMA request:  
“…help from external consultants.” 
                                                          
28
 GCCBDI is a not-for-profit organisation launched by a combination of large corporations and professional 
advisory firms such as SABIC and PWC. 
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o External auditor/external consultant  
The AHP results show that the external auditor is the least important category in the external 
governance systems, and the factors in this category also have the lowest values. This was 
strongly supported in the interviews, with most interviewees viewing external audits as 
having specific roles and functions, and that any extra role or function could change the focus 
and nature of the external auditor. CMA3 pointed out: 
“In case we need to further increase such responsibilities and roles, we might 
turn to changing the nature of their functions, and eventually they will divert the 
external auditors from their core functions.” 
CMA2 stated:  
“The external auditor is following the SOCPA standards, and I expect that it is 
difficult to assign them more tasks as such.” 
Most interviewees perceived that in corporate governance the role of the external auditor is to 
serve as ‘an advisor’, as specified by EA1. 
However, an external auditor does, in fact, assist with some aspects of corporate governance 
beyond an advisory role. An external auditor carries out tasks that are closely related to 
corporate governance systems. Based on Saudi accounting standards, an external auditor 
must report on related-party transactions, particularly if they are asked to build an internal 
corporate governance system. An interceptor question was asked of EA1: ‘Have you helped a 
company build their governance systems for them?’ EA1 answered: 
“Yes, we have done that.” 
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External auditors also help companies; PC1 replied to an interceptor question that asked, ‘Did 
you get help from an external auditor in building or improving your governance systems?’, 
saying: 
“Yes, we get help from external auditors.” 
An external auditor also has additional roles: PC8 provided an example of the role of an 
external auditor serving on the board of directors: 
“The general assembly….has the external auditor, who reports on related-party 
transactions.” 
External auditors also carry out some consultancy work; PC10 noted: 
“The external auditor, who is the external consultant, assesses the regulations of 
procedure because he depends on the ratings of the final financial statement.”  
An external auditor also helps to develop and improve the internal governance systems; PC2 
indicated: 
“We have a continuous improvement system which is facilitated by the external 
consultants.” 
Most interviewees assessed the current role of external auditors, and argued that they are 
probably weak because there is no legal support and a company has more power than the 
external auditor. One of the interviewees mentioned that if the external auditor:   
“…causes me a headache, I will kick him out and I will hire another one.” 
These issues led to suggestions such as increasing and strengthening the role of the external 
auditor; PC3 and PC8 recommended: 
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“more activation of the external auditors’ role.” 
 Internal governance systems  
Within internal governance systems, participants considered internal issues and the board of 
directors to be the two main factors.  
o Internal issues  
The AHP results show that internal governance systems were ranked with very low 
weightings because the entire sample believed that external governance systems are more 
important. Insiders depended entirely on external governance systems, whereas outsiders 
gave more emphasis to internal governance systems because they believed a company is a 
partner in achieving effective and efficient corporate governance systems. Participants were 
asked questions about their internal governance systems, and urged to provide examples of 
the current situation and make suggestions about the governance systems in their companies.  
- The internal situation and condition of the company 
Most outsiders stated that after knowing and understanding the external laws and regulations, 
a company must know and understand its internal situations and conditions, in order to help 
them set their overall business goals and strategic plans and identify their weaknesses and 
strengths. CMA2 noted: 
“The most important factors that need to be considered are the situations of the 
companies, which requires a good understanding of company’s internal 
conditions. Then, obstacles face the company in the application.” 
The CMA participants indicated that knowing the internal situations and conditions means 
that internal laws and regulations can be added to manage those areas not included in the 
external legal system. CMA3 pointed out: 
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“[Knowledge of the] internal situations of the companies allows the company to 
be able to recognise all its advantages and disadvantages, which it is required to 
properly manage and deal with.” 
- The internal policies  
Internal policies were an area of dispute between outsiders and insiders, because each group 
saw the need for internal policies differently. Outsiders believed that laws and regulations are 
general guidelines and that each company should develop its own specific ones, whereas 
insiders limited themselves to existing laws and regulations.  
 One reason is that the CMA left this as an internal issue in corporate governance regulations 
without providing any details. PC9 noted that their company’s internal corporate governance 
regulations are based on CMA corporate governance regulations, and thus from an insider’s 
perspective, the company’s internal aspects are controlled by external laws and regulations. 
For example, external corporate governance regulations do not refer to ownership structure, 
so the insiders were not concerned with it because there was no reference to it.  
In this instance the regulators and companies understood internal policies differently; this 
creates problems because outsiders expect a governance system that corresponds with those 
in other industries, markets, and countries, while the insiders only follow the laws and 
regulations.  
- Internal staff  
Several problems emerged from the interviews about internal staff because they include the 
internal auditor, the management team, and board members. The first area of concern is 
qualifications; most interviewees noted that directors and managers lack professional 
qualifications. EA1 noted that one important factor is: 
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“the qualification criteria of the relevant people who are managing ... If you have 
low-quality people, you will get low-quality management.”  
The second issue is not having internal or external laws and regulations for selecting directors 
and managers, which means an employer can choose whoever it wants. EA1 argued: 
“The board is able to pick and choose who they want, and they are aligning the 
people to their vision.” 
The third issue is independence. EA3 indicated that one of the most important factors that 
should be considered is: 
“the independency of the members in the Board of directors and executive 
management from any external influences.” 
The fourth issue is different views of how an internal auditor operates; most interviewees 
supported expanding their role. EA3 suggested: 
“strengthening the role of the internal auditor.” 
- Interference of others 
The AHP results show that most participants ranked the interference of others as one of the 
least important factors because they believe there are no interventions in any of a company’s 
decisions and actions; in fact all the listed petrochemical-companies interviewees stated that 
there is no interference except through the board of directors, but they also stated that there is 
no system for checking these interventions. PC12 indicated: 
“There are no systems that measure the impact because there are no effects from 
major shareholders.” 
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It is not clear how they can be so certain there is no intervention from others, especially when 
there is no system to measure, confirm, or deny the existence of interventions. Second, most 
interviewees agreed that the only way to interfere in a company’s decisions or actions is 
through the board of directors, but they could not be sure the board does not interfere. 
However, a family can interfere with decisions and actions via a family member on the board. 
Third, major shareholders have representatives on the board while minor shareholders do not; 
thus major shareholders can influence decisions made by the board while minor shareholders 
cannot.   
o Board of directors and internal oversight  
The AHP results indicate that the board of directors ranked low in importance within the 
category of internal governance systems. Specifically, outsiders relied more on the board of 
directors than monitoring systems while insiders relied more on the monitoring systems 
because they believed the system also controls the directors. System effectiveness is 
determined by the position of the board of directors and how it affects the company. EA4 
used a phrase that summarises the impact of the board of directors: 
“Being effective or not depends on the board of directors’ position, which in 
return will affect the company.”  
One example of the effect the position of the board can have whether the board members 
believe the internal and external controls are important. CMA3 indicated: 
“External or internal controls wouldn’t be efficient if the company’s management 
as well as its board didn’t believe in its importance.” 
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- Audit committee 
In the current situation there are no specific requirements for an internal audit committee. 
EA1 specified: 
“At the moment what you find is that it says that you should have three audit 
committee members. Now, if you take you, me and my driver, you are making up 
the required committee members and you tick the box.” 
However, most interviewees mentioned an audit committee when they were asked to provide 
suggestions for improving the internal or external governance systems. For example, PC9 
recommended: 
“activating a bigger role and increasing the functions and powers of the Audit 
Committee.” 
- Roles and responsibilities 
It is odd that the CMA required companies to specify a framework for the roles and 
responsibilities of the board of directors. CMA1 said: 
“Specific frameworks should be established for the tasks and responsibilities of its 
board of directors and executive officers.” 
This is supported by the external auditor; for example, EA2 stated that the company must 
specify its internal policies: 
“[companies should] further clarify and specify the regulations concerning the 
qualifications and experiences of the audit committee members, and also should 
stipulate professional certifications such as CPA and others.” 
This is consistent with the claim that the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations are 
general guidelines around which each company frames its own laws and regulations to deal 
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with specific issues. However, this also supports the idea that the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Regulations are not enough, and that more laws and regulations are needed.   
- The members  
Directors on the board face some of the same problems as internal staff; specifically, lack of 
qualifications, problems with the selection criteria, a lack of knowledge and understanding of 
the governance systems, and a lack of independence; these issues enable the board to appoint 
whoever they want. Thus, most interviewees suggested setting specific frameworks for 
selecting the members of the board. CMA2 suggested: 
“It is important to set standards for efficiency and expertise to choose, appoint 
and select key members – and not rely on the trust, family-relations, or courtesy 
standards in the selection of members.” 
7.4.4.1.2 Other important issues 
These issues were included along with the major issues because they are linked to the focus 
of the research topic, and even if they are not directly involved with the AHP model, they are 
still relevant to this research. Moreover, they are important because they highlight some of 
the weaknesses of Saudi corporate governance systems.  
 Ownership structures  
The Saudi Capital Market, particularly the petrochemical industries sector, is characterised as 
concentrated ownership because it involves different types of major shareholders. The Saudi 
Corporate Governance Regulations contain no laws and regulations governing the type, size, 
or interests of major shareholders. This section discusses issues that emerged from the 
interviews that are related to ownership structure, despite there being many contradictions 
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between the participants. In fact they occasionally provided incorrect answers, possibly due 
to a lack of information. 
o Knowing the major shareholders 
One crucial question for participants is whether they are familiar with the types, sizes, and 
interests of major shareholders in the Saudi Capital Market, the petrochemical industries 
sector, or their own company, since they are under no legal obligation to report – or even 
track – such knowledge. CMA1 was asked about major shareholders in the SCM, and stated: 
“The government’s ownership and being a major shareholder are what 
distinguishes Saudi Arabia, which is not available in other countries.” 
The Saudi Government plays the primary role in the Saudi capital market, but it is incorrect 
that this is unique to Saudi Arabia, because China and Singapore, among others, also have 
government ownership. This statement can be interpreted to indicate that interviewees believe 
the CMA focuses only on western markets, and the US market in particular, where 
government ownership is not their primary role; or that they do not know that other countries 
are similar to Saudi Arabia because other countries are not mentioned; or that most 
interviewees are not concerned with other types of ownership. Indeed, only a few 
interviewees mentioned family ownership, listed-company ownership or foreign ownership in 
relation to the Saudi market or the petrochemical sector. PC6 stated: 
“Family ownership isn’t frequent in this sector, but does exist, as well as 
listed companies.” 
This statement is actually incorrect because family-owned Saudi listed companies are 
frequent and substantial. Families have 3.64% of the controlled shares, which is low (Figure 
2.10). However, seven out of 14 listed petrochemical companies have family ownership 
Chapter (7)  Results and Findings (2) 
244 | P a g e  
(Table 2.6). In Nama Chemicals, the only major shareholder is a family member who owns 
7.4% of the total shares. However, five listed petrochemical companies have a Saudi listed 
company as the major shareholder. Twenty-five percent of the controlled shares are owned by 
Saudi listed companies. For example, the Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 
own 35% of Saudi Kayan’s shares. While many participants know that foreign shareholders 
have an important role in the petrochemical sector, only 8.62% of the controlled shares are 
owned by foreign shareholders. All the previous numbers are based on 2015 figures from the 
Tadawul website. PC8 noted:  
“The other distinctive factor for this sector is the foreign partner.” 
It appears from these answers that most participants have limited awareness of ownership 
structure in general or in any detail.  
o Identifying major shareholders 
The second issue is whether participants identify major shareholders when they are not 
required to do so by laws and regulations. All the participants were asked, “Do you identify 
types of major shareholders in [your company]?” and “How important are the interests of 
major shareholders to you when you develop and implement corporate governance 
regulations at [your company]?” These questions aimed to find the types, size, and interests 
of major shareholders at different levels. The answers were placed into categories based on 
the participants’ groups.  
The first group was CMA participants. These interviewees did not believe it is important to 
know and understand types, sizes, and interests of major shareholders when setting or 
developing corporate governance systems because it is an internal issue and each company 
must determine and deal with this information as it sees fit. CMA3 said: 
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“This must be internal issue to the companies.” 
The second reason is that corporate governance regulations are structured irrespective of the 
size and type of ownership. CMA2 pointed out: 
“It is established and set for everybody.” 
The second group is external auditing firms’ interviewees, who believed that identifying 
details about major shareholders is important because it helps to identify their possible 
impact. EA1 stated that: 
“We identify because positive or negative impacts depend on who it is.” 
The second reason was pointed out by EA2: 
“The ownership disclosures can ease the information asymmetry practices, which 
in return will increase the transparency and control the manipulations.” 
As EA3 mentioned, the third reason is:  
“to audit the related-party transactions.” 
The fourth reason is to measure the independence of the board. EA4 noted:  
“We identify the main shareholders in the company, so as to measure the extent of 
its board of directors’ independence.” 
The third group was participants from listed petrochemical companies. Their answers are 
divided into two sections. The first includes those who answered “yes” to the first question, 
usually when the company sees this as “a piece of information”, as noted by PC1, and also 
when the company believes this is part of disclosure. PC11 reported: 
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“Yes, the major shareholders can be identified so they can be published in 
the company’s financials.” 
This information can also be used internally, where for example, a company uses it to 
facilitate the general assembly. PC9 reported: 
“We care about this information with respect to the meetings of the General 
Assembly.” 
The other section includes those who answered “no” to the first question, generally because 
no laws or regulations required companies to identify their major shareholders. PC1 stated: 
“No, because there is no legal requirement that mandates the company to 
know the owners.”  
A number of participants in this group thought that this piece of information was not 
important to their companies. PC10 stated plainly:  
“It is not an important fact to us.” 
Third, many believed there is no need for this information because it has no impact. PC5 
noted: 
“It will not change anything.” 
Fourth, one of the unusual replies was along the lines of “if no one else does it, I won’t 
either”. PC2 stated: 
“Determining the type and size of major shareholders is not being practiced.”  
Fifth, some interviewees relied on others to disclose this information. PC12 noted: 
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“Tadawul
29
 identifies the types of major shareholders and reveals them on their 
website.” 
Sixth, the owners may have changed. PC7 said: 
“Ours is a publicly listed company where the shareholding pattern changes 
continuously. So, it is not important to identify the types of major shareholders.” 
Seventh, the company may deal with all shareholders equally, and thus there is no need to 
identify them. PC8 said: 
“This piece of information isn’t important to us, because we deal with all 
shareholders in the same way.” 
o Major shareholders’ impacts  
The third issue is whether participants understand the impact of major shareholders. The 
questions focused on the general impact that major shareholders have on external and internal 
corporate governance systems because every participant found it difficult to declare whether 
major shareholders had any direct or indirect impact in the company. For this reason they 
were only asked general questions about their knowledge and experience. They all agreed 
that the major shareholders had a strong influence over a controlled company, and they all 
gave examples of this when asked; this implies they are aware that major shareholders do 
influence a controlled company. EA1 pointed out: 
“The influence of the ownership is very strong here.” 
                                                          
29
 Tadawul is the operator of the Saudi Capital Market. 
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- Identifying impacts of major shareholders 
The fourth issue is whether internal systems are needed to determine and measure the impact 
of major shareholders. Some participants knew the major shareholders had neither positive 
nor negative influence regardless of the type of major shareholders. For example, PC8 said: 
“There are two goals of the partnership with foreign companies. 1) Getting 
advanced technology in the field; 2) Obtaining marketing services in markets 
other than the Saudi market.” 
All the insider interviewees were asked, “What internal governance systems do you have in 
place to monitor and report the influences of major shareholders?” They all stated that no 
certain system could determine the impact of major shareholders or even how they 
intervened. PC4 said: 
“[There is] no particular system that monitors the major shareholders impact.” 
The reason for not having such a system is that major shareholders have no impact in the 
company, as PC1 noted:  
“because such influence is not available.” 
This raises the question of how the participants knew there was no impact when they did not 
have a system to monitor and report the impact of their major shareholders. The following 
sections describe two types of impact that major shareholders have via external and internal 
governance systems. This is diametrically opposed to their previous reason, where they do 
not identify major shareholders because they believe they have no influence and they do not 
have systems for finding and measuring any influence, and yet they provide examples of the 
impact of most types of ownership.  
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- The impacts on the external governance systems 
The listed petrochemical-company interviewees were asked, “To what extent and how do 
you think major shareholders positively or negatively influence external governance 
requirements?” All of the insiders indicated that major shareholders have no influence over 
the external governance systems, as they felt that because these systems were controlled by 
government agencies, it would be difficult to interfere or change laws and regulations. PC11 
stated: 
“Everybody is interested to have the rules and regulations directed to their 
personal interests, but in Saudi Arabia I think that the external governance 
requirements are well protected by the CMA and Ministry of Commerce.”  
Second, most interviewees mentioned that if there is any change to the laws and regulations, 
every company will be required to apply the changes. PC12 noted: 
“If there is any change in any external requirement, it will be applicable to all 
companies without any exception for any company.”  
Third, participants felt that there was no need to influence external governance systems 
because they are not strong enough. According to EA1,  
“The external is not so aggressive anyway.” 
- The impact on the internal governance systems 
All interviewees were asked “In your experience, what positive and/or negative issues are 
associated with major shareholders and how do those issues affect the company’s 
corporate governance systems?” They all agreed that major shareholders have both positive 
and negative impacts, and gave some specific examples based on the type of major 
shareholder.  
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Family ownership was seen as the most influential type of major shareholder, because family 
members manage the family’s money and reputation. PC2 reported: 
“The management in family ownership are better than others because they are 
managing their own money and always keen to protect it.” 
However, the family can easily interfere in most aspects of the company. PC2 said: 
“There are many interventions by the family in all the company’s affairs.” 
Second, government ownership also has both positive and negative impacts on a controlled 
company; CMA1 identified one positive impact of government ownership: 
“The government can play the role of a trustworthy guarantor for minor 
investors.” 
There are also negative impacts, such as where governments are ignorant of the quality and 
ability of government-appointed directors.  EA4 noted: 
“The government’s negative impact could be in the form of its ignorance about 
the quality and efficiency of directors.” 
Third, Saudi listed company ownership was ignored in most interviews because some 
interviewees believe the listed companies are not influential. CMA1 pointed out the impact of 
Saudi listed company ownership by stating: 
“[They are] considered to be not important, and they have no impacts.” 
One insider also confirmed this view; PC9 said: 
“Usually listed companies have no effects.” 
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These answers indicate that participants know that a major shareholder can positively or 
negatively affect a company, and that each type of major shareholder has a different impact 
over a controlled company. It is important to link this knowledge to their views about the 
types, sizes, and interests of major shareholders, which are not contradictory.  
 The uniqueness of Saudi governance systems and ownership structure 
The participants were asked about the uniqueness of the Saudi governance systems and 
ownership structure compared to other countries or other sectors. Most interviewees argued 
that there is no unique factor in Saudi Arabia or in the petrochemical companies; that 
corporate governance systems are similar to those in other counties and other sectors. CMA2 
argued: 
“There are not unique factors for ownership structure or corporate governance 
which are specific for Saudi Arabia compared to other countries.” 
Most interviewees lacked knowledge or understanding of governance systems and ownership 
structures, and of the differences between countries, because they usually only focused on the 
western countries, particularly the United States. They did not mention other countries such 
as China, Singapore, Japan, Italy, or Germany, whose legal systems and ownership structures 
are similar. This appeared in the interviews because most interviewees provided examples of 
governance and ownership structures from developed countries and western countries.  
However, they did specify some differences between the Saudi and other markets, and 
between the petrochemical and other sectors, such as market sophistication. EA1 said: 
“We are still developing and learning.”  
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Another difference was seen to be “social environments in Saudi Arabia”, which EA3 noted 
should be considered when setting and developing corporate governance systems. Another 
was the nature and characteristics of the sector: most interviewees suggested that oversight 
agencies should employ someone from every sector. PC11 supported this: 
“It is important that the CMA and Ministry of Commerce and Industry get help 
from people or representatives from all sectors in [the Saudi Capital Market] 
because they can understand the nature and characteristics of their sector.” 
One example of the differences in the petrochemical sector was raised by PC9: 
“The company studies the benefits of the decision, like a feasibility study, and this 
study takes a long time. An example that happened in our company [was that] the 
study of listing the company started by 1994, but the company was registered and 
listed in 2004 – that is, after almost 10 years. What we know is that the decision-
making process in petrochemicals is very slow.” 
Finally, there are differences in ownership where, for example, the government is a major 
shareholder in the Saudi market but not in the markets of western countries. 
 The concept of development  
Development should exist in internal and external governance systems, but it is not covered 
in the AHP model. Most participants considered this to be an important issue, but it is outside 
the focus of this research, albeit useful as a suggestion.   
Saudi corporate governance systems are relatively new and need to be continually developed 
and improved. A Continuous Development Unit operates in the Corporate Governance 
Department of the CMA. All the CMA interviewees considered the continuous development 
and improvement of the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations to be one of the main 
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features of this Unit, and overall they demanded more development of the governance 
systems, both internally and externally. There are, however, some issues with development 
that have some consequences, such as cooperation with other agencies, which may cause 
developmental delays.  According to CMA2: 
“There might be delays in some updates to agree on the best suitable solutions 
with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.” 
All 21 participants suggested developing and improving most of the previous issues, but other 
areas also need further development. Table 7.2 summarises these areas. 
One area that needs development is sanction systems within the internal and external 
governance systems. At present there are no clear and fair sanction systems that would deter 
any wrongdoing, but if they existed they would support the authority of the oversight agency. 
EA2 noted: 
“There must be strong systems that have strong deterrent sanctions systems.” 
The interviewees believed that strong sanction systems would increase the strength of 
corporate governance systems. Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations do not have a 
section for sanctions, so if there is a breach in the system, the CMA is punished based on 
other existing rules that are not specified in the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations, and 
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No Development areas Example 
1 Definition, identification, interpretation, 
explanation, and clarification. 
Adding explanatory paragraphs. 
2 
More laws and regulations. 
Monitoring systems, the independence of the 
internal auditor, and internal control areas. 
3 
Extending existing laws and regulations. 
Related-party transactions, and disclosure 
and transparency. 
4 More collaboration between all oversight 
agencies. 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, and SOCPA. 
5 The involvement of others in designing and 
developing the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Regulations. 
Representation from main sectors. 
6 Meetings with companies that are required 
to apply these laws and regulations. 
Periodic meetings with the listed company 
for updates. 
7 The CMA must follow best practice 
internally and externally. 
The Italian experience. 
8 The CMA should revise the laws and 
regulations. 
Evaluating mandatory or optional 
requirements. 
9 Communicating with and educating the 
employees in the companies. 
Training courses, seminars, and conferences 
10 Increasing public awareness.  Through the media 
 
 Disclosure and communication  
Disclosure, transparency, and communications are mentioned at different places in the AHP, 
but all the participants ranked these factors with very low values. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, participants argued about the influence of disclosure on independence, but 
there is another issue with disclosure and communication between the major and minor 
shareholders. Most insiders stated there is no difference between any type and size of 
shareholders; for instance, PC1 indicated: 
“No, there are no variances, as the disclosing practices are the same.” 
However, the fact is there are differences in disclosure between major and minor shareholders 
because major shareholders have ability and access due to their representation on the board of 
directors. Another example is an interceptor question that was asked to EA1: “Do minor 
shareholders see the external auditor letter?” 
Table 7.3: Areas for legal and regulatory development  
21Table 7.3: Areas for legal and regulatory development 
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EA1 responded: 
“They will not see this letter unless they are on the audit committee.” 
This shows that shareholders on the board of directors have better access to information, 
while minor shareholders, who can never become members of the board, have no access to 
information. Moreover, the CMA requires companies to have more communications with 
minor shareholders by attending general assemblies and being active in the assembly. CMA2 
noted: 
“Corporations should activate the shareholder’s role by urging them to attend the 
general assemblies and so forth with an active participation, as well as to make 
them always aware of such issues.” 
As mentioned before, companies will not do what is not required by laws and regulations. 
Most participants were dissatisfied in terms of disclosure, as shown by the fact that most of 
them suggested increasing disclosure laws. For example, CMA3, EA2, PC3, PC4, PC8, 
PC10, PC12, and PC14 specified the need for laws and regulations that would increase 
transparency and disclosure and thus prevent all types of negative impacts; the remainder, 
however, were unclear about this issue.    
7.4.4.1 Minor issues 
This section highlights some issues that emerged from the interviews, but are not directly 
related to the focus of the interview. They were considered less important than those covered 
by the main focus of the research, but they still need more investigation to determine how 
they influence the corporate governance systems in listed petrochemical companies. The 
three minor issues in this section are best practice, evaluation, and whistleblowing.  
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7.4.4.2.1 Best practice  
Several countries have a great deal of experience with corporate governance, which makes it 
beneficial to follow the best national and international practices, as they are the result of years 
of experience and work. Several outsider and insider interviewees suggested alignment with 
best practice; for instance, CMA1 said that one important factor which should be considered 
is whether a company’s governance system is:  
“in line with the best international practices.” 
Most participants have no idea where best practices exist, so there are various views about 
where they could be obtained. EA4 could be no more specific than to say: 
“Best practices and that should come from both inside and outside Saudi Arabia.” 
A second view was only to use international best practice, but interviewees’ opinion varied as 
to which practices should be followed. CMA1 pointed out:  
“Best practices are the ones applied in matured or experienced markets in the 
stock exchange field…such as the US stock market.” 
PC9 suggested: 
“International experiences such as Pakistan.” 
PC13 suggested following: 
“global best practices, and in particular [those of] countries that we have 
business relationship with.” 
It is true that best practices can be obtained from different places, but the reason or logic 
behind the choice is important because there are no right or wrong reasons for following a 
particular practice. Most participants only talked about best practice in general, and did not 
specify why they chose their particular preferred model. They were asked, “What are the 
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criteria that must be available in the best practices country, market, or company?” PC13 
justified his choice with “business relationship”. There were also different views about who 
should follow these best practices in the CMA. CMA1 pointed out: 
“We should be aligned and consistent with the best international practices with 
respect to the corporate governance.” 
CMA3 indicated: 
“Corporations should always be in advance in following best practices in 
corporate governance.” 
Thus, a company either waits for CMA to cope with local and international best practices or 
acts independently to be in an advanced position. This may justify the blurred vision that 
CMA members and companies suffer from with regard to what are best practices.  
7.4.4.2.2 Evaluation 
Corporate governance systems may be evaluated or assessed by internal evaluation systems, 
which must first exist. One of the functions of a board is to assess management decisions and 
actions. PC8 suggested: 
“Assessment of the Board of Directors [is an important function].” 
Some interviewees recommended assessing the board of directors, but as EA4 explained:  
“In most cases they are the top of hierarchy, where evaluating them is not 
allowed, and that should be changed.” 
This is a Saudi cultural influence which should be considered. There must also be external 
evaluation systems; one suggestion that emerged from the interviews was to have an 
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independent organisation or agency that evaluates the corporate governance systems in listed 
companies. This would result in a ranking, list, or reports to classify listed companies based 
on the effectiveness of their corporate governance systems. CMA2 said:  
“An example of initiatives of coordination is a project to establish an ‘index’ 
between King Khaled’s University and other agencies.” 
EA1 suggested: 
“People should start publishing this kind of statistics to show the value of the 
governance systems. Then it will all flow.” 
These evaluations would give external users information on the status of corporate 
governance systems in these companies. External users may be small investors, potential 
investors, or other interested people. One influence of this evaluation would be changes in the 
share prices in these companies. EA1 predicted: 
“The share price will be higher for the people with good governance and lower 
for people with poor governance.” 
7.4.4.2.3 Whistleblowing 
One important principle is whistleblowing, which was omitted from the internal and external 
corporate governance systems. According to PC2: 
“Unfortunately this principle doesn’t broadly exist in Saudi Arabia, as there are 
no systems to make claims about any issues or to protect the claiming person. 
Finally, there are no processes to handle such claims.” 
Supporting such a principle would result in a monitoring system both inside the companies 
and in the external governance systems, so that any problem in either system can be reported 
without detriment to the person involved.   
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7.5 Summary  
This chapter presented an analysis of the findings and results of the third section, the semi-
structured interviews. A thematic coding system was used to organise the findings and results 
into major and minor issues. These issues were determined depending on their link to the 
AHP model and the focus of this research. The findings and results were supported by the 
AHP results.  
The major issues consisted of AHP factors and important issues. The AHP factors were sub- 
divided into external and internal governance systems, where the external legal and 
regulatory framework is important for both issuer and applier. These issues include lack of 
interpretation, lack of enforcement, conflict and duplication, and missing laws and 
regulations. There are also external oversights such as agency authority and coordination 
between agencies, and there is the external auditor/external consultant issue.  
Internal governance systems have issues with the internal situation and condition of the 
company, internal policies, internal staff, and interference of others. There are also issues 
with the board of directors and internal oversight, the audit committee, roles and 
responsibilities, and members. Other important issues not directly linked to the AHP or 
participants were also not linked to external or internal governance systems. They include 
ownership structures, the uniqueness of the Saudi governance systems and ownership 
structure, development, disclosure, and communication.  
Finally, there are less important issues that still have some influence over the corporate 
governance system in Saudi Arabia; of these, this study examined best practice, evaluation, 
and whistleblowing. The following chapter will discuss and clarify all the findings and results 
of this research, and then conclude by showing the contributions, suggestions for further 
research, and limitations of this study. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous seven chapters provided information on every aspect of this study: the Saudi 
Arabian context, explanations of corporate governance and ownership structure, the 
methodology used and the findings. These chapters were organised to offer a clear and 
comprehensive picture of the research aspects. 
A description of Saudi systems was provided to facilitate an understanding of the particular 
context and the strong relationships that exist between corporate governance systems and 
ownership structure. These relationships were explained to determine their complexity in the 
Saudi context. One of the features of this research is the use of AHP methodology because it 
offers systematic stages to organise concepts and provide the best possible results for 
interpretation, and supports the use of mixed methods through interpretation. 
This last chapter brings together the main aspects of this research. First, it will summarise 
each aspect of this research to provide an overview of the research strategy, and then 
highlight the main findings and results. Second, it will discuss the links and interconnections 
discovered in the findings. Third, it contains a critical reflection to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of this research so that suggestions can be offered. Finally, it will offer ideas 
about topics for future research. 
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8.2 Overview of the study 
This study aimed to demonstrate the complexity of ownership structures that predominate in 
Saudi Arabia and how that complexity influence corporate governance systems of 
petrochemical companies listed in the SCM. To achieve this aim, three questions were asked: 
I. What is unique about ownership structures in the Saudi context and corporate 
governance systems within petrochemical companies listed in the Saudi capital 
market?  
II. What problems are associated with corporate governance in this context?  
III. What response to these problems will improve governance systems in the Saudi 
petrochemical context? 
In general, corporate governance systems attract a great deal of attention, both locally and 
globally, from individuals, groups, organisations and countries. The roles and functions of 
corporate governance systems can lead to positive outcomes, which increases their 
importance (Demirag & Solomon 2003) as controlling systems that provide checks for 
managerial behaviour and provide grounds for more trust and confidence from current and 
future investors. 
Moreover, the importance of corporate governance systems stems from achieving several 
goals at different levels. At an individual level, for example, the SOX aims “to protect 
investors by improving accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the 
securities laws”. At an organisational level, Armstrong (2004, p. 1) claims that “good 
governance aims to add value to the organisation, reduce financial, business and operational 
risk, strengthen shareholder confidence in the entity, and assist in the prevention of 
fraudulent, dishonest and unethical behaviour”. At an economic level, the OECD (2004) 
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recognises corporate governance as one key element in improving economic efficiency and 
growth as well as enhancing investor confidence 
Nonetheless, there is a long—and continuing—history of incidents related to corporate 
governance that have caused a number of market and company scandals, failures and 
collapses. The most recent case was the GFC of 2008, which affected most countries around 
the world (Coffee 2009). In Saudi Arabia, the causes of some scandals, failures and collapse 
cases have been attributed to problems with corporate governance systems. This raises the 
question of why these systems were unable to prevent, or reduce the effects of, these crises. 
In addition to economic and financial effects, poor corporate governance can extend its 
influence to social, cultural and legal areas. 
One of the most influential aspects of corporate governance systems is the ownership 
structure in a country (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; Denis & McConnell 
2003). It has been almost a century since Berle and Means (1932) developed the concept of 
separation of ownership and control; ownership structure has changed through history and 
differs among countries. Academics and researchers still investigate potential problems and 
issues arising from the influence of ownership structure, but most research focuses 
exclusively on developed countries. 
The current research is considered to be a continuation of the research stream investigating 
ownership structure with a novel focus on the Saudi context. The research focuses on 
corporate governance systems within the petrochemical industries sector in the SCM. There 
are several reasons to focus on the Saudi context, and on this sector in particular. First, the 
petrochemical industries sector is one of the strongest sectors in the SCM, which makes it a 
very important sector at the national and international levels. Saudi Arabia is one of the 
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largest and most powerful emerging markets regionally and internationally; it is also one of 
the largest producers and exporters of oil and gas. In fact, any internal failures in that sector 
may lead to international problems. Second, the size and importance of the petrochemical 
industries sector make it attractive to local and foreign investors. Regionally, the SCM is the 
biggest market in Arab countries. Globally, the Saudi economy is part of the G20, a body 
consisting of the largest economies in the world. Informing the corporate governance systems 
in Saudi Arabia will enhance the market and encourage more new investors to enter the 
market. 
Third, the ownership structure of the Saudi market in general is highly concentrated; this is 
particularly true for companies listed in the petrochemical industries sector, which have 
major shareholders. Fourth, the Saudi legal and regulatory framework is considered to be a 
relatively weak system. Due to historical business relationships, Saudi legal, economic and 
political systems have been strongly influenced by the Anglo-American systems, whereas the 
Saudi ownership structure and legal system differ from the US context. Sixth, Saudi Arabia 
has unique social and cultural systems. In Saudi Arabia, the Islamic faith and Arabic cultural 
roots exert an enormous influence over most aspects of life. In addition, due to Saudi 
Arabia’s economic, political, social and cultural systems, it occupies a powerful position in 
the Arab and Muslim worlds. Seventh, there is a lack of literature exploring the ownership 
structure and its relationship to corporate governance systems in Saudi Arabia, especially in 
the petrochemical sector. 
8.3 Research strategy  
One of the important features of this research is its use of the AHP methodology. The AHP is 
an algorithmically sophisticated method that can be used when making decisions in complex 
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and unstructured settings (Partovi 1994). The stages of the AHP allow the researcher to 
understand the issue, collect both primary and secondary data, and sort and interpret the 
results (Saaty 1980, 1987, 1999) (Figure 8.1). 
 
Secondary data were used to recognise and understand the problem and to structure and build 
the AHP model. This stage established the foundations and basis of the research to help build 
the AHP model. Literature, examples, cases and regulations were explored to understand 
corporate governance systems and ownership structures in different contexts, including Saudi 
Arabia. Other supportive sources of data were also used to build a comprehensive picture of 
Saudi corporate governance systems and ownership structures. 
In the second stage, primary data were collected to investigate the effect of ownership 
structure on corporate governance in Saudi listed petrochemical companies. Primary data 
Fourth Stage: Discussion 
Contribution to knowledge 
Third Stage: Results and Analysis 
Analytic Hierarchy Process  Thematic Analysis 
Second Stage: Data Collection 
Demographic questions AHP questionnaires Semi-structured interviews 
First Stage: Structuring problems and building the AHP model  
Secondary resources 
Figure 8.1: Research strategy 
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were collected by interviewing relevant people using an interview template that contained 
demographic questions, AHP questionnaires and semi-structured interview questions. 
Twenty-one participants were interviewed and asked to answer questions in each of these 
three areas. 
In the third stage, the results of the AHP questionnaires were analysed using the Expert 
Choice software, and the results of the semi-structured interviews were revealed and analysed 
using thematic analysis. In the fourth stage, the results of each stage and the literature were 
explored and linked. These links helped to paint a picture of current practices in Saudi 
corporate governance. 
8.4 Main findings of the study 
Three methods were used to collect primary data, each of which identifies an aspect of the 
research; collectively, the results reveal current practices in corporate governance systems in 
Saudi listed petrochemical companies. 
8.4.1 Demographic results 
The demographic results provided a summary of socio-biographical information provided by 
the participants, including their knowledge, experience and expertise. Most participants were 
Saudis, males and relatively young. 
With regard to their knowledge and experience, most participants had graduate degrees in 
related specialities such as accounting, finance and law, and most had significant experience 
in finance-related jobs. The interviews revealed that participants had attended a number of 
training courses, seminars and conferences about corporate governance, and thus were aware 
of current best practices at local and international levels. 
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Other factors may have influenced their knowledge and expertise. Most had only been in 
their current job for a few years, and some had specialities unrelated to corporate governance. 
Some participants did not understand or know much about ownership structures or major 
shareholders, and they did not know the difference between the Saudi and US markets in 
relation to corporate governance (Section 6.4.1). 
8.4.2 The AHP and semi-structured interview results 
This section presents and summarises results from the two methods; taken together, they 
reveal a comprehensive picture of Saudi corporate governance systems in listed 
petrochemical companies. 
The results of the AHP and semi-structured interviews indicate that most participants agreed 
that external governance systems are much more important than internal governance systems, 
and while both groups supported this view, they differed in the degree of importance they 
ascribed to external systems. Insiders depended mainly on external governance systems, 
whereas outsiders emphasised internal governance systems because they believed that 
external and internal governance systems compete against each other. 
When considering external governance systems, most participants ranked laws, regulations 
and external oversight agencies as highly important. However, while outsiders believed these 
laws and regulations were important guidelines for companies, insiders considered them to be 
limits that could not be altered. Surprisingly, most participants in both groups gave the 
external auditor category the lowest importance because they believe the external auditor has 
specific roles and functions unrelated to corporate governance. 
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The groups disagreed about the importance of the categories of internal governance systems. 
Insiders ranked the board of directors as the most important factor, because directors are a 
powerful element influencing the monitoring system. Outsiders, however, ranked the 
monitoring system as the most important factor because they believe the monitoring system 
determines the roles and functions of directors. 
Unexpectedly, most participants had little concern about communication with minor 
shareholders because they believed that communication should focus on all shareholders, not 
just the minors, even though they knew that major shareholders have easy access to 
information. They ranked interference of others as very low because they believed there was 
no interference in the company’s systems other than by directors. The functions and process, 
and board characteristics factors also ranked very low in importance. 
8.5 Discussion of the results 
8.5.1 The uniqueness of the Saudi context 
The first research question was “What is unique about both ownership structures in the Saudi 
context and corporate governance systems within petrochemical companies listed in the 
Saudi capital market?” 
A unique context for a country exists when systems are characterised by local circumstances 
such as history, location, people and economy. Collectively, these characteristics distinguish 
a country and make it unlike any other, but do not negate the existence of similarities with 
other countries. For example, Arab countries share the influence of Arabic traditions, which 
are considered a unique factor not shared with non-Arabic countries. The level of influence of 
Arabic traditions also varies among Arab countries: for example, some Arab countries were 
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colonised by Western countries, which reduced their link to the Arab world. Nonetheless, all 
Arab countries are influenced, albeit to different levels, by Arabic traditions. 
The importance of these unique factors is obvious when a country plans to develop a new 
system or desires to benefit from other more advanced, developed and experienced countries. 
The borrowing country must know and understand its own local context to benefit from the 
example country’s advantages and reduce its weaknesses. Moreover, the borrowed system 
must fit into the local context so it can support local advantages and reduce any 
disadvantages.  
In Saudi Arabia, corporate governance systems is a new topic. Saudi Arabia has unique legal 
and regulatory, economic, political, social and cultural systems, as well as unique ownership 
structures. Chapter 2 provided a detailed description of Saudi systems to illustrate unique 
aspects of the Saudi context. 
The main issue is that Saudi corporate governance systems have been borrowed from others. 
As indicated by Fallatah and Dickins (2012), Saudi corporate governance systems are hugely 
influenced by the US model, though the Saudi context and the US context are very different, 
suggesting that perhaps borrowed corporate governance systems will not resolve Saudi 
governance issues. 
In addition, participants were asked generally what they thought was unique about Saudi 
ownership structure and corporate governance systems compared to other sectors or 
countries. The purpose was to determine whether they understood the uniqueness of the Saudi 
context. There was no consensus on the unique factors and participants’ answers were 
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contradictory. Indeed, most participants believed that neither the petrochemical sector nor 
Saudi Arabia had any unique characteristics. 
However, when the same participants were asked other questions, they said that Saudi Arabia 
had some differences from other countries. For example, one participant responded with ‘no’ 
when asked if there were unique factors, but when asked about the identification of major 
types of shareholder they stated that government ownership is considered to be unique to 
Saudi Arabia. The following discussions highlight unique factors and influences on Saudi 
systems. 
8.5.1.1 The Saudi legal system 
The Saudi legal system is generally characterised as being weak, and this affects most legal 
aspects. The Saudi commercial legal system involves multiple laws and regulations related to 
corporate governance, such as the SCGRs, the Laws of Companies 1965, Listing Rules 2004, 
Capital Market Laws 2003, and accounting and auditing standards. This multiplicity of laws 
and regulations creates contradictions and duplication, companies are confused about which 
laws they should follow. 
Moreover, with regard to the issuers of laws and regulations, those agencies that regulate and 
monitor external governance systems exist in several layers. The CMA issues SCGRs, which 
involve laws and regulations related to other agencies such as the Ministry of Commerce and 
the SOCPA, but companies are still confused about which of these agencies is actually 
responsible for which aspects. 
The AHP and the semi-structured interview results support perceptions about weaknesses in 
the legal and regulatory framework and external oversight agencies in Saudi Arabia. Both 
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groups ascribed these two categories—legal and regulatory framework and external 
oversight—high importance. Specifically, the participants ranked highly the lack of 
enforcement, interpretations, and missing laws and regulations. Most participants during 
interview mentioned issues in the laws and regulations, such as the lack of clarity. The 
participants ranked external oversight as the second most important factor in external 
governance systems, and while both groups gave the lower-level factors high values, they 
differed in the order in which they ranked them. 
One example of the layers of agencies and multiplicity of laws and regulations is that Saudi 
listed banks must apply two corporate governance systems. The first system is issued by the 
CMA for all listed companies; the second is issued by the SAMA for the financial sector in 
Saudi Arabia. 
8.5.1.2 The ownership structure  
Most literature indicates the importance of ownership structure and shows that it has a large 
effect on the corporate governance systems of a country (Berle & Means 1932; Roe 1993; 
Hart 1995; Franks & Mayer 1997; Shleifer & Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 2002; Denis & 
McConnell 2003; Coffee 2005; Young et al. 2008; Nguyen, Locke & Reddy 2015). The 
participants did not regard ownership structure as important in Saudi Arabia, but there were 
obvious contradictions between the two groups. Outsiders believed it is an internal issue that 
each company must deal with, while insiders believed they had no need to identify the type, 
size and interest of major shareholders because there are no laws or regulations requiring 
them to do so. 
Chapter (8)  Discussion and Conclusion 
271 | P a g e  
This lack of interest in the ownership structure in Saudi Arabia may be the case for several 
reasons. Saudi corporate governance is influenced by the system in the US, where differences 
in ownership mean that major shareholders are not considered to be a significant issue. 
Therefore, the Saudi system, which models itself on the US system, also does not recognise 
the major shareholder as a major issue. Also, most participants’ relative lack of knowledge or 
understanding of the nature and effects of major shareholders may have caused them to be 
disinterested in the subject. 
8.5.1.2.1 The ownership structure in Saudi Arabia 
The SCM, especially the petrochemical industries sector, is characterised by highly 
concentrated ownership (Al-Tonsi 2003; Alajlan 2004). In Chapter 2, the ownership structure 
was explained for both the total market and the sector (Table 2.5). The types of major 
shareholders include government ownership, family ownership, corporate ownership and 
foreign ownership, and each type of major shareholder influences its company differently. 
8.5.1.2.2 The impacts of major shareholders  
Most participants believed that major shareholders have no influence, and thus that there is 
no special system to explore, measure or report the influence of major shareholders. Further, 
they believed that there are no external or internal laws or regulations concerned with major 
shareholders. However, when participants were asked to provide examples of the effect of 
major shareholders, they were able to do so. 
This indicates that most participants had no understanding of major shareholders and their 
influence; however, one participant said there are enormous issues in company ‘X’
30 because 
it was controlled by family ‘X’.
30
 At the same time, this participant did not believe in the 
                                                          
30
 The participant mentioned the name of the company and the family, but for reasons of confidentiality the 
names will not be disclosed. 
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influence of major shareholders and thus he may have believed that family ownership can be 
the only influential ownership type, and other types are non-influential; or he may not have 
had knowledge about other ownership types. 
Participants had several concerns about major shareholders because their characteristics 
differed from those outside Saudi Arabia. There is no assessment of the power and ability of 
major shareholders, which can determine how they influence companies. The following 
sections summarise the participants’ perceptions of the positive and negative characteristics 
of major shareholders based on type. 
 Government ownership 
The Saudi Government has several advantages as an owner. Chapter 2 shows that it has 
abundant financial resources to fund any new project, and it controls all the natural resources 
in Saudi Arabia including oil and gas. The participants considered it to be a trusted guarantor. 
Local investors have great confidence and reliance on any company owned by the 
government. Based on development plans for Saudi Arabia, the government creates 
companies in a particular sector to channel investments to that sector. 
Nevertheless, there are many issues with appointed directors. Some participants mentioned 
that the appointed directors have low qualifications, experience or knowledge in the field, 
because the appointment was a kind of promotion or bonus not based on their knowledge of 
the directorship or the business in which the company works. The government also has the 
power to interfere in any controlled company, which is an issue even if the purpose is to 
achieve social benefits. As mentioned in Article 66 in the Laws of Companies 1965, the 
government has the right to determine the number of directors on the board in companies in 
which it has ownership. The government also aims to achieve social goals. For example, the 
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Saudi Shura Council has recommended hiring Saudi employees in companies that the 
government owns, such as SABIC. This recommendation aims to decrease the unemployment 
rate among Saudis.  
As a result, the government will often control the board of directors because it will have the 
votes of the majority who are appointed by them. This will make it easy for the government 
to override the CG system and ultimately undermine the internal control systems of the 
company. However, results of this study suggest that such behavior may not be significant 
since participants did not attribute much important to the effect of board characteristics on 
governance. 
 Family ownership  
Family ownership has some positive outcomes. Most of the participants mentioned that 
families seek to maintain the company’s reputation because it reflects on their own 
reputation. The family is thus keen to find the best person to direct and manage the controlled 
company, who would normally be the most experienced and knowledgeable member of the 
family (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Wang 2006). Investors may gain more trust and confidence 
in a family-controlled company because the family aim is to protect their money, which is 
embodied in the company as a whole. As participant PC2 stated, ‘they are managing their 
own money and always keen to protect it’. This is also relevant when the family appoints 
managers and directors who have a business background and experience. 
However, the interviews highlight as one negative factor that the family can interfere in 
company decisions and processes because family members are employed at different 
managerial levels. This led to the second factor: the family can appoint a member of the 
family with no experience, just because they are a member of the family. This is another issue 
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which is not consistent with AHP and the interviews results. For example, in the AHP, the 
participants gave low importance to board characteristics, but interviews produced many 
examples of the quality of the directors and the control of the board where family board 
members can interfere in the internal system. The third factor is that, as mentioned by the 
CMA participants, a family has concerns about achieving private interests through related-
party transactions.  
 Corporate ownership 
Corporate ownership may be appealing if the relevant corporations have a great deal of 
experience in the field; if the corporations have strong business relationships, which can help 
a new company easily enter new markets; or if cooperation between companies can reduce 
expenses. These positive factors were seen in the case of SABIC, which controls 35% of 
Saudi Kayan. SABIC is considered one of the leading petrochemical companies in the world, 
as stated in ICIS
 
(2015), and in 2015 it ranked fifth in the top 100 companies in the global 
chemical industry. SABIC has experience in the field. Based on the SABIC report (2015), it 
has significant business relationships due to its global operations. Finally, the board of 
directors report (2011) shows that SABIC and Saudi Kayan have signed a contract for 
marketing services because SABIC has a large customer base. 
However, the SABIC case also highlights some negative aspects. For example, internal 
contracts may be to the advantage of SABIC because SABIC appoints four out of seven 
directors to Saudi Kayan’s board, which will ensure that decisions benefit SABIC. In 
addition, one of the participants
31
 indicated that there can be less desirable reasons for 
establishing a new company. For example, the Saudi Government provides limited natural 
resources to companies based on a specific factor such as capacity, so a company may create 
                                                          
31
 The participant mentioned this after the interview. 
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a new company to increase its access to natural resources; a controlling company has 
concerns about related-party transactions, and establishes a new company to achieve private 
interests. The results confirm that there are many issues regarding laws and regulations that 
can be manipulated to achieve specific interests. In addition, there is a lack of disclosure and 
communication with shareholders, especially minor shareholders, who have no access to 
some details. 
 Foreign ownership  
One positive aspect of foreign ownership is experience at the business and managerial levels. 
As mentioned by participant PC8, there are two goals of partnership with foreign companies: 
‘getting advanced technology in the field’ and ‘obtaining marketing services in markets other 
than the Saudi market’. Being partnered with a foreign company does enhance the reputation 
of the controlled company. For example, one of the major shareholders of PetroRabigh is a 
Japanese company; in this instance, current and new investors perceive this company to have 
experience and technology akin to that of the Japanese company. 
Nevertheless, some of the participants mentioned negative side effects of foreign ownership. 
This type of ownership can take the form of ‘silent ownership’, where (based on the 
directors’ information in listed companies’ reports or websites) a company has some degree 
of foreign ownership, but there are no representatives of those foreign owners on the board. 
Another issue not mentioned in laws or regulations, including the internal laws and 
regulations, is that there are no guarantees if this foreign investor withdraws or sells their 
controlled shares. Finally, there may be differences in context. With respect to the example of 
PetroRabigh, although there are differences between the Japanese and Saudi systems, there 
may also be differences in the focus, such that the Japanese owner may be more concerned 
with environmental issues, while the Saudis may have no concerns whatsoever.   
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8.5.1.3 The Saudi social and cultural system 
As discussed in Chapter 2, several unique social and cultural factors in Saudi Arabia affect its 
corporate governance systems. In Saudi Arabia, the Islamic faith has a primary role in most 
aspects of life. Moreover, tribal traditions strengthen the relationships among tribe members, 
and the collectivist nature of Saudi culture gives relationships priority over most rules 
(Hofstede 1984b; Idris 2007; Cassell & Blake 2012). 
Another factor is the reasonably large family size and resulting ongoing relationships 
between relatives, even if they are distant relatives or their children. According to Abdul 
Salam et al. (2014, p. 4), ‘the Saudi household size ranges from 5.5 to 8.4 (average of 6.4)’. 
These family relationships engender strong loyalty between individuals and groups. Another 
important relationship is friendship. It is complicated to identify a friendship relationship 
because there is no way to prove or disprove its strength, but at the same time it has a massive 
influence over a company and its managers and directors. 
Finally, people who are members of an elite also influence others; for instance, those who 
belong to the royal family, business executives, religious groups and tribal leaders have 
massive influence over the people around them, and over their community. When one of 
these people occupies a position such as senior manager or a director in a company, this 
influence gives them more power and ability to intervene in the company’s system. Due to 
the power and abilities of the elite people, they may influence employees; for example, the 
employees may be asked to do or not to do something. Those elite people may not have 
adequate knowledge or experience in the field, but they still order the employees to do 
something wrong and the employee cannot refuse this order. 
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Nevertheless, there are huge differences between the AHP and interview results in the context 
of interference for others. Based on AHP results, both groups of participants ranked the 
interference of others as being of low importance. This does not match with the reality 
described and discussed in the interviews. As mentioned by one participant, the “X” family 
has strong influence over the company it controls. This is a problematic issue: participants 
believe there is no interference, but they said the opposite in the interviews.  
8.5.1.4 The Saudi economic system 
Saudi Arabia has a strong economy, so it occupies prominent economic positions at regional 
and international levels. There are many reasons for the SCM to maintain the stability, 
maturity and transparency required to enhance Saudi corporate governance systems. The 
SCM is a destination of choice for local and foreign investors. In fact, the number of newly 
listed companies in the SCM is growing rapidly due to increases in the prices of oil and gas, 
and new development plans. 
Even with recent decreases in oil and gas prices, the Saudi Government may use its reserves 
to complete development plans. It also aims to sustain the capital market to attract new 
investment from both local and foreign investors. These companies, especially petrochemical 
companies, have national and international influence, and they have strong business 
relationships with a number of other countries, all of which will benefit the Saudi market. 
The economic system is one of the main unique factors of the Saudi context, but was not 
mentioned in the interviews. This shows the participants’ lack of knowledge of and 
understanding about the Saudi context. It is essential to increase the effectiveness, efficiency, 
sophistication, legal protection, transparency and stability of the market because this will 
increase investor confidence. Moreover, promoting better governance and continuous 
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development will facilitate the sustainable growth of the Saudi Capital Market and enhance 
its reputation, so that it becomes a destination for national, regional, and foreign investors. 
8.5.2 The Saudi corporate governance system 
This section aims to answer the second research question ‘What problems are associated with 
corporate governance in this context?’ A weak system can produce problems that affect the 
market, the company and investors. The following sections explain some of these problems, 
supported by evidence from the AHP and interview results.  
8.5.2.1 Internal versus external  
In general, there is no specification of the roles and functions of the internal or the external 
governance systems in the SCGRs. Essentially, this provides space for everyone to do what 
they want. According to the CMA (outsider) participants, the laws and regulations are general 
guidelines for all companies, but each company has to build its own internal corporate 
governance system based on its own specifications. However, insiders believe that external 
governance systems are the limits for a company, and they will do nothing unless it is 
required by these laws and regulations. 
An example from the interviews is that CMA (outsider) participants mentioned that 
identifying major shareholders is an internal issue, whereas insiders responded by saying 
there are no laws or regulations related to major shareholders, so the issue is not what they 
believer, but is what is written in these laws and regulations. This was supported by the AHP 
results, where insiders gave external governance systems high importance, but outsiders 
ranked both internal and external governance systems similarly. The vast differences between 
these views leads each party to do what they think, not what they are required to do.  
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8.5.2.2 The importance of the legal and regulatory framework 
There problems arise from the Saudi legal system. First, it is viewed as a weak system that 
fails to cover all commercial aspects. The prior literature and the empirical results of this 
research agree that there are many issues in the Saudi legal system. The AHP results reveal 
lack of interpretation, lack of enforcement, duplication and contradiction between different 
laws and regulations, and missing laws and regulations. This creates vagaries that can be 
misused or misinterpreted. 
Second, the multiplicity of laws and regulations and the layers of agencies cause confusion 
and complications for all practitioners. As mentioned in the Saudi listed banks example, they 
are required to follow the laws and regulations of the CMA, which regulate and manage the 
capital market, as well as those of the SAMA, which regulates and manages the financial 
sector in Saudi Arabia. Both agencies have issued corporate governance regulations. 
The third problem is related to ownership structure. The SCGRs do not solve this local 
agency issue. This is because the regulations are influenced by the US model, where share 
ownership is a dispersed structure and thus the main agency problem is between management 
and shareholders. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has a concentrated ownership structure in which 
agency problems are between major and minor shareholders. 
The fourth problem is that current SCGRs do not incorporate Saudi social and cultural 
factors. As mentioned in Chapter 2 and pervious sections, there are several important factors 
such as relationships, the Islamic faith and Arabic traditions. None of these factors are 
mentioned in the SCGRs, nor are they correctly reflected. For instance, the Islamic religion 
promotes corporate governance principles such as justice and responsibility, so there should 
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be a strong link between the legal system and the Islamic religion, which should, in turn, 
influence corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
Saudis often pay a great deal of attention to the Islamic religion, which increases compliance 
to laws and regulations, although Saudis have different perceptions about civil and religious 
laws. In short, breaking an Islamic law will lead to punishment from Allah, but breaking civil 
laws is easy because there will be no punishment from Allah. 
Another example is where director independence is infringed when the director ‘is a first-
degree relative of any board member of the company or of any other company within that 
company’s group’ (in the SCGRs, first-degree relatives comprise ‘father, mother, spouse and 
children’). This is not in line with the strong family relationships that occur in the Saudi 
context. In Saudi Arabia, individuals may induce others to conspire to breach some of the 
laws or regulations to facilitate employment or other benefits for them or a family member, 
due to the strong relationships between individuals and groups. The fifth problem with the 
Saudi legal system is applying the ‘comply or explain’ concept as stated in Article 9/a of the 
SCGRs, where a company that fails to comply with some laws and regulations must explain 
why they did so. In the case of non-compliance, a company is required to provide an 
explanation, but there are no rules for the nature of the explanation. On the positive side, this 
is in line with the nature of Saudi culture, where laws and regulations can be adopted 
gradually, as mentioned by the participants in the interviews. A negative effect is that the 
concept allows a company not to comply with important elements in the system, which can 
be in the interest of the major shareholders. For example, companies were allowed to either 
comply with or explain why they did not comply with the ‘accumulative voting system’. A 
company explained its refusal to comply with this system by saying the shareholders voted 
against this system. For clarification, this voting system benefits small shareholders, and it is 
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not in the interest of major shareholders because it minimises their voting power. Thus, in 
reality, major shareholders voted against it because they had enough votes to protect their 
interests, while the minor shareholders could do nothing. In the end, the ‘comply or explain’ 
concept benefited the major shareholders more than minor shareholders. 
The fifth problem is the concept of the regulator ‘ticking the boxes’ of all the requirements 
based on the company’s reply. For example, the SCGRs require companies to have internal 
corporate governance regulations. When CMA participants were asked whether they checked 
the quality of the internal corporate governance regulations for the companies, they replied 
that they just ensured the existence of such regulations but they did not go into detail. This 
delegates this role to the board of directors, who are responsible for setting, developing and 
approving the regulations; the regulators only look for the existence of these required aspects, 
not their quality.  
8.5.2.3 The external auditor  
One of the surprising results is the weak roles and functions of the external auditor with 
regard to corporate governance systems. In the AHP and semi-structured results, most 
participants gave the external audit very low importance. In reality, external auditors play 
very important roles and functions with regard to corporate governance. One of the main 
roles of an external auditor, which is related to corporate governance systems, is to audit for 
related-party transactions, as required in the Saudi auditing standards. 
External auditors have a significant role in the general assembly because they explain the 
audit report to shareholders. As a consultant, the external auditor can be asked to build or 
improve a company’s internal corporate governance system. External auditors are expected to 
be on the shareholders’ side because they are employed to investigate the company to ensure 
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that the financial processes and systems are free of problems. This is important because 
minor shareholders have no power or opportunity in such an investigation due to the size of 
their investments. 
There are significant issues related to the external auditors. The first issue is the relationships 
between external auditors and major shareholders, managers, and directors which create a 
kind of familiarity that can lead to serious problems. In the AHP results, both groups gave the 
appointment of the external auditor very low importance. This means that they do not 
recognize the significance of the appointment of the external auditor. 
The second issue is a change between roles: an external auditor cannot provide financial and 
auditing services for a company, so the question is whether corporate governance consultancy 
work is included in the categorisation. There is nothing mentioned in the SCGRs or the 
auditing standards. For example, an auditor could be the external auditor while 
simultaneously building the internal corporate governance system for the audited company. 
The AHP results demonstrated that participants do not consider such roles and functions of 
the external auditors as particularly important. 
The third significant issue is communication, which the participants viewed in ambiguous 
ways. As mentioned, when they arrived at this part of the AHP, most of the participants 
struggled with the relationship between independence and disclosure. Outsiders indicated that 
the audit report is sent to the board, which includes representatives of major shareholders, 
while minor shareholders cannot access these reports—a potentially serious inequality. 
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8.5.2.4 Internal governance system 
In the AHP results combined across all groups, the internal governance systems were given 
ranks less than 25% those given to external governance systems. In the detailed results of the 
AHP results, both groups have ranked the internal governance systems as less important 
systems compared to the external governance systems. 
Outsiders emphasised the internal governance system more because they believed that 
ensuring an effective and efficient corporate governance system is the responsibility of both 
external and internal governance systems. However, insiders placed less emphasis on the 
internal governance system, which suggests that companies rely more on external governance 
systems and therefore wait for orders to come from external agencies. It is reasonable to 
suggest that if there are no legal requirements for having internal governance systems, there 
will be no effective internal governance systems. 
There are two main elements in internal governance systems: a monitoring system and a 
board of directors. Outsiders believed that the board of directors is more important than a 
monitoring system, whereas insiders believed the opposite. 
One of the main issues is the qualifications of internal staff such as directors, managers and 
internal auditors. It is important to have a set of policies and procedures for these internal 
staff, and companies must have a strong monitoring system in place to increase the 
confidence and trust of current and potential investors. There may be some sort of 
relationship between managers, major shareholders and other directors. There are directors 
who work in multiple companies, which may result in the transfer of information, but there 
are no specifications for the membership of committees or the board.  
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8.5.2.5 The interference of others 
The discussion in the second and third chapters and the empirical results show there are many 
ways for all types of owners to interfere in a company, while there is nothing requiring the 
companies to have strong systems to explore, measure and report these interferences. There is 
a lack of laws and regulations that specify or limit the role of every party inside or outside of 
a company. Laws and regulations are very important because without them it is impossible to 
limit the power attached to a role. For example, according to Article 10(b) in the SCGRs, one 
function of the board of directors is to ‘lay down rules for internal control systems and [for] 
supervising them’. However, as mentioned by CMA participants, these laws and regulations 
can be general guidelines for all parties, so each company must add its unique specifications. 
On the other hand, there is no internal system designed to expose interference from any party 
on any aspect of the company. However, most of the internal participants were very sure that 
the major shareholders exert no adverse influence. The existence of a system ensures that 
there is not likely to be interference by any party; but, if there is any, the system will report 
this interference to the highest levels of management, which should be revealed in the general 
assembly.   
8.5.2.6 Disclosure, transparency and communication 
Major shareholders have easy access to information because they have a representative on the 
board, while minor shareholders must wait for financial reports or attend the general 
assembly. The big issues are disclosure, transparency and communication, which require laws 
and regulations to ensure they are complied with. Most of the participants appear not to have 
taken this issue seriously because in the AHP results, communication in the internal 
governance system ranked very low. 
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There are some problems with communication, particularly a lack of communication with 
minor shareholders. As mentioned regarding the audit report, the minor shareholders must 
attend the general assembly to have access to even a brief form of the audit report. In fact, 
they need special reports, which are not required by laws and regulations, to provide some 
insight into the company to support their investment decisions. Thus, the annual report must 
contain a section with comments and notes about the company’s deliverables for the benefit 
of minor shareholders.   
8.5.3 Recommendations of this study 
Previous discussions revealed a number of issues with recommendations to respond to them. 
These are relevant to the third research question, ‘What response to these problems will 
improve governance systems in the Saudi petrochemical context?’ These recommendations 
are designed to result in the most effective and efficient corporate governance systems in 
Saudi Arabia. Most participants supported these suggestions, which are divided into three 
sections: general, external governance systems and internal governance systems. 
The major and issue that is essential to be solved first concerns the designation of the roles 
and functions of each party. These should be clearly specified in the laws and regulations to 
show what is required from regulators and from the company. For example, the CMA 
participants claimed that the SCGRs are general guidelines for companies and that each 
company should put its particular specifications in its internal corporate governance 
regulations. This claim is not mentioned in the SCGRs.  
8.5.3.1 External governance system 
- Laws and regulations  
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According to the AHP and interview results, the legal and regulatory framework is the most 
important category in external governance systems; thus, regulatory agencies are assumed to 
mediate all related issues. The results indicate a lack of interpretation, lack of enforcement, 
duplications and contradictions between the laws and regulations, and missing laws and 
regulations. There are several recommendations for resolving these legal and regulatory 
issues. 
First, regulators must provide explanations for the laws and regulations. For example, an 
exploratory section must be included in the SCGRs to clarify all articles as provide examples 
and cases for more clarification. Second, important laws and regulations such as those that 
address internal control processes, sanction systems and major shareholders, are missing and 
must be provided. For example, the SCGRs should require companies to follow the COSO 
framework for internal control processes. There must also be sections that enhance major 
shareholders’ positive influences and limit their negative influences. 
Third, it is important to take account of unique Saudi factors in the SCGRs to minimise the 
negative aspects of the Saudi context and to increase the regulations’ efficiency and 
effectiveness. They must be rewritten to include Saudi social and cultural factors to align 
them with the Saudi context. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Islamic faith plays 
a major role in Saudi life, so the SCGRs must be congruent with the Islamic faith. 
Fourth, the CMA should move from ‘ticking the boxes’ to detailed inspection. This will cost 
the CMA in time and money but will improve their effectiveness. Fifth, the CMA must re-
evaluate the application of the ‘comply or explain’ concept, which must consider excluding 
issues that do not influence any party in the company. An example is that one of the 
companies refused to apply a cumulative voting system, explaining that the shareholders had 
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voted against it. However, it seems unlikely that someone would vote against a proposal 
designed to enhance their own interests. In reality, major shareholders would have voted 
against this system because it was against their interests. 
Sixth, it is unfair to give one party the ability to decide for the rest; for example, the board 
sets the internal control process even though it may be controlled by one of the major 
shareholders. There must be an external review that gives the minor investors more trust and 
confidence.  
- External agencies  
This section discusses two main issues: the lack of enforcement, duplications and 
contradictions and the lack of collaboration among related agencies. There are tools that 
enhance the enforcement power of an agency, such as sanction systems and the power to 
enforce these systems. The first recommendation is that all external oversight agencies must 
cooperate and collaborate to organise, regulate and solve SCM issues. When gathered, they 
must specify the roles and functions of each agency (e.g. inspecting, monitoring and 
regulating). 
Second, this will help to integrate all related laws and regulations to reduce or eliminate 
contradictions, eliminate repetition and to increase the emphasis on other laws and 
regulations. For example, there must be integration between the SCGRs and the Principles of 
Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia to minimise confusion for Saudi 
listed banks. 
Third, enforcement must be proactive and not reactive to overcome any weaknesses. This 
depends on the idea of continuous development, which will be explained later. Finally, 
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cooperation and collaboration among all related organisations should include companies, the 
CMA, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment, the SOCPA, external auditors, professional 
bodies, education centres and the general public. The CMA is a new and relatively 
inexperienced agency. Indeed, some companies are new and inexperienced, whereas others 
have international experience and relationships. Their opinions about corporate governance 
and where issues lie should be sought.  
- External auditor  
As mentioned, it is surprising that the participants did not see the external auditor as an 
important element in corporate governance at either the external or internal level. This could 
be because auditors have very little power. Significant revisions are needed in relation to 
external auditors and their place in Saudi corporate governance. 
Thus, the first recommendation is to enhance the roles and functions of external auditor. 
Second, the SCGRs must specify some of the external auditors’ roles and functions, or at 
least refer to them. For example, the SCGRs must refer to the relationships between external 
auditors and other parties in the company such as major shareholders, managers and 
directors. Third, there must be disclosure of the identity of the designer of a company’s 
internal governance system.  
8.5.3.2 Internal governance system 
This section provides recommendations to companies. In general, a company should focus 
mainly on its business objectives and achieving the interests of all the parties. Such a focus 
will determine most of the aspects in the company. 
- Monitoring systems 
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As mentioned above, there must be laws and regulations that force the company to have an 
effective and efficient monitoring system. There must be an external agency that confirms the 
system’s accuracy by exploring, measuring every type of interference, and reporting them to 
the internal auditor and the board. This would enable any deviations towards private interests 
to be disclosed, which would increase investor confidence in the internal governance systems. 
In addition, the internal governance system must determine the roles and responsibilities of 
each party within the company. There must be some sort of communication with all 
shareholders, especially the ones who have no representatives on the board. This will reduce 
information asymmetry.  
- Board of directors  
In general, there must be a variety of interests on the board; a board should include more 
qualified EDs and NEDs, as well as independent and non-independent, male and female, and 
young and old directors. Based on the interviews, the directors, especially the government 
representatives, must be qualified and understand the business to be active in the board. One 
of the participants’ recommendations was that the role of minor shareholders should become 
more influential; for example, minor shareholders could create an association to have a 
representative on the board and general assembly who can speak on their behalf. 
8.5.3.3 General 
This section suggests general recommendations at both internal and external levels. From the 
interviews, it is evident that regulators and companies do not fully understand or appreciate 
the uniqueness of the Saudi context, so they must focus on and consider these factors when 
building or improving a corporate governance system. 
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It is important to promote the concept of continuous development in which companies and 
regulators continuously develop and improve their external and internal systems. This will 
help solve any current or new problems. For example, laws and regulations, external 
agencies, monitoring systems and boards of directors all need further development. 
Both groups ranked disclosure, transparency and communication as of very low importance; 
hence, both groups need to be made aware of the crucial importance of these factors. The 
regulator must provide information about companies’ levels of compliance to inform current 
and new investors, and there must be laws and regulations forcing companies to communicate 
with all their shareholders, especially minor shareholders. Moreover, a company must 
provide accurate and correct information to all shareholders, especially minor shareholders. 
It is better for a company or a country to adopt best corporate governance practices from 
national and/or international experience, but the regulator or company must choose practices 
that can be aligned with the local context. or modify a system to fit the local context. 
Singapore, China, Italy, UAE and Malaysia are examples of countries that have similar 
ownership structures and similar major shareholder characteristics to those of Saudi Arabia 
(Fallatah & Dickins 2012). 
As part of cooperation and collaboration between external agencies and companies, both 
groups must increase awareness of corporate governance systems on the part of current and 
new investors, managers, major shareholders, regulators and the general public. There are 
several ways to encourage awareness of corporate governance issues, such as training 
sessions, conferences, media, social media, education and publications.  
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8.6 Contribution of the study 
This research contributes to the body of knowledge in several ways. The research 
investigated the effect of ownership structures on corporate governance systems of listed 
petrochemical companies in the SCM. The use of AHP methodology has enhanced the 
contribution of this research by providing robust results. Overall, the research contributes to 
the literature, knowledge, theory and methodology.  
8.6.1 Contribution to literature 
This research contributes to the literature in three areas: ownership structure, corporate 
governance and the Saudi setting. As far as the researcher knows, there is no literature 
examining the effect of ownership structures on corporate governance systems in the Saudi 
context. Most ownership structures and corporate governance literature focuses on developed 
countries (Bozec & Bozec 2012; Baydoun et al. 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013). This 
research contributes by expanding the literature to involve non-developed and non-Western 
countries, and to study developing countries and emerging economies, the Arab world, GCC 
countries and Saudi Arabia. Finally, this research helps to fill the gap in the literature 
regarding ownership structure, especially concentrated ownership structure, corporate 
governance systems and the Saudi setting.  
8.6.2 Contribution to methodology 
This research contributes to methodology via the research approach, the methodology used 
and interviews. First, a large number of corporate governance studies used only quantitative 
research methods (Molina-Azorin 2012). The use of a qualitative or mixed-methods research 
approach was recommended for the benefit of the corporate governance literature (Boyd, 
Franco Santos & Shen 2012). These methods enhance understanding of corporate governance 
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systems, and thus were used in this research; this contributes to the literature by showing the 
findings from integrated quantitative and qualitative data. 
Second, this research used the AHP methodology. While this methodology has been used in 
previous PhD studies, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no doctoral research has 
used corporate governance systems and/or ownership structures. This study also contributes 
to the literature by adopting the AHP methodology for every aspect of the research. AHP is a 
sophisticated method that can handle quantitative and qualitative data, and it can be 
implemented to obtain pairwise data without any human bias. 
Last, this study created primary data by using interviews; thus this thesis contributes to the 
literature by assessing the understanding of participants on the effects of ownership structure 
and the role of major shareholders on corporate governance systems in Saudi Arabia.  
8.6.3 Contribution to theory 
Due to the focus on developed countries, agency theory dominates the corporate governance 
literature, especially the classical agency, or principal–agent, theory. This classical view has 
limited relevance to emerging economies and developing countries; in contrast, this study has 
benefited from a new dimension of agency theory—the principal–principal theory. 
In Saudi Arabia, ownership structure and corporate governance issues differ from those 
developed within Anglo-Saxon contexts, which is why the principal–principal theory 
explains the agency issue in the Saudi context. The difference between the Saudi context and 
other contexts with similar principal–principal issues is the characteristics of the 
principals/major shareholders.  
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8.6.4 Contribution to knowledge 
The findings of this research enhance the level of understanding of Saudi ownership 
structures and corporate governance systems in Saudi Arabia, particularly the behaviours of 
major shareholders within the listed petrochemical companies. This research has shown how 
the Saudi context influences corporate governance systems and ownership structures. 
The AHP and interview findings will help regulators, researchers and practitioners to address 
weaknesses and challenges in current external and internal governance systems, as well as 
suggesting ways to assess and improve these systems. Finally, these findings can help future 
researchers continue to study ownership structures and corporate governance systems in 
Saudi Arabia.  
8.7 Limitations of the Study 
As with any academic work, this study has several limitations; in this case they are 
conceptual and methodological. 
8.7.1 Conceptual limitations 
The corporate governance system is a relatively new topic in Saudi Arabia, which means it is 
not well known; this was apparent from interviews with those who work in the field. Most 
participants had no idea of the differences between Saudi ownership structures and those 
common in other countries, such as the US and UK. As would be expected, this challenged 
the researcher, who was forced to explain and clarify the differences to the interview 
participants. 
Second, one of the main ideas in this research is interference by major shareholders, which is 
likely to be a sensitive topic for participants. It is culturally inappropriate for someone to 
criticise their employer, so asking for examples of any negative interference by owners or 
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managers is difficult. In fact, no participant would suggest that owners or managers had a 
negative influence. To overcome these challenges, only general questions were asked, which 
were answered based on the participants’ impressions rather than on actual events. 
The AHP results show that most participants ranked interference by others as least important 
because they thought that no one intervened in company decisions and actions. However, 
some participants mentioned that ‘when you go to certain companies’ that are family 
controlled, ‘you will find lots of intervention by the family in the company’s decisions and 
actions’. However, the participants from that ‘family-controlled company’ said that there was 
no intervention by anyone in the company’s decisions and actions. 
Third, the study focuses on listed petrochemical companies because good corporate 
governance systems are important in these companies, but there are other firms that have 
made significant contributions to the Saudi economy and are worth investigating. These firms 
could be selected from other sectors, or from non-listed companies. 
Fourth, this study used agency theory as the theoretical framework, but corporate governance 
studies can involve multiple theoretical perspectives; thus additional theories should be used 
to provide richer foundations for understanding and exploring corporate governance systems.  
8.7.2 Methodological limitations 
First, several challenges arose due to the use of a mixed-methods approach. To design, plan 
and collect data is time consuming and costly; for instance, face-to-face interviews required 
at least one visit to every participant; they were often located in different cities; and most 
participants were highly regarded individuals and senior managers, which made gaining 
access to some very difficult. 
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Second, the AHP technique was unfamiliar to most participants and is rarely used in Saudi 
Arabia. This meant that a large amount of time was required to explain the method, its 
instructions and the terms used. This may have caused some misinterpretation or 
misunderstanding of some of the questions during the interviews or while filling out the 
questionnaires. 
Third, one of the major issues in the timing of the interviews is that most participants asked 
more questions in the AHP section, which reduced the time intended for the semi-structured 
interview questions. While all the questions in the semi-structured interview section were 
asked to all participants, there was not enough time to ask additional questions or seek 
clarification. 
8.8 Avenues for further research 
This research makes a considerable contribution to investigating the relationships between 
ownership structure and corporate governance systems in Saudi Arabia, but obviously it 
cannot cover every aspect, and there is much scope for future research. As mentioned, Saudi 
Arabia is considered to be one of the largest oil and gas reserves and exporters, which 
increases the need for stability. This requires more investigation, research and studies that 
help to stabilize the Saudi oil and gas companies and economy as whole.  
There are a number of avenues for future research for the author and other researchers. First, 
one limitation of this study suggests new avenues for further corporate-governance research. 
This study has adopted a primarily principal-agent framework for understanding corporate 
governance. Of course, as is always the case, any single framework cannot capture the 
richness and complexity of lived experience and is thus limited in its ability to explain. In this 
study, several possible frameworks other than a principal-agent one have been introduced, 
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though not fully developed. Thus a limitation of the study but a source of future research 
involves further development of different approaches to accountability and corporate 
governance. 
The principal-agent framework focuses primarily on the accountability of management to 
shareholders. This leaves out other meaningful accountability relations which are relevant to 
the Saudi context such as Islamic shariah, welfare of citizens, labor, the environment, etc.  
One of the most important avenues for research is the impact of Islamic shariah on corporate 
governance. The Islamic faith has a strong influence on all aspects of Saudi culture, including 
corporate governance.  Another fruitful direction for research is to focus on sectors other than 
petroleum, on non-listed companies, and on broader relations between companies and the 
public.   
Third, future research might also want to compare the Saudi scenario with regional and 
international contexts which have different political, cultural, and economic environments. 
For example, research might focus on Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, other Arab 
countries, or the Middle East and North Africa region more generally. Internationally, future 
investigation might extend the comparison to other G20 members.  
Fourth, there is a need for further research on every aspect of corporate governance systems, 
such as the impact of political, social, cultural, and economic practices on ownership 
structure or the corporate governance systems themselves. Fifth, one of important areas in 
Saudi Arabia is to explore the impact of interlocking directorates on corporate governance 
best practice and possible firm performance. Sixth, one possible avenue for future research is 
to examine each type of major shareholder in detail. This would help to define the role of 
each shareholder and how each type influences the company. For example, there are many 
Chapter (8)  Discussion and Conclusion 
297 | P a g e  
areas in government ownership open for investigations, such as government agencies’ roles 
in appointing directors and how they perform on the board.  
Seventh, future research might also investigate the role of the external auditor on corporate 
governance systems within different types of companies. One area of significance is the 
external auditors and their relationships with other parties such as major shareholders or 
management. Eighth, future studies may also want to examine the level of activism of minor 
shareholders within listed companies in more detail. Ninth, further research is needed to 
examine the role of internal governance systems and the impact that ownership structures 
have on corporate governance systems.  Finally, future research may advance the contribution 
of the AHP framework to ownership structure and/or corporate governance systems studies.  
AHP has proven itself valuable to researchers and policy makers in a large number of areas in 
which policy and operating decisions involve multiple attributes and complex cultural 
settings. 
8.9 Summary 
In conclusion, factors linking the ownership structures, legal and regulatory systems, and 
social and cultural systems are important aspects of the development of a corporate 
governance system. These influential factors affect the individual companies and the whole 
market, which must be taken into consideration when building or improving local corporate 
governance systems. Considering those factors is the role of both the regulatory bodies and 
the companies, because they complement each other. 
This initial research about relationships between ownership structure and corporate 
governance in the Saudi context has led to some interesting directions for better development 
of corporate governance processes. Significant issues emerge from attention to Saudi culture 
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and practices. Attention to these issues may be a determining factor in the prosperity of Saudi 
corporations and citizens. 
Finally, it is important to continue researching these and other influential factors for corporate 
governance systems to achieve the highest possible effectiveness and efficiency in the Saudi 
setting. This has a positive influence on the efficiency and effectiveness of the companies and 
the market as well as giving current and new investors more confidence in the Saudi 
economy in general.  
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Article 1: Preamble 
a) These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the
management of joint stock companies listed in the Exchange to ensure
their compliance with the best governance practices that would ensure
the protection of shareholders’ rights as well as the rights of
stakeholders.
b) These Regulations constitute the guiding principles for all companies
listed in the Exchange unless any other regulations, rules or
resolutions of the Board of the Authority provide for the binding
effect of some of the provisions herein contained.
c) As an exception of paragraph (b) of this article, a company must
disclose in the Board of Directors` report, the provisions that have
been implemented and the provisions that have not been implemented
as well as the reasons for not implementing them.
Article 2: Definitions 
a) Expression and terms in these regulations have the meanings they bear
in the Capital Market Law and in the glossary of defined terms used in
the regulations and the rules of the Capital Market Authority unless
otherwise stated in these regulations.
b) For the purpose of implementing these regulations, the following
expressions and terms shall have the meaning they bear as follows
unless the contrary intention appears:
Independent Member: A member of the Board of Directors who enjoys 
complete independence. By way of example, the following shall constitute 
an infringement of such independence: 
1. he/she holds a five per cent or more of the issued shares of the
company or any of its group.
2. Being a representative of a legal person that holds a five per cent or




3. he/she, during the preceding two years,  has been a senior executive of 
the company or of any other company within that company’s group. 
4.  he/she is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company 
or of any other company within that company’s group. 
 
5. he/she is first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the 
company or of any other company within that company’s group. 
 
6. he/she is a board member of any company within the group of the 
company which he is nominated to be a member of its board. 
 
7. If he/she, during the preceding two years, has been an employee with 
an affiliate of the company or an affiliate of any company of its group, 
such as external auditors or main suppliers; or if he/she, during the 
preceding two years, had a controlling  interest in any such party. 
 
Non-executive director: A member of the Board of Directors who does not 
have a full-time management position at the company, or who does not 
receive monthly or yearly salary. 
 
First-degree relatives: father, mother, spouse and children. 
 
Stakeholders: Any person who has an interest in the company, such as 
shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, community. 
 
Accumulative Voting: a method of voting for electing directors, which 
gives each shareholder a voting rights equivalent to the number of shares 
he/she holds.  He/she has the right to use them all for one nominee or to 
divide them between his/her selected nominees without any duplication of 
these votes.  This method increases the chances of the minority shareholders 
to appoint their representatives in the board through the right to accumulate 
votes for one nominee. 
 
Minority Shareholders: Those shareholders who represent a class of 
shareholders that does not control the company and hence they are unable to 





RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
 
Article 3: General Rights of Shareholders 
A Shareholder shall be entitled to all rights attached to the share, in 
particular, the right to a share of the distributable profits, the right to a share 
of the company’s assets upon liquidation; the right to attend the General 
Assembly and participate in deliberations and vote on relevant decisions; the 
right of disposition with respect to shares; the right to supervise the Board of 
Directors activities, and file responsibility claims against board members; 
the right to inquire and have access to information without prejudice to the 
company’s interests and in a manner that does not contradict the Capital 
Market Law and the Implementing Rules. 
 
Article 4: Facilitation of Shareholders Exercise of Rights and Access to 
Information 
 
a)  The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify 
the procedures and precautions that are necessary for the 
shareholders’ exercise of all their lawful rights. 
 
b)  All information which enable shareholders to properly exercise their 
rights shall be made available and such information shall be 
comprehensive and accurate; it must be provided and updated 
regularly and within the prescribed times; the company shall use the 
most effective means in communicating with shareholders. No 
discrepancy shall be exercised with respect to shareholders in relation 
to providing information. 
 
Article 5: Shareholders Rights related to the General Assembly  
 
a) A General Assembly shall convene once a year at least within the six 
months following the end of the company’s financial year. 
 
b) The General Assembly shall convene upon a request of the Board of 
Directors. The Board of Directors shall invite a General Assembly to 
convene pursuant to a request of the auditor or a number of 
shareholders whose shareholdings represent at least 5% of the equity 
share capital. 
 
c) Date, place, and agenda of the General Assembly shall be specified and 




invitation for the meeting shall be published in the Exchange’ website, 
the company’s website and in two newspapers of voluminous 
distribution in the Kingdom. Modern high tech means shall be used in 
communicating with shareholders. 
 
d) Shareholders shall be allowed the opportunity to effectively 
participate and vote in the General Assembly; they shall be informed 
about the rules governing the meetings and the voting procedure. 
 
e) Arrangements shall be made for facilitating the participation of the 
greatest number of shareholders in the General Assembly, including 
inter alia determination of the appropriate place and time. 
 
f)  In preparing the General Assembly’s agenda, the Board of Directors 
shall take into consideration matters shareholders require to be listed 
in that agenda; shareholders holding not less than 5% of the 
company’s shares are entitled to add one or more items to the agenda. 
upon its preparation. 
 
g) Shareholders shall be entitled to discuss matters listed in the agenda of 
the General Assembly and raise relevant questions to the board 
members and to the external auditor. The Board of Directors or the 
external auditor shall answer the questions raised by shareholders in a 
manner that does not prejudice the company’s interest. 
 
h) Matters presented to the General Assembly shall be accompanied by 
sufficient information to enable shareholders to make decisions. 
 
i) Shareholders shall be enabled to peruse the minutes of the General 
Assembly; the company shall provide the Authority with a copy of 
those minutes within 10 days of the convening date of any such 
meeting. 
 




Article 6: Voting Rights 
a)  Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which 
shall not, in any way, be denied. The company must avoid taking any 




must be afforded all possible assistance as may facilitate the exercise 
of such right. 
 
b)  In voting in the General Assembly for the nomination to the board 
members, the accumulative voting method shall be applied. 
 
c)  A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is 
not a board member and who is not an employee of the company to 
attend the General Assembly on his behalf. 
 
d)  Investors who are judicial persons and who act on behalf of others - 
e.g. investment funds- shall disclose in their annual reports their 
voting policies, actual voting, and ways of dealing with any material 
conflict of interests that may affect the practice of the fundamental 
rights in relation to their investments. 
 
 
Article 7: Dividends Rights of Shareholders 
 
a)  The Board of Directors shall lay down a clear policy regarding 
dividends, in a manner that may realize the interests of shareholders 
and those of the company; shareholders shall be informed of that 
policy during the General Assembly and reference thereto shall be 
made in the report of the Board of Directors. 
 
b) The General Assembly shall approve the dividends and the date of 
distribution. These dividends, whether they be in cash or bonus shares 
shall be given, as of right, to the shareholders who are listed in the 
records kept at the Securities Depository Center as they appear at the 


















DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
 
 
Article 8:Policies and Procedure related to Disclosure 
 
The company shall lay down in writing the policies, procedures and 





: Disclosure in the Board of Directors’ Report  
 
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the 
content of the report of the Board of Directors, which is appended to the 
annual financial statements of the company, such report shall include the 
following: 
 
a)  The implemented provisions of these Regulations as well as the 
provisions which have not been implemented, and the justifications 
for not implementing them. 
 
b)  Names of any joint stock company or companies in which the 
company Board of Directors member acts as a member of its Board of 
directors. 
 
c)   Formation of the Board of Directors and classification of its 
members as follows: executive board member, non-executive board 
member, or independent board member.   
 
d) A brief description of the jurisdictions  and duties of the Board's main 
committees such as  the Audit Committee, the Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee; indicating their names, names of their 
chairmen, names of their members, and the aggregate of their 
respective meetings. 
 
e)  Details of compensation and remuneration paid to each of the 
following: 
                                                 
1
  The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H 
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 9 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all 
companies listed on the Exchange effective from the first board report issued by the company following the date 





1. The Chairman and members of the Board of Directors. 
2. The Top Five executives who have received the highest 
compensation and remuneration from the company.  The CEO 
and the chief finance officer shall be included if they are not 
within the top five. 
 
For the purpose of this paragraph, “compensation and 
remuneration” means salaries, allowances, profits and any of 
the same; annual and periodic bonuses related to performance; 
long or short- term incentive schemes; and any other rights in 
rem. 
 
f) Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the 
company by the Authority or any other supervisory or regulatory or 
judiciary body. 
g) Results of the annual audit of the effectiveness of the internal control 






























BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
Article 10: Main Functions of the Board of Directors 
 
Among the main functions of the Board is the fallowing: 
 
a) Approving the strategic plans and main objectives of the company and 
supervising their implementation; this includes: 
 
1. Laying down a comprehensive strategy for the company, the 
main work plans and the policy related to risk management, 
reviewing and updating of such policy. 
 
2. Determining the most appropriate capital structure of the 
company, its strategies and financial objectives and approving 
its annual budgets. 
 
3. Supervising the main capital expenses of the company and 
acquisition/disposal of assets. 
 
4.  Deciding the performance objectives to be achieved and 
supervising the implementation thereof and the overall 
performance of the company. 
 
5. Reviewing and approving the organizational and functional 
structures of the company on a periodical basis. 
 
b) Lay down rules for internal control systems and supervising them; this 
includes: 
 
1.  Developing a written policy that would regulates conflict of 
interest and remedy any possible cases of conflict by members of 
the Board of Directors, executive management and 
shareholders. This includes misuse of the company’s assets 
and facilities and the arbitrary disposition resulting from 
dealings with the related parties. 
 
2. Ensuring the integrity of the financial and accounting 
procedures including procedures related to the preparation of 





3. Ensuring the implementation of control procedures appropriate 
for risk management by forecasting the risks that the company 
could encounter and disclosing them with transparency. 
 
4. Reviewing annually the effectiveness of the internal control 
systems. 
 
c) Drafting a Corporate Governance Code for the company that does not 
contradict the provisions of this regulation, supervising and 
monitoring in general the effectiveness of the code and amending it 
whenever necessary. 
 
d) Laying down specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures, 
for the membership of the Board of Directors and implementing them 
after they have been approved by the General Assembly. 
 
e) Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with 
stakeholders with a view to protecting their respective rights; in 
particular, such policy must cover the following: 
 
1. Mechanisms for indemnifying the stakeholders in case of 
contravening their rights under the law and their respective 
contracts. 
 
2. Mechanisms for settlement of complaints or disputes that might 
arise between the company and the stakeholders. 
 
3. Suitable mechanisms for maintaining good relationships with 
customers and suppliers and protecting the confidentiality of 
information related to them. 
 
4. A code of conduct for the company’s executives and employees   
compatible with the proper professional and ethical standards, 
and regulate their relationship with the stakeholders. The Board 
of Directors lays down procedures for supervising this code and 
ensuring compliance there with. 
 
5. The Company’s social contributions. 
f) Deciding policies and procedures to ensure the company’s compliance 
with the laws and regulations and the company’s obligation to 








Article 11 : Responsibilities of the Board 
 
a)  Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the 
company’s Board of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers 
for the company’s management. The ultimate responsibility for the 
company rests with the Board even if it sets up committees or  
delegates some of its powers to a third party. The Board of Directors 
shall avoid issuing general or indefinite power of attorney.  
 
b)  The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated 
in the company’s Articles of Association. 
 
c)  The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible 
manner, in good faith and with due diligence. Its decisions should be 
based on sufficient information from the executive management, or 
from any other reliable source. 
 
d)  A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; he 
undertakes to carry out whatever may be in the general interest of the 
company, but not the interests of the group he represents or that which 
voted in favor of his appointment to the Board of Directors. 
 
e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to 
the executive management and the procedures for taking any action 
and the validity of such delegation. It shall also determine matters 
reserved for decision by the Board of Directors. The executive 
management shall submit to the Board of Directors periodic reports on 
the exercise of the delegated powers. 
 
f)  The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for 
orienting the new board members of the company’s business and, in 
particular, the financial and legal aspects, in addition to their training, 
where necessary. 
 
g)  The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about 
the company is made available to all members of the Board of 
Directors, generally, and, in particular, to the non-executive members, 






h)  The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which 
spans more than three years, and shall not sell or mortgage real estate 
of the company, or drop the company's debts, unless it is authorized to 
do so by the company’s Articles of Association. In the case where the 
company’s Articles of Association includes no provisions to this 
respect, the Board should not act without the approval of the General 






: Formation of the Board  
 
Formation of the Board of Directors shall be subject to the following: 
 
a) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the number 
of the Board of Directors members, provided that such number shall 
not be less than three and not more than eleven. 
  
b)  The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the Board of 
Directors for the duration provided for in the Articles of Association 
of the company, provided that such duration shall not exceed three 
years. Unless otherwise provided for in the Articles of Association of 
the company, members of the Board may be reappointed. 
 
c)  The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non-
executive members. 
 
d)  It is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board 
of Directors with any other executive position in the company, such as 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the 
general manager. 
 
e)  The independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less 
than two members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater. 
 
f)  The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the manner 
in which membership of the Board of Directors terminates. At all 
times, the General Assembly may dismiss all or any of the members 
                                                 
2 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H 
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making paragraphs (c) and (e) of Article 12 of the Corporate Governance 





of the Board of Directors even though the Articles of Association 
provide otherwise. 
 
g)  On termination of membership of a board member in any of the ways 
of termination, the company shall promptly notify the Authority and 
the Exchange and shall specify the reasons for such termination. 
 
h) A member of the Board of Directors shall not act as a member of the 
Board of Directors of more than five joint stock companies at the 
same time. 
 
i) Judicial person who is entitled under the company’s Articles of 
Association to appoint representatives in the Board of Directors, is not 




Article 13: Committees of the Board  
 
a) A suitable number of committees shall be set up in accordance with 
the company’s requirements and circumstances, in order to enable the 
Board of Directors to perform its duties in an effective manner. 
 
b) The formation of committees subordinate to the Board of Directors 
shall be according to general procedures laid down by the Board, 
indicating the duties, the duration and the powers of each committee, 
and the manner in which the Board monitors its activities. The 
committee shall notify the Board of its activities, findings or decisions 
with complete transparency. The Board shall periodically pursue the 
activities of such committees so as to ensure that the activities 
entrusted to those committees are duly performed. The Board shall 
approve the by-laws of all committees of the Board, including, inter 
alia, the Audit Committee, Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee. 
 
c) A sufficient number of the non-executive members of the Board of 
Directors shall be appointed in committees that are concerned with 
activities that might involve a conflict of interest, such as ensuring the 
integrity of the financial and non-financial reports, reviewing the deals 
concluded by related parties, nomination to membership of the Board, 









: Audit Committee  
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named the 
“Audit Committee”.  Its members shall not be less than three, 
including a specialist in financial and accounting matters. Executive 
board members are not eligible for Audit Committee membership.  
 
b)  The General Assembly of shareholders shall, upon a recommendation 
of the Board of Directors, issue rules for appointing the members of 
the Audit Committee and define the term of their office and the 
procedure to be followed by the Committee. 
 
c)  The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee include the 
following: 
 
1. To supervise the company’s internal audit department to ensure 
its effectiveness in executing the activities and duties specified 
by the Board of Directors.  
2. To review the internal audit procedure and prepare a written 
report on such audit and its recommendations with respect to it. 
 
3. To review the internal audit reports and pursue the 
implementation of the corrective measures in respect of the 
comments included in them. 
 
4.  To recommend to the Board of Directors the appointment, 
dismissal and the Remuneration of external auditors; upon any 
such recommendation, regard must be made to their 
independence. 
 
5.  To supervise the activities of the external auditors and approve 
any activity beyond the scope of the audit work assigned to 
them during the performance of their duties. 
 
6.  To review together with the external auditor the audit plan and 
make any comments thereon. 
 
                                                 
3
 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H 
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 14 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory 




7.  To review the external auditor’s comments on the financial 
statements and follow up the actions taken about them. 
 
8. To review the interim and annual financial statements prior to 
presentation to the Board of Directors; and to give opinion and 
recommendations with respect thereto. 
 
9. To review the accounting policies in force and advise the Board 





: Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named 
“Nomination and Remuneration Committee”. 
 
b)  The General Assembly shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of 
Directors, issue rules for the appointment of the members of the 
Nomination and Remuneration Committee, their remunerations, and 
terms of office and the procedure to be followed by such committee. 
 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee include the following: 
 
1. Recommend to the Board of Directors appointments to 
membership of the Board in accordance with the approved policies 
and standards; the Committee shall ensure that no person who has 
been previously convicted of any offense affecting honor or 
honesty is nominated for such membership. 
 
2.  Annual review of the requirement of suitable skills for 
membership of the Board of Directors and the preparation of a 
description of the required capabilities and qualifications for such 
membership, including, inter alia, the time that a Board member 
should reserve for the activities of the Board. 
 
3. Review the structure of the Board of Directors and recommend 
changes. 
 
                                                 
4
 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-10-2010) Dated 30/3/1431H 
corresponding to 16/3/2010G making Article 15 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on 




4. Determine the points of strength and weakness in the Board of 
Directors and recommend remedies that are compatible with the 
company’s interest. 
 
5. Ensure on an annual basis the independence of the independent 
members and the absence of any conflict of interest in case a Board 
member also acts as a member of the Board of Directors of another 
company. 
 
6. Draw clear policies regarding the indemnities and remunerations of 
the Board members and top executives; in laying down such 
policies, the standards related to performance shall be followed. 
 
 
Article 16: Meetings of the Board  
 
1.The Board members shall allot ample time for performing their 
responsibilities, including the preparation for the meetings of the Board 
and the permanent and ad hoc committees, and shall endeavor to attend 
such meetings. 
 
2. The Board shall convene its ordinary meetings regularly upon a request 
by the Chairman. The Chairman shall call the Board for an unforeseen 
meeting upon a written request by two of its members. 
 
3. When preparing a specified agenda to be presented to the Board, the 
Chairman should consult the other members of the Board and the CEO. 
The agenda and other documentation should be sent to the members in 
a sufficient time prior to the meeting so that they may be able to 
consider such matters and prepare themselves for the meeting. Once 
convened, the Board shall approve the agenda; should any member of 
the Board raise any objection to this agenda, the details of such 
objection shall be entered in the minutes of the meeting. 
 
4. The Board shall document its meetings and prepare records of the 
deliberations and the voting, and arrange for these records to be kept in 
chapters for ease of reference. 
 
Article 17:  Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members 
 
The Articles of Association of the company shall set forth the manner of 




lump sum amount, attendance allowance, rights in rem or a certain 




Article 18. Conflict of Interest within the Board 
 
a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the 
General Assembly, to be renewed each year, have any interest 
(whether directly or indirectly) in the company’s business and 
contracts. The activities to be performed through general bidding shall 
constitute an exception where a Board member is the best bidder. A 
Board member shall notify the Board of Directors of any personal 
interest he/she may have in the business and contracts that are 
completed for the company’s account. Such notification shall be 
entered in the minutes of the meeting. A Board member who is an 
interested party shall not be entitled to vote on the resolution to be 
adopted in this regard neither in the General Assembly nor in the 
Board of Directors. The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall 
notify the General Assembly, when convened, of the activities and 
contracts in respect of which a Board member may have a personal 
interest and shall attach to such notification a special report prepared 
by the company’s auditor. 
 
b)  A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization of the 
General Assembly, to be renewed annually, participate in any activity 
which may likely compete with the activities of the company, or trade 
in any branch of the activities carried out by the company. 
 
c)  The company shall not grant cash loan whatsoever to any of its Board 
members or render guarantee in respect of any loan entered into by a 


















Article 19: Publication and Entry into Force 
 





The impact of ownership structures on corporate governance systems of 
listed petrochemical companies in Saudi Arabia 
The research team would like to thank you and express our appreciation for your participation in this 
project. Also, we wish you a pleasant and useful time during the interview.  
Please use your experience to answer the interview questions about the relations between ownership 
structures and corporate governance systems in the Saudi capital market.  
In this project, you will be asked to complete three sections which are (1) demographic information, 
(2) an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) questionnaire and (3) open-ended questions. The questions in 
the second and third sections have been divided into three subsections:  
 “General”; 
 “External governance systems” and,  
 “Internal governance systems”.  
- The first section is the demographic information  
In the beginning of the interview, you will be asked to answer 7 questions about general personal 
information which will be used in the study to identify quantifiable subsets within a given population.  
- The second section is the AHP questionnaire 
In the AHP questionnaire, you will be asked to answer 8 questions. You will answer those questions 
by doing paired comparisons which means that you will use your experience to judge and give 
weights to the relative importance of each factor on the left compared to the factor on the right.  
- The third section is open-ended questions 
After finishing the second section, you will be asked to answer 11 semi-structured interview questions 
related to the same topic. You will be asked to answer those questions according to your experience 
and judgement. 
Finally, your contribution to this research is very significant to the success of this project. Again thank 
you and we appreciate your cooperation.  
Notes:  
- There are aid documents which are instructions for doing the AHP questionnaire, the comparison scale, 
and list of terms and definitions.  
- Please carefully apply each of the definitions to the terms that you will see in this task.  
- You have the right and please feel free to refer back to any of these documents as you complete the 




Instructions for AHP Questionnaire 
Introduction 
The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is a decision making technique. Briefly, it provides a 
comprehensive framework for structuring a problem. It is a method of breaking down a 
complex, unstructured situation into its component parts. In this research, the AHP technique 
is used as a data collection and analysis method. The AHP enables the researcher to measure 
qualitative judgements that are provided from participants by quantitative tools. The AHP is a 
well-designed technique and it should follow a certain format. The following are instructions 
for doing the AHP questionnaire. Please carefully read the instructions because understanding 
the format will help to provide answers that are consistent with your experience.  
Instructions 
In everything that we do, there are influential factors, and some factors are more important 
than other factors. Thus, we need to know the relative importance of each factor. For example, 
in building road systems, cost and safety are both important factors. But, for any given 
decision-maker, those two factors may differ in their relative importance according to his/her 
experience and judgement.  
In this questionnaire, you, as an expert, will be asked to do paired comparisons by circling 
one number which best represents the relative importance of the factor on the left compared 
to the factor on the right. As you will see in the questions, every question has a row of 
numbers and number (1) standing in the middle. There are three possibilities for giving 
weights to the relative importance of a factor.  
- First, the factor on the left has equal importance to the factor on the right. Number (1) 
represents that equality. 
- Second, the factor on the left has a relative importance more than the factor on the 
right. Numbers (2 to 9) from the middle to the left represent this high importance. 
- Third, the factor on the right has a relative importance more than the factor on the left. 
Numbers (2 to 9) from the middle to the right represent this high importance. 
To choose the best number that represents the relative importance, you will need the 
comparison scale, which shows the meaning of these numbers. It is attached to this 




For Example  
Referring back to the road building example and using the AHP comparison scale, consider 
the following examples of possible responses from five experts.  
- The first respondent circled number (7) 
Cost 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Safety 
 
According to the comparison scale, this means that the first respondent views cost as very 
strongly more important than safety. 
- The second respondent circled number (3) 
Cost 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Safety 
 
According to the comparison scale, this means that the second respondent views cost as 
moderately more important than safety. 
- The third respondent circled number (1) 
Cost 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Safety 
 
According to the comparison scale, this means that the third respondent views that both cost 
and safety have equal importance. 
- The fourth respondent circled number (4) 
Cost 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Safety 
 
\ 
According to the comparison scale, this means that the fourth respondent views safety as 
moderately to strongly more important than cost.  
- The fifth respondent circled number (8) 
Cost 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Safety 
 
According to the comparison scale, this means that the fifth respondent views safety as very 
strongly to extremely more important than cost.  
 
Using the scale, we would like you to provide similar responses to each of the questions in 





The AHP Comparison Scale 
The scale below represents one way of indicating judgements about relative importance. Also, 
it shows the meanings of the numbers. 
 
In the question format, the comparison scale will be applied similarly for the numbers on the 
left and on the right of number (1). The difference between the numbers is that the numbers 
on the left (2 to 9) indicate that factor (A) is more important than factor (B). The numbers on 





1 Equally The two factors are equally important 
2 Equally to moderately The factor is equally to moderately important 
3 Moderately  The factor is moderately important 
4 Moderately to strongly The factor is moderately to strongly important 
5 Strongly  The factor is strongly important 
6 Strongly to very strongly The factor is strongly to very strongly important 
7 Very strongly  The factor is very strongly important 
8 Very strongly to Extremely The factor is very strongly to Extremely important 






















































































































































































































































































































































































في  المساھمةالملكیة على نظم حوكمة الشركات لشركات البتروكیماویات  ةتأثیر ھیكل
 المملكة العربیة السعودیة
و  اً و ایضاً یتمنى لك وقت ممتع .البحثي المشاركة في ھذا المشروع كلقبول التقدیر و لك الشكر قدمن یُ أ یود فریق البحث
 خالل المقابلة. اً مفید
حول العالقات بین ھیاكل المطلوب منك اإلجابة على جمیع األسئلة باإلعتماد على خبرتك و معرفتك  قابلة،الم ةفي ھذ
 . سوق المال السعوديشركات البتروكیماویات المدرجة في أنظمة حوكمة الشركات في  الملكیة و
الھرمي و األسئلة المفتوحة. و سوف یتم توجیھ ثالثة أقسام من األسئلة وھي أسئلة دیموغرافیة و استبانة عملیة التحلیل 
 األسئلة في القسمین الثاني و الثالث مقسمة إلى ثالثة فروع و ھي: 
 ؛"عامة" •
 و  ؛الحوكمة الخارجیة" أنظمة" •
 الحوكمة الداخلیة". أنظمة" •
 األسئلة الدیموغرافیة :القسم األول -
ھذا النوع من األسئلة یساعد في تحدید بعض أسئلة تتعلق بمعلومات شخصیة عامة و  7في بدایة المقابلة سیتم توجیة 
 السمات و الممیزات لعینة البحث.
 استبانة عملیة التحلیل الھرمي  :القسم الثاني -
ھذة االستبانة تستخدم طریقة "عملیة التحلیل الھرمي" و التي تتم من خالل عمل المقارنات الزوجیة. المقارنات الزوجیة 
عطاء وزن لألھمیة النسبیة لكل عامل في الجھة الیسرى مقارنةً مع العامل في الجھة ھي حكم الخبیر أو صانع القرار بإ
ل مستخدماً خبرتك و سؤا 8مل في الیمنى. في ھذا القسم سوف یُطلب منك الحكم بإعطاء وزن لألھمیة النسبیة لكل عا
 معرفتك.
 سئلة المفتوحةألا :لثالقسم الثا -
یُطلب منك اإلجابة على أسئلة مقالیة مفتوحة تتعلق بنفس موضوع البحث. في ھذا سوف  القسم الثاني،اء من ھنتبعد اإل
 .ئلة مفتوحة. الرجاء استخدام خبرتك و معرفتك عند اإلجابة على األسئلةأس 11ك طرح علییُ القسم سوف 
 
 حسن تعاونك. في النھایة، مشاركتك في ھذة المقابلة مھمة جداً في نجاح ھذا المشروع البحثي. شاكرین و مقدرین
 مالحظات:
ھناك أوراق مساعدة و سوف تُقدم لك خالل المقابلة مثل: تعلیمات عن استبانة عملیة التحلیل الھرمي، و المقیاس األساسي  -
 للمقارنات الزوجیة، و قائمة بتعاریف المصطلحات المستخدمة في ھذة المقابلة.
 األسئلة.الرجاء تطبیق التعاریف على كل المصطلحات الواردة في  -




 الھرميستبانة عملیة التحلیل تعلیمات ا
 مقدمة:
ھي أداة إلتخاذ القرار. بإختصار عملیة التحلیل الھرمي تُقدم إطار شامل لھیكلة المشكلة،    (AHP)عملیة التحلیل الھرمي
ھذة األداة كأداة لجمع و تم إستخدام و ھي طریقة لتفكیك الوضع الُمعقد الغیر ُمھیكل إلى أجزائھ األساسیة. في ھذا البحث 
إن عملیة التحلیل الھرمي تُساعد الباحث في قیاس األحكام النوعیة التي یقدمھا المشاركون بأدوات كمیة. إن تحلیل البیانات. 
عملیة التحلیل الھرمي ھي طریقة مصممة بشكل جید و یجب أن تتبع شكالً معیناً. فیما یلي تعلیمات تشرح الطریقة و تبین 
التعلیمات بعنایة ألن المعرفة الجیدة للطریقة تساعد في تالئم اإلجابات مع كیفیة اإلجابة على االستبانة. الرجاء قراءة ھذة 
 خبرتك و معرفتك.
 التعلیمات:
في كل األعمال التي نقوم بھا ھناك عوامل مؤثرة كثیرة، و لكن بعض ھذة العوامل أھم من غیرھا. على سبیل المثال التكلفة 
كن ھذان العامالن یختلفان في األھمیة النسبیة بالنسبة لكل صانع قرار في أنظمة بناء الطرق و ل و السالمة عامالن مھمان
 و ذلك بناًء على خبرتھ و معرفتھ.
مقارنات زوجیة لألھمیة النسبیة، و ذلك من خالل إختیار رقم أنت كخبیر، سوف یطلب منك في ھذة االستبانة القیام بعملیة 
ر األیسر مقارنةً بالعنصر األیمن. كما سوف تشاھد في األسئلة یوجد واحد و الذي یمثل أفضل وزن لألھمیة النسبیة للعنص
  ).1صف من األرقام في كل سؤال و یتوسط ھذا الصف الرقم (
 حتماالت عند إعطاء وزن لألھمیة النسبیة لكل عنصر. إھناك ثالث 
 یمثل ھذا التساوي.) 1اإلحتمال األول: العنصر األیسر لدیھ أھمیة نسبیة مساویة للعنصر األیمن. الرقم ( -
) من المنتصف 9إلى  2من العنصر األیمن. األرقام من ( براإلحتمال الثاني: العنصر األیسر لدیھ أھمیة نسبیة أك -
 إلى الیسار تمثل ھذة األھمیة العالیة.
نتصف ) من الم9إلى  2. األرقام من (یسرمن العنصر األ أكبرلدیھ أھمیة نسبیة  األیمناإلحتمال الثالث: العنصر  -
 .العالیةإلى الیمین تمثل ھذة األھمیة 
جدول المقیاس األساسي للمقارنات الزوجیة یوضح معاني األرقام الموجودة في السؤال. لذا الرجاء الرجوع إلیھ : مالحظة





 :على سبیل المثال
بناء الطرق السابق و بإستخدام المقیاس األساسي للمقارنات الزوجیة، فیما یلي أمثلة على خمسة أحكام من بالرجوع لمثال 
  ُصناع القرار شاركوا في مثل ھذة االستبانة:
 )7المشارك األول اختار الرقم ( -
 السالمة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 التكلفة
 
كبیرة جداً  ھمیة نسبیةألھا  للمقارنات الزوجیة، ھذا یعني أن المشارك األول یرى أن التكلفةبناًء على المقیاس األساسي 
 مقارنة بالسالمة.
 )3المشارك الثاني اختار الرقم ( -
 السالمة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 التكلفة
 
 معتدلة ھمیة نسبیةأ لھا ن التكلفةأیرى  الثانين المشارك أھذا یعني بناًء على المقیاس األساسي للمقارنات الزوجیة، 
 السالمة.قارنة بم
 )1المشارك الثالث اختار الرقم ( -
 السالمة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 التكلفة
 
متساویان في  السالمةو ن التكلفة أیرى  الثالثن المشارك أھذا یعني بناًء على المقیاس األساسي للمقارنات الزوجیة، 
 .ھمیة النسبیةاأل
 )4المشارك الرابع اختار الرقم ( -
 السالمة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 التكلفة
 
أھمیة نسبیة معتدلة إلى  السالمة لھان أیرى  الرابعن المشارك أھذا یعني بناًء على المقیاس األساسي للمقارنات الزوجیة، 
 .بالتكلفة قارنةم كبیرة
 )8اختار الرقم (المشارك الخامس  -
 السالمة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 التكلفة
 
ھمیة نسبیة كبیرة جداً أ السالمة لھان أیرى  الخامسن المشارك أھذا یعني بناًء على المقیاس األساسي للمقارنات الزوجیة، 




 المقیاس األساسي للمقارنات الزوجیة
جدول التالي ھو جدول المقیاس األساسي للمقارنات الزوجیة و ھو یمثل طریقة لتحدید أوزان األھمیة النسبیة. ایضاَ ھذا ال
 الجدول یوضح معاني االرقام. 
 
عند تطبیق جدول المقیاس األساسي على صف األرقام الموجود في األسئلة، فإنھ یحمل نفس المعاني سواًء على الجھة 
(أ) یمثل أكثر أھمیة نسبیة  العامل) في الجھة الیسرى توضح أن 9إلى  2الیسرى أو الیمنى. و اإلختالف ھو أن األرقام (
(ب) یمثل أكثر أھمیة نسبیة مقارنًة  امل) في الجھة الیمنى تعني أن الع9إلى  2رقام ((ب). و أما األ املمقارنًة بالع
 (أ). املبالع
 مدى
ھمیةاأل  التوضیح التعریف 
 العامالن لھما أھمیة نسبیة متساویة. متساویة 1
 العامل لھ أھمیة نسبیة أكبر من متساویة إلى أصغر من معتدلة مقارنةً بالعنصر اآلخر. متساویة إلى معتدلة 2
 العامل لھ أھمیة نسبیة معتدلة مقارنةً بالعنصر اآلخر. معتدلة 3
كبیرةمعتدلة إلى  4  العامل لھ أھمیة نسبیة أكبر من معتدلة إلى أًصغر من كبیرة مقارنة ً بالعنصر اآلخر. 
 العامل لھ أھمیة نسبیة كبیرة مقارنة ً بالعنصر اآلخر. كبیرة 5
 العامل لھ أھمیة نسبیةأكبر من كبیرة إلى أصغر من كبیرة جداً مقارنة ً بالعنصر اآلخر. كبیرة إلى كبیرة جداً  6
 العامل لھ أھمیة نسبیة كبیرة جداً مقارنة ً بالعنصر اآلخر. كبیرة جداً  7
 العامل لھ أھمیة نسبیة أكبر من كبیرة جداً إلى أصغر من قصوى مقارنة ً بالعنصر اآلخر. كبیرة جداً إلى قصوى 8














































































































































































































































































































































































































(أ) العامل (ب) العامل 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Appendices
353
 قائمة بتعاریف المصطلحات المستخدمة في ھذة المقابلة
List of definitions for terms used in this interview 
 General -عامة  -
The term The definition المصطلح التعریف 
Corporate 
governance 
Policies for directing and managing the company 
in order to achieve and protect interests of all 
shareholders. 
و  جل تحقیقأدارة و توجیة الشركة من سیاسات إل
اھمین.مصالح كل المس حمایة حوكمة الشركات 
Ownership 
structure 
The distribution of shares with regard to votes, 
control, and identity of the shares’ owners. 
صوات و األالشركة بناًء على سھم أتوزیع كیفیة 
سھم .السیطرة و ھویة مالك األ  ھیكلة الملكیة 
Diffused 
ownership 
Ownership is widely dispersed. Corporate 
decisions are not influenced by ownership 
interests. 
بشكل  بین المساھمین موزعة تكون سھماأل في ملكیةال
ال یمكنھم التأثیر على قرارات  المساھمین ، وواسع




The majority of shares are held by certain 
individuals or group who can use their 
ownership interests to influence corporate 
decisions. 
و  ،سھماألغلبیة ألو مجموعات أشخاص إمتالك أ





The Saudi government owns 5% or more of a 
listed company’s shares. It can be directly 
owned by the government or through its 
agencies such as general fund investments, 
stated-owned companies, general organization 
for social insurance and public pension agency. 
 كثرأو أ% 5السعودیة  المملكة العربیة حكومة إمتالك
الملكیة  عن طریق و ذلك ،المساھمة ةالشركسھم أمن 
 .منظمات تابعة لھاو عن طریق أالمباشرة للشركة 
 الشركات المملوكة ،ستثمارالھیئة العامة لإلمثل: 
المؤسسة  ،المؤسسة العامة للتقاعد ،للحكومة بالكامل
جتماعیة.العامة للتأمینات اإل  
الحكومةملكیة   
Family 
ownership 
The ownership of 5% or more of the company’s 
shares by individuals and/or groups with family 
or social relationships. 
 سھم الشركة المساھمة منأكثر من أو أ% 5 إمتالك
و أ عالقات عائلیة تربطھممجموعات  /ووأفراد أ قبل
جتماعیة.إ  




A listed company owns 5% or more of shares in 
other listed company.  
 ةسھم شركأكثر من أو أ% 5 تملك مساھمةة شرك






External requirements for directing and 
managing the company in the interests of all 
shareholders such as laws and standards and 
oversight agencies. 
 بناءً  دارة و توجیة الشركةإلالخارجیة  اإللتزامات
مثل القوانین و المعاییر  على مصالح جمیع المساھین






Internal requirements for directing and 
managing the company in the interests of all 
shareholders such as monitoring systems and 
board of directors. 
على  دارة و توجیة الشركة بناءً الداخلیة إل اإللتزامات






According to SCGRs 2006, Minority 
Shareholders represent a class of shareholders 
that does not control the company and hence 
they are unable to influence the company. 
 ،2006على قانون حوكمة الشركات السعودي  بناءً 
مساھمو االقلیة ھم المساھمین الذین یمثلون فئة غیر 
مسیطرة على الشركة بحیث ال یستطیعون التأثیر 
 علیھا.





As a result of the previous definition, the major 
shareholders are those who control the company 
and are able to influence it. 
Also, the definition of Substantial shareholder is 
one who holds (5%) or more of the company’s 
shares. 
ھم  نستنتج من التعریف السابق، المساھمین الرئیسیین
 الذین یسیطرون على الشركة و یمكنھم التأثیر علیھا.
% أو أكثر 5و المساھمین الكبار: ھم  الذین یملكون 
من أسھم الشركة وفقاً لقائمة تعریف المصطلحات 






5% or more of the company’s shares are owned 
by one or more of major shareholders. 
أو أكثر  مملوكة ألحد الشركة % أو أكثر من اسھم 5





When the major shareholder(s) is in company 
for listed corporations or some of the companies 
or agencies within the government ownership 
such as the Public Pension Agency. 
عندما یكون المساھمین الرئیسیین في شكل شركة مثل 
الشركات المساھمة أو بعض من الشركات او الھیئات 





 External governance systems - أنظمة الحوكمة الخارجیة -




External requirements for directing and 
managing the company in the interests of all 
shareholders such as laws and standards and 
oversight agencies. 
 بناءً  دارة و توجیة الشركةإلالخارجیة  اإللتزامات
مثل القوانین و المعاییر  على مصالح جمیع المساھین






All Saudi legal and regulatory requirements 
for corporate governance in the form of 
laws, rules, regulations and standards. 
القانونیة والتنظیمیة السعودیة  اإللتزاماتجمیع 
شكل قوانین  و التي تكون فيلحوكمة الشركات 
 وقواعد وأنظمة ومعاییر.




The absence of any laws, rules, regulations 
and standards related to corporate 
governance. 
معاییر ال وأنظمة األوأ قوانینمن ال اً ای وجود عدم






The deficiency or shortage of explanation 
and clarification in any part of the legal and 
regulatory requirements related to corporate 
governance. 
ي جزء أو توضیح أتفسیر  في قصورعدم وجود أو 
بحوكمة  ةالقانونیة و التنظیمیة المتعلق اإللتزاماتمن 
.في اإلطار التنظیمي و القانوني الشركات  
في التفسیرنقص   
Lack of 
enforcement 
A lack of capacity to monitor and/or enforce 
corporate governance legal and regulatory 
requirements. 
 اإللتزاماتفرض  أو/ومراقبة  علىالقدرة  عدم
في  القانونیة و التنظیمة المتعلقة بحوكمة الشركات
.اإلطار التنظیمي و القانوني  
التنفیذنقص في   
Conflicts and/or 
duplicates 
Repetition and/or contradiction in the laws 
and regulations related to corporate 
governance. 
 المتعلقةفي القوانین و التنظمات  أو/و تضارب تكرار





The agencies or organizations have the 
capacity to supervise and monitor listed 
companies. 
الخارجیة التي لھا  أو الھیئات أو الوكاالت المنظمات





Oversight of listed companies is vested in a 
series of agencies each of which has 
authority over particular aspects of 
corporate governance regulations. 
The role or decision of one agency may 
impede those of others. 
المساھمةالشركات  أن تكون الرقابة على طة منو 
بسلسلة من كل  أو الھیئات أو الوكاالت و المنظمات 
 أنظمة جوانب معینة من سلطة على منھم لھ
 .حوكمة الشركات





Agencies charged with oversight of specific 
companies on specific aspects of companies 
in the Saudi capital market. For example, 
the General Auditing Bureau is tasked with 
oversight of companies in which the 
government owns shares. 
جوانب  مكلفة لرقابة أو ھیئات أو وكاالت منظمات
 سھماألبعض الشركات المدرجة في سوق  معینة في
مراقبة كلف بدیوان المراقبة العامة م السعودي. مثل
س مالھا.  أالشركات التي تملك الحكومة في ر  




There may be repetitions or inconsistencies 
in the jobs or roles of oversight agencies. 
دوار أو أعمال أفي أو تكرار سق تناعدم تضارب أو 






The power of an agency to supervise and 
monitor a company. There are differences in 
the power of those agencies which influence 
their role. 
أو االشراف  لمراقبةل أو الوكالة و الھیئةأقوة المنظمة 
ختالفات في ھذه القوة إھناك  علماً أن شركة.على ال




A person or an organization who is 
authorized based on the Saudi regulations 
and laws to audit financial statements of 
listed companies in SCM. 
نظمة أو منظمة مصرح لھ حسب قوانین و أشخص 
ملكة العربیة السعودیة لمراجعة القوائم المالیة مال
سھم السعودي.للشركات المساھمة في سوق األ  




Independence requires the auditor to do his 
or her work freely and in an objective 
manner. The auditor should be independent 
from parties that have a financial interest in 
the business being audited such as managers 
and major shareholders. 
A lack of independence may have a 
 ةبحریھ ن یقوم بعملأاالستقاللیة تتطلب من المراجع 
أي  . المراجع یجب أن ال یكون لھو بشكل محاید
ھداف مالیة في ألھا  اتمجموع أو عالقة مع أي أفراد
  .یراجعھاالشركة التي 
ثار سلبیة على ثقة آالخلل في االستقاللیة قد یكون لھ 






negative impact on the confidence of users 
of external reports. 
Roles of the 
external auditor 
There are two roles for the external auditors 
which are auditing and consultation. There 
may be an overlap between these two roles. 
This overlap may have an impact on auditor 
independence. 
 الخارجي و ھما المراجع بھا ھناك مھمتان یقوم
و قد یكون ھناك تداخل بین  ،و االستشارة ةالمراجع




The influences in the selection or 
appointment of auditors. Also, the rotation 
and change in the role in one company from 
the consultant to auditor or vice versa. 
أیضا عملیة و  ،و تعیین المراجعأختیار إثیر على أالت
ن یتغیر من مستشار الشركة كأتغیر دور المراجع في 
و العكس.ألى مراجع إ  
تعیینال  
Disclosure 
Revealing any issue that affects the role of 
the auditor as an element in external 
governance such as the influence of 
independence, relationship with members 
on the board or overlapping in tasks. Also, it 
has to include all issues that influence the 
corporate governance systems of the 
company. 
تؤثر على دور المراجع  كلةي مشأالكشف عن 
ثیر على أمثل الت ،كعنصر خارجي في نظم الحوكمة
و التداخل في أخرین أو العالقات مع اآلاالستقاللیة 
جمیع فصاح ضمن اإلن یتو یجب أراجع. مھام المُ 






 Internal governance systems - الداخلیة أنظمة الحوكمة -
 




Internal requirements for directing and 
managing the company in the interests of 
all shareholders such as monitoring systems 
and board of directors. 
على  دارة و توجیة الشركة بناءً الداخلیة إل اإللتزامات






Any system that supports an organization 
for evaluating practices and procedures. 




A process for assuring achievement of an 
organization's objectives in operational 
effectiveness and efficiency, reliable 
financial reporting, and compliance with 
laws, regulations and policies. 
في الفعالیة  المنظمةعملیة لضمان تحقیق أھداف 
موثوق بھا، الالتشغیلیة والكفاءة والتقاریر المالیة 





The person who performs the internal 
control process in the company. 
الشخص الذي یقوم بعملیة الرقابة الداخلیة في 
راجع الداخليالمُ  الشركة.
Interference of 
others 
Any kind of intervention from anyone who 
is outside the system to influence the 
system or people in the system. An 
example is the influence of major 
shareholders on the internal control process 
or internal auditor. 
 ي شخص خارج نظامأي نوع من التدخالت من أ
لیؤثر على النظام او االشخاص في  رقابة الداخليال
الرئیسیین على عملیة  المساھمینثیر أت ، مثلالنظام




All policies that govern the operations and 
activities of the company such as the 
Memorandum of Association. 
لیة و یعمال التشغجمیع السیاسات التي تحكم األ






Any kind of communication with minor 
shareholders about the monitoring systems. 
التواصل بأي شكل مع المساھمین الصغار في 






A body of elected or appointed members 
who oversee the activities of a company. 
و معینین لمراقبة أعضاء منتخبین أمن یتكون مجلس 
الشركة. نشطةأ دارةمجلس اإل 
Board   
characteristics 
A mixture of factors that impact the 
effectiveness of the board such as 
independence and size. 
المجلس مثل  فعالیةخلیط من العوامل التي تؤثر على 





Compulsory jobs and procedures for the 
directors that specified in the Memorandum 
of Association such as number of meetings 
and voting policies for decisions at 
meetings. 
عضاء مجلس أالمھام و الوظائف الواجبة على 
دد مثل ع ،لشركةل للنظام العام اً دراة و ذلك وفقإلا
قرارات في على الاالجتماعات و سیاسة التصویت 
 االجتماعات.




It is the process and steps for establishing 
the audit committee such as the 
appointment of members, the authority of 
members, duration of appointment and 
possibility of reappointment. 
مثل  ،لجنة المراجعة عمل المھام و الخطوات لبداء
عضاء و مدة العضویة و عضاء و سلطة األاختیار األ




Disclosing any information that influences 
the decisions of all shareholders. Minority 
and majority shareholders should have 
access to this information. 
فصاح عن المعلومات التي تؤثر على قرارات كل اإل
ن یتاح أالمساھمین. المساھمین الصغار و الكبار البد 





The technical, professional and training 
experience for the position of each director. 
ة و الخبرات المطلوبة من یالمواصفات التقنیة و المھن
.المركزدارة حسب عضاء مجلس اإلأ  
مؤھالت عضو 
دارةمجلس اإل  
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (PIS) FOR: 
Listed petrochemical companies  
 
PROJECT TITLE: “The impact of ownership structures on corporate governance 
systems of listed petrochemical companies in Saudi Arabia”. 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH: 
The purpose of the research is to demonstrate the complexity of ownership structures 
prevalent in Saudi Arabia and how that complexity impacts the corporate governance systems 
of listed petrochemical companies in the Saudi capital market.  
To achieve that purpose, the examination will involve three aspects which are:  
(i) The uniqueness of the Saudi context in relation to ownership structures and 
corporate governance systems of listed petrochemical companies.  
(ii) Associated problems with corporate governance in this context.  




Researcher:   Supervisor 1:    Supervisor 2: 
Abdullah A Alakkas  A/Professor Kathie Cooper  Professor Ed Arrington  
Faculty of Business   Faculty of Business   Faculty of Business 
+61 423 712 884        +61 2 4221 3718    +61 2 4221 3718 
aaa257@uowmail.edu.au  kathie@uow.edu.au   edarr@uow.edu.au 
 
WHAT WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO DO: 
If you choose to participate, you will be asked to be involved in about 1 hour interview. The 
researcher will conduct interviews with you and it will be audiotaped. The confidentiality and 
privacy of participants and their organization will be assured. Each participant will be asked 
about various aspects of the relations between ownership structures and corporate governance 
in the Saudi capital market, especially the listed petrochemical companies.  
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There are three sections for the questions which are built according to the data analysis 
requirements. Typical questions in the interview include:  
 Section (1): Demographic Information  
o What is your gender? 
Male Female 
 
o What is your age? 
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-over 
 
 Section (2): AHP Questionnaire 
o Which of these ownership structures has the most relative importance in influencing 




































































o Which of these major shareholders has the most relative importance in terms of which 





































































9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Family ownership  
Listed corporation 
ownership 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Family ownership  
 
 Section (2): open-ended questions  
o What factors are important when designing and improving a corporate governance 
system for Saudi petrochemical companies? Why? 
o In your experience, to what extent and how do you think major shareholders 
positively or negatively influence external governance requirements? 
o What internal governance systems do you have in place to monitor and report the 
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POSSIBLE RISKS, INCONVENIENCES AND DISCOMFORTS 
Apart from 1 hour of your time for the audiotaped interview, this is ‘low risk’ research which 
means that there is no foreseeable risk more than discomfort or inconvenience. The data will 
be securely stored with me and my supervisors. Your involvement in the study is voluntary 
and confidential. To assure the confidentiality and privacy, the provided information will not 
cross to any other participants inside or outside the organization. We will not use your name 
and position or the organization name in any part of the research. You are free to decide if 
you want to be involved in this project or not and you can stop participating at any time. If 
you decide to stop participating any information you have given will not be used. Withdrawal 
or refusal to participate in the study will not affect your relationship with the University of 
Wollongong. 
 
FINDINGS AND BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
The findings of this research will provide a basis for future decisions on the development of 
ownership structures and corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. Findings from the study will 
be published in my thesis and possibly published in a journal article. Confidentiality is 
assured. You and your organization will not be identified in any part of the research. 
 
ETHICS REVIEW AND COMPLAINTS 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Social Science, Humanities and Behavioural Science) of the University of Wollongong. If 
you have any concerns or complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted, 
you can contact the UOW Ethics Officer on (+61 2 4221 3386) or email rso-
ethics@uow.edu.au. 
 
If you require any further information please do not hesitate to contact members of the 
research. 
Thank you for your interest in this study. 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (PIS) FOR: 
Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
 
PROJECT TITLE: “The impact of ownership structures on corporate 
governance systems of listed petrochemical companies in Saudi Arabia”. 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH: 
The purpose of the research is to demonstrate the complexity of ownership structures 
prevalent in Saudi Arabia and how that complexity impacts the corporate governance systems 
of listed petrochemical companies in the Saudi capital market.  
To achieve that purpose, the examination will involve three aspects which are:  
(i) The uniqueness of the Saudi context in relation to ownership structures and 
corporate governance systems of listed petrochemical companies.  
(ii) Associated problems with corporate governance in this context.  




Researcher:   Supervisor 1:    Supervisor 2: 
Abdullah A Alakkas  A/Professor Kathie Cooper  Professor Ed Arrington  
Faculty of Business   Faculty of Business   Faculty of Business 
+61 423 712 884        +61 2 4221 3718    +61 2 4221 3718 
aaa257@uowmail.edu.au  kathie@uow.edu.au   edarr@uow.edu.au 
 
WHAT WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO DO: 
If you choose to be included, you will be asked to participate in a one-day visit to the 
corporate governance department in Capital Market Authority. On this visit the researcher 
will conduct about 1 hour interview with you and it will be audiotaped. The confidentiality 
and privacy of participants and their organization will be assured. Each participant will be 
asked about various aspects of the relations between ownership structures and corporate 
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governance systems in the Saudi capital market, especially the listed petrochemical 
companies. 
There are three sections for the questions which are built according to the data analysis 
requirements. Typical questions in the interview include:  
 Section (1): Demographic Information  
o What is your gender? 
Male Female 
 
o What is your age? 
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-over 
 
 Section (2): AHP Questionnaire 
o Which of these ownership structures has the most relative importance in influencing 




































































o Which of these major shareholders has the most relative importance in terms of which 





































































9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Family ownership  
Listed corporation 
ownership 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Family ownership  
 
 Section (2): open-ended questions  
o What factors are important when designing and improving corporate governance 
regulations for Saudi Arabia? Why? 
o Is there collaboration with other external oversight agencies and external auditors in 
order to improve the external governance regulatory systems to prevent negative 
impacts of major shareholders? 
o How do you enhance the internal corporate governance systems of companies in 
developing and implementing Saudi corporate governance regulations?  
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POSSIBLE RISKS, INCONVENIENCES AND DISCOMFORTS 
Apart from the 1 hour of your time for the audiotaped interview, this is ‘low risk’ research 
which means that there is no foreseeable risk more than discomfort or inconvenience. The 
data will be securely stored with me and my supervisors. Your involvement in the study is 
voluntary and confidential. To assure the confidentiality and privacy, the provided 
information will not cross to any other participants inside or outside the organization. We will 
not use your name and position or the organization name in any part of the research. You are 
free to decide if you want to be involved in this project or not and you can stop participating 
at any time. If you decide to stop participating any information you have given will not be 
used. Withdrawal or refusal to participate in the study will not affect your relationship with 
the University of Wollongong. 
 
FINDINGS AND BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
The findings of this research will provide a basis for future decisions on the development of 
ownership structures and corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. Findings from the study will 
be published in my thesis and possibly published in a journal article. Confidentiality is 
assured. You and your organization will not be identified in any part of the research. 
 
ETHICS REVIEW AND COMPLAINTS 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Social Science, Humanities and Behavioural Science) of the University of Wollongong. If 
you have any concerns or complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted, 
you can contact the UOW Ethics Officer on (+61 2 4221 3386) or email rso-
ethics@uow.edu.au. 
 
If you require any further information please do not hesitate to contact members of the 
research. 
 
Thank you for your interest in this study. 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (PIS) FOR: 
External Auditing Firms 
 
PROJECT TITLE: “The impact of ownership structures on corporate governance 
systems of listed petrochemical companies in Saudi Arabia”. 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH: 
The purpose of the research is to demonstrate the complexity of ownership structures 
prevalent in Saudi Arabia and how that complexity impacts the corporate governance systems 
of listed petrochemical companies in the Saudi capital market.  
To achieve that purpose, the examination will involve three aspects which are:  
(i) The uniqueness of the Saudi context in relation to ownership structures and 
corporate governance systems of listed petrochemical companies.  
(ii) Associated problems with corporate governance in this context.  




Researcher:   Supervisor 1:    Supervisor 2: 
Abdullah A Alakkas  A/Professor Kathie Cooper  Professor Ed Arrington  
Faculty of Business   Faculty of Business   Faculty of Business 
+61 423 712 884        +61 2 4221 3718    +61 2 4221 3718 
aaa257@uowmail.edu.au  kathie@uow.edu.au   edarr@uow.edu.au 
 
WHAT WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO DO: 
If you agreed to be included, you will be asked to participate in a one-day visit to the 
department that is responsible for corporate governance. On this visit the researcher will 
conduct approximately 1 hour interview with you and it will be audiotaped. The 
confidentiality and privacy of participants and their organization will be assured. The 
participant will be asked about various aspects of the relations between ownership structures 
Appendices
364
HE14/297                           Participant Information Sheet (PIS)                            Version 4 
   PIS  Interview No. (                  )  . 2 
and corporate governance in the Saudi capital market, especially the listed petrochemical 
companies.  
There are three sections for the questions which are built according to the data analysis 
requirements. Typical questions in the interview include:  
 Section (1): Demographic Information  
o What is your gender? 
Male Female 
 
o What is your age? 
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-over 
 
 Section (2): AHP Questionnaire 
o Which of these ownership structures has the most relative importance in 




































































o Which of these major shareholders has the most relative importance in terms of 





































































9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Family ownership  
Listed corporation 
ownership 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Family ownership  
 
 Section (2): open-ended questions  
o What factors are important when designing and improving corporate governance 
regulations for Saudi Arabia? Why? 
o Is there collaboration with other external oversight agencies and external auditors 
in order to improve the external governance regulatory systems to prevent 
negative impacts of major shareholders? 
o How do you enhance the internal corporate governance systems of companies in 
developing and implementing Saudi corporate governance regulations?  
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HE14/297                           Participant Information Sheet (PIS)                            Version 4 
   PIS  Interview No. (                  )  . 3 
POSSIBLE RISKS, INCONVENIENCES AND DISCOMFORTS 
Apart from the 1 hour of your time for the audiotaped interview, this is ‘low risk’ research 
which means that there is no foreseeable risk more than discomfort or inconvenience. The 
data will be securely stored with me and my supervisors. Your involvement in the study is 
voluntary and confidential. To assure the confidentiality and privacy, the provided 
information will not cross to any other participants inside or outside the organization. We will 
not use your name and position or the organization name in any part of the research. You are 
free to decide if you want to be involved in this project or not and you can stop participating 
at any time. If you decide to stop participating any information you have given will not be 
used. Withdrawal or refusal to participate in the study will not affect your relationship with 
the University of Wollongong. 
 
FINDINGS AND BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
The findings of this research will provide a basis for future decisions on the development of 
ownership structures and corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. Findings from the study will 
be published in my thesis and possibly published in a journal article. Confidentiality is 
assured. You and your organization will not be identified in any part of the research. 
 
ETHICS REVIEW AND COMPLAINTS 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Social Science, Humanities and Behavioural Science) of the University of Wollongong. If 
you have any concerns or complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted, 
you can contact the UOW Ethics Officer on (+61 2 4221 3386) or email rso-
ethics@uow.edu.au. 
 
If you require any further information please do not hesitate to contact members of the 
research. 
Thank you for your interest in this study. 
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AMENDMENT APPROVAL LETTER 
In reply please quote: HE14/297 
 
16 October 2014 
 
 
Mr Abdullah Alakkas 
16/26 Market St 
Wollongong NSW 2500 
 
Dear Mr Alakkas  
I am pleased to advise that the amendment dated 15 October 2014 to the following Human 
Research Ethics application has been approved.  
Ethics Number: HE14/297 
Project Title: The impact of ownership structures on corporate governance 
systems of listed petrochemical companies in Saudi Arabia 
Researchers: Mr Abdullah Alakkas, A/Professor Kathie Cooper, Professor Ed 
Arrington 
Amendment: Addition of request for demographic information to the 
research 
Documents Reviewed/Approved: 
 -Revised Participant Information Sheet for Auditing  
(Version 4: rec 15/10/14) 
-Revised Participant Information Sheet for Petrochemical 
(Version 4: rec 15/10/14) 
-Revised Participant Information Sheet for CMA  
(Version 4: rec 15/10/14) 
-Revised Questionnaire for Auditing (Version 4: rec 15/10/14) 
-Revised Questionnaire for Petrochemical 
(Version 4: rec 15/10/14) 
-Revised Questionnaire for CMA (Version 4: rec 15/10/14) 
Amendment Approval Date: 16 October 2014 
Expiry Date: 13 August 2015 
Please remember that in addition to reporting proposed changes to your research protocol the 
HREC requires that researchers: immediately report:  
• Report serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants immediately 
• Report unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the 
project. 
• Submit a progress report annually and on completion of your project. The progress 
report template is available at 
http://www.uow.edu.au/research/ethics/UOW009385.html. This report must be 
completed, signed by the researchers and appropriate Head of Unit and returned to the 
Research Services Office prior to the expiry date. 
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If you have any queries regarding the HREC review process, please contact the Ethics Unit on 
phone 4221 3386 or email rso-ethics@uow.edu.au. 
 
Yours sincerely 
Dr Mark Rix 
Acting Chair, Social Sciences  
Human Research Ethics Committee 
 
The University of Wollongong/ Illawarra and Shoalhaven Local Health Network District (ISLHD) 
Social Science HREC is constituted and functions in accordance with the NHMRC National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research. 
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HE14/297  Interview No. (                  ) Version 4 
   Consent Form   1 
 
CONSENT FORM  
 
(Participant name :__________________________________________) 
 
Researcher: Abdullah Abdurhman Alakkas 
 
I have been given information about “The impact of ownership structures on corporate governance 
systems of listed petrochemical companies in Saudi Arabia” and discussed the research project with 
Abdullah Alakkas who is conducting this research as part of Doctor of Philosophy supervised by 
Associate Professor Kathie Cooper and Professor Ed Arrington in Accounting, Economics and 
Finance School at the University of Wollongong. 
 
I have read the participant information sheet (PIS) and I have had an opportunity to ask Abdullah 
Alakkas any questions that I may have about the research and my participation. I have been informed 
that the interview will be audio recorded and scripted for the use of the analysis. I understand that my 
contribution will be confidential. I have informed that the provided information will not be shared 
with other participants inside or outside the organization. There will be no personal identification in 
the data that I agree to be used in the study. I understand this is ‘low risk’ research which means that 
there is no foreseeable risk more than discomfort or inconvenience.  
 
I understand my participation in this research is voluntary, I am free to refuse to participate and I am 
free to withdraw from the research at any time. My refusal to participate or withdrawal of consent will 
not affect my relationship with University of Wollongong. 
 
If I have any enquiries about the research, I can contact (Abdullah Alakkas +61423712884 and/or 
Associate Professor Kathie Cooper and/or Professor Ed Arrington +61242213718) or if I have any 
concerns or complaints regarding the way the research is or has been conducted, I can contact the 
Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Office of Research, University of Wollongong on 
4221 3386 or email rso-ethics@uow.edu.au. 
 
By signing below I am indicating my consent to participate in the research. I understand that the data 
collected from my participation will be used primarily for a PhD thesis, and will also be used in 









Name.................................................................................................................................................    
 
 
Signe.................................................................................................. Date: …....../…...../.............. 
 
 







Interview No. (                  )                                            Day:                      Date:       /      /            
 
Section (1): Demographic information 
Please answer the following questions:  
 
1. What is your gender? 
Male Female 
 
2. What is your age range? 
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-Over 
 
3. What is your nationality?  
 
 
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Bachelor Master PhD Other 
 
5. What is your specialization? 
 
 
6. How many years of Financial or Accounting experience do you have?  
 
 





   /          المقابلة رقم. (                   )                                              الیوم:                      التاریخ:      / 
 
 القسم األول: األسئلة الدیموغرافیة
 االجابة على األسئلة التالیة:الرجاء 
 
 ما ھو جنسك؟ .1
 ذكر أنثى
 
 ما ھو عمرك؟  .2
 30-20 40-30 50-40 60-50 أكثر -60
 
 ما ھي جنسیتك؟ .3
 
 
 ما ھو أعلى مستوى تعلیمي أكملتھ؟ .4
 البكالوریس الماجستیر الدكتوراة اخرى
 
 ما ھو تخصصك؟ .5
 
 
 المحاسبة؟كم عدد سنوات الخبرة التي قضیتھا في المالیة أو  .6
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Section (2): AHP Questionnaire 
Compare the two factors listed in each of the following pairs, what is the extent of relative 
importance of these factors to corporate governance systems according to your experience in 
listed petrochemical companies in Saudi Arabia. 
Circle one number per row below using the scale: 
1 = Equal, 3 = Moderate, 5 = Strong, 7 = Very strong, 9 = Extreme 
2, 4, 6, 8 are intermediate values  
Number (1) means that the two factors have equal importance. The numbers (2 to 9) on the 
left mean that the factor on the left is more important than the factor on the right. The 
numbers (2 to 9) on the right mean that the factor on the right is more important than the 







 General  
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 External governance systems 
 
2. What is the relative importance of each of these external governance factors in 















































Legal and regulatory 
framework 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 External oversight 
Legal and regulatory 
framework 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
External auditor 
External oversight 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 External auditor 
 
 
3. What is the relative importance of each of the following issues in producing effective 















































Missing laws and 
regulations 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lack of interpretation 
Missing laws and 
regulations 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lack of enforcement 
Missing laws and 
regulations 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Conflicts and 
duplicates 
Lack of interpretation 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Lack of enforcement 
Lack of interpretation 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Conflicts and 
duplicates 
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4. What is the relative importance of each of these factors on the effectiveness of the 















































Layers of agencies 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Special agencies 
Layers of agencies 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Agencies conflicts 
and duplicates 
Layers of agencies 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agency  authority 
Special agencies 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Agencies conflicts 
and duplicates 
Special agencies 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agency  authority 
Agencies conflicts 
and duplicates 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Agency  authority 
 
 
5. What is the relative importance of each of these factors on the effectiveness of the 















































Auditor independence 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Roles of the external auditor  
Auditor independence 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Disclosure 
Auditor independence 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Appointment 
Roles of the external 
auditor  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Disclosure 
Roles of the external 
auditor  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Appointment 
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 Internal governance systems 
 
6. What is the relative importance of each of these internal governance factors in 















































Monitoring systems 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Board of directors 
 
7. What is the relative importance of each of these factors in producing effective 
















































processes 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Internal auditors 
Internal control 
processes 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Interference of others 
Internal control 
processes 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Internal Policies 
Internal control 
processes 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communicating with 
minor shareholders 
Internal auditors 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Interference of others 
Internal auditors 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Internal Policies 
Internal auditors 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communicating with 
minor shareholders 
Interference of others 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Internal Policies 
Interference of others 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Communicating with 
minor shareholders 
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8. What is the relative importance of each of these factors on the effectiveness of the 















































Board characteristics 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Board functions and 
process 
Board characteristics 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Audit  committee 
Board characteristics 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Disclosure and 
transparency 
Board characteristics 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Director's 
qualifications 
Board functions and 
process 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Audit  committee 
Board functions and 
process 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Disclosure and 
transparency 
Board functions and 
process 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Director's 
qualifications 
Audit  committee 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Disclosure and 
transparency 















   /          المقابلة رقم. (                   )                                              الیوم:                      التاریخ:      / 
 
 القسم الثاني: استبانة عملیة التحلیل الھرمي
العوامل على أنظمة حوكمة الشركات وفقاً قارن العوامل المدرجة في األزواج التالیة، ما ھو مدى األھمیة النسبیة لھذة 
 لخبرتك و معرفتك في شركات البتروكیماویات المساھمة في المملكة العربیة السعودیة
 ضع دائرة حول رقم واحد فقط في كل صف باستخدام المقیاس التالي:
 = قصوى،9= كبیر جداً، 7= كبیر، 5= معتدل، 3= متساوي، 1
 قیم المتوسطة لما سبقھي ال 8، 6، 4، 2اما األرقام 
) من جھة الیسرى تعني أن العامل األیسر أكثر أھمیة 9إلى  2) یعني أن العامالن متساویان في األھمیة. األرقام (1الرقم (

























































   /          المقابلة رقم. (                   )                                              الیوم:                      التاریخ:      / 
 
 أنظمة الحوكمة الخارجیة 
 







































طار التنظیمي و اإل
 الرقابة الخارجیة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 القانوني
طار التنظیمي و اإل
جع الخارجياالمر 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 القانوني  
جع الخارجياالمر 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 الرقابة الخارجیة  
 
 







































 نقص في التفسیر 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 غیاب التنظیم القانوني
التنفیذنقص في  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 غیاب التنظیم القانوني  
 التعارض أو/و اإلزدواجیة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 غیاب التنظیم القانوني
التنفیذنقص في  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 نقص في التفسیر  
 التعارض أو/و اإلزدواجیة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 نقص في التفسیر











   /          المقابلة رقم. (                   )                                              الیوم:                      التاریخ:      / 
 







































المنظمات تعدد طبقات خاصة منظمات 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
المنظمات تعدد طبقات  بین المنظماتالتعارض أو/و اإلزدواجیة  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
المنظمات تعدد طبقات المنظمة سلطة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
خاصة منظمات  بین المنظماتالتعارض أو/و اإلزدواجیة  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
خاصة منظمات  سلطة المنظمة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
التعارض أو/و اإلزدواجیة 
 سلطة المنظمة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 بین المنظمات
 








































 مھام المراجع الخارجي 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  الخارجي
استقاللیة المراجع 
 التعیین 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  الخارجي
استقاللیة المراجع 
 اإلفصاح 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  الخارجي
 التعیین 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 مھام المراجع الخارجي
 اإلفصاح 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 مھام المراجع الخارجي






   /          المقابلة رقم. (                   )                                              الیوم:                      التاریخ:      / 
 
  الداخلیةأنظمة الحوكمة 
 







































نظمة الرقابةأ دارةمجلس اإل 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
 







































راجع الداخليالمُ  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 عملیة الرقابة الداخلیة  
 تدخل االخرین 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 عملیة الرقابة الداخلیة
 السیاسات الداخلیة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 عملیة الرقابة الداخلیة
 المساھمینالتواصل مع صغار  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 عملیة الرقابة الداخلیة
راجع الداخليالمُ   تدخل االخرین 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
راجع الداخليالمُ   السیاسات الداخلیة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
راجع الداخليالمُ   المساھمینالتواصل مع صغار  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 السیاسات الداخلیة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 تدخل االخرین
 المساھمینالتواصل مع صغار  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 تدخل االخرین









   /          المقابلة رقم. (                   )                                              الیوم:                      التاریخ:      / 
 







































عمال و وظائف المجلسأ 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 خصائص المجلس  
 لجنة المراجعة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 خصائص المجلس
فصاح و الشفافیةاإل 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 خصائص المجلس  
دارةاإلمؤھالت عضو مجلس  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 خصائص المجلس  
عمال و وظائف المجلسأ  لجنة المراجعة 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
عمال و وظائف المجلسأ فصاح و الشفافیةاإل 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
المجلسعمال و وظائف أ دارةاإلمؤھالت عضو مجلس  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
فصاح و الشفافیةاإل 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 لجنة المراجعة  
دارةاإلمؤھالت عضو مجلس  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 لجنة المراجعة  
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Section (3): Open-ended Questions 
Petrochemical Companies 
 General  
1. What factors are important when designing and improving a corporate governance system for 
Saudi petrochemical companies? Why? 
2. What is unique about the ownership structure and corporate governance system in Saudi 
petrochemical companies compared to other sectors? 
3. Do you identify types of major shareholders in your company? Who are they? If no, why? 
4. In your experience, what positive and/or negative issues are associated with major 
shareholders and how do those issues impact the company’s corporate governance systems? 
5. How important is the interests of major shareholders to you when you develop and implement 
corporate governance systems at your company? 
 
 External governance systems  
6. In your experience, to what extent and how do you think major shareholders positively or 
negatively influence external governance requirements? 
7. Do you think external governance requirements help to prevent negative impacts of major 
shareholders? If yes, how? / If no, why? 
 
 Internal governance systems 
8. Do you regularly review your corporate governance systems in order to identify deficiencies 
in the internal governance requirements? 
a. What deficiencies or weaknesses have you identified in the past? 
b. How do you address deficiencies and weaknesses identified? 
9. What internal governance systems do you have in place to monitor and report the influences 
of major shareholders? 
 
- Improvements 
10. How can CMA improve the current corporate governance regulatory systems? 
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Section (3): Open-ended Questions 
Capital Market Authority 
 General  
1. What factors are important when designing and improving corporate governance regulations 
for Saudi Arabia? Why? 
2. What is unique about the ownership structure and corporate governance system in Saudi 
Arabia compared to other countries? 
3. Do you identify types of major shareholders in SCM? Why? If yes, who are they?  
4. In your experience, what positive and/or negative issues are associated with major 
shareholders and how do those issues impact the company’s corporate governance systems?  
5. How important are the interests of major shareholders to you when you develop and 
implement Saudi corporate governance regulations?  
 
 External governance systems  
6. Do you regularly review corporate governance regulations in order to identify deficiencies or 
weaknesses? 
a. What deficiencies or weaknesses have you identified in the past? 
b. How do you address deficiencies and weaknesses identified? 
7. Is there collaboration with other external oversight agencies and external auditors in order to 
improve the external governance regulatory systems to prevent negative impacts of major 
shareholders? 
 
 Internal governance systems 
8. Do you think internal governance requirements for a company can prevent negative impacts 
of major shareholders? If yes, how? / If no, why? 
9. How do you enhance the internal corporate governance systems of companies in developing 
and implementing Saudi corporate governance regulations?  
 
- Improvements 
10. How can companies improve their corporate governance systems? 
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Section (3): Open-ended Questions 
External Auditing Firms 
 General  
12. What factors are important when designing and improving corporate governance regulations 
for Saudi Arabia? Why? 
13. What is unique about the ownership structure and corporate governance system in Saudi 
Arabia compared to other countries? 
14. Do you identify types of major shareholders in the audited company? Why? If yes, who are 
they?  
15. In your experience, what positive and/or negative issues are associated with major 
shareholders and how do those issues impact the company’s corporate governance systems?  
16. How important are the interests of major shareholders to you when you develop and 
implement Saudi corporate governance regulations?  
 
 External governance systems  
17. Do you regularly review corporate governance systems of the client company in order to 
identify deficiencies or weaknesses? 
a. What deficiencies or weaknesses have you identified in the past? 
b. How do you address deficiencies and weaknesses identified? 
18. Is there collaboration with other external oversight agencies and CMA in order to improve the 
external governance regulatory systems to prevent negative impacts of major shareholders? 
 
 Internal governance systems 
19. Do you think internal governance requirements for a company can prevent negative impacts 
of major shareholders? If Yes, how? / If no, why? 
20. How do you enhance the internal corporate governance systems of companies in developing 
and implementing Saudi corporate governance regulations?  
 
- Improvements 
21. How can companies improve their corporate governance systems? 







   /          المقابلة رقم. (                   )                                              الیوم:                      التاریخ:      / 
 
 القسم الثاني: األسئلة المفتوحة
 شركات البتروكیماویات
 عامة -
تصمیم أو تحسین نظام حوكمة الشركات لشركات البتروكیماویات في المملكة العربیة  عندما ھي العوامل الھامة  .1
 السعودیة؟ لماذا؟
قارنة شركات البتروكیماویات السعودیة م في ھیكلة الملكیة و نظام حوكمة الشركات فيأو الممیز ما ھو الفرید  .2
 األخرى؟بقطاعات 
 نعم، من ھم؟  إذاكم؟ لماذا؟ ھل یتم تحدید أنواع المساھمین الرئیسیین في شركت .3
السلبیة التي ترتبط بالمساھمین الرئیسیین، و كیف تؤثر ھذة من خالل خبرتك، ما ھي القضایا اإلیجابیة و/أو  .4
 القضایا في نظم حوكمة الشركات للشركة؟
 ؟ لشركتكم حوكمة الشركات نظمعند وضع وتنفیذ  لمساھمین الرئیسیینمصالح اإھتمامك بما مدى  .5
 
 أنظمة الحوكمة الخارجیة  -
 الحوكمةعلى أنظمة  أو إیجاباً  سلباً  ونؤثری المساھمین الرئیسیینمن خالل خبرتك، إلى أي مدى و كیف تعقد أن  .6
 الخارجیة؟
إذا  /مات الحوكمة الخارجیة تساعد على منع اآلثار السلبیة للمساھمین الرئیسیین؟ إذا نعم، كیف؟ ھل تعتقد إلتزا .7
 ال، لماذا؟
 
 أنظمة الحوكمة الداخلیة  -
 ھل تتم مراجعة أنظمة حوكمة الشركات بصفة دوریة من أجل إیجاد الخلل في إلتزامات الحوكمة الداخلیة؟ .8
a. ما ھو الخلل أو نقاط الضعف التي تم إیجادھا؟ 
b. كیف تمت معالجة الخلل أو نقاط الضعف؟ 
 تقدیم تقاریر عن تأثیر المساھمین الرئیسیین؟ما ھي أنظمة الحوكمة الداخلیة التي تم إتخاذھا لمراقبة و  .9
 
 التحسینات -
 ؟التنظیمیة الحالیة لحوكمة الشركات كیف تستطیع ھیئة سوق المال تحسین اللوائح .10
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سئلة المفتوحةالقسم الثاني: األ  
 ھیئة سوق المال   
 عامة -
 تصمیم أو تحسین لوائح حوكمة الشركات في المملكة العربیة السعودیة؟ لماذا؟ الھامة عندما ھي العوامل  .1
في ھیكلة الملكیة و نظام حوكمة الشركات في المملكة العربیة السعودیة مقارنة بالدول  أو الممیز ما ھو الفرید .2
 األخرى؟
 نعم، من ھم؟ إذاھل یتم تحدید أنواع المساھمین الرئیسیین في سوق األسھم السعودي؟ لماذا؟  .3
السلبیة التي ترتبط بالمساھمین الرئیسیین، و كیف تؤثر ھذة یجابیة و/أو اإل القضایامن خالل خبرتك، ما ھي  .4
 القضایا في نظم حوكمة الشركات للشركة؟
 الرئیسیین عند وضع وتنفیذ لوائح حوكمة الشركات السعودیة ؟لمساھمین امصالح ب إھتمامكما مدى  .5
 
 الحوكمة الخارجیة  أنظمة -
 یتم مراجعة لوائح حوكمة الشركات بصفة دوریة من أجل إیجاد الخلل أو نقاط الضعف؟ ھل .6
a. ما ھو الخلل أو نقاط الضعف التي تم إیجادھا؟ 
b. معالجة الخلل أو نقاط الضعف؟ تكیف تم 
وكاالت أو منظمات أو ھیئات الرقابة الخارجیة أو مع المراجعین الخارجیین من أجل تحسین ھل ھناك تعاون مع  .7
 المساھمین الرئیسیین؟ التأثیرات السلبیة من لمنع نظم أنظمة الحوكمة الخارجیة
 
 الحوكمة الداخلیة  أنظمة -
المساھمین الرئیسیین؟ إذا نعم،  لشركة تمنع التأثیرات السلبیة منفي احوكمة لتعتقد أن اإللتزامات الداخلیة ل ھل .8
 إذا ال، لماذا؟ كیف؟
 ؟ حوكمة الشركات السعودیة لوائح وضع وتنفیذ عند الداخلیة للشركات الحوكمة أنظمة تعزیز كیف یمكن .9
 
 التحسینات -
 كیف یمكن للشركات تحسین أنظمة حوكمة الشركات الخاصة بھا؟ .10
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المفتوحةسئلة : األالثالثالقسم   
 المراجع الخارجي
 عامة -
 تصمیم أو تحسین لوائح حوكمة الشركات في المملكة العربیة السعودیة؟ لماذا؟ الھامة عندما ھي العوامل  .12
في ھیكلة الملكیة و نظام حوكمة الشركات في المملكة العربیة السعودیة مقارنة بالدول  أو الممیز ما ھو الفرید .13
 األخرى؟
 نعم، من ھم؟ إذاھل یتم تحدید أنواع المساھمین الرئیسیین في الشركات التي تتم مراجعتھا؟ لماذا؟  .14
السلبیة التي ترتبط بالمساھمین الرئیسیین، و كیف تؤثر ھذة یجابیة و/أو اإل القضایامن خالل خبرتك، ما ھي  .15
 القضایا في نظم حوكمة الشركات للشركة؟
 لمساھمین الرئیسیین عند وضع وتنفیذ لوائح حوكمة الشركات السعودیة ؟امصالح ب إھتمامكما مدى  .16
 
 الحوكمة الخارجیة  أنظمة -
 ؟في شركة العمیل یتم مراجعة لوائح حوكمة الشركات بصفة دوریة من أجل إیجاد الخلل أو نقاط الضعف ھل .17
a. ما ھو الخلل أو نقاط الضعف التي تم إیجادھا؟ 
b. معالجة الخلل أو نقاط الضعف؟ تكیف تم 
من أجل  ھیئة سوق المال السعودیةھل ھناك تعاون مع وكاالت أو منظمات أو ھیئات الرقابة الخارجیة أو مع  .18
 المساھمین الرئیسیین؟ التأثیرات السلبیة من لمنع تحسین نظم أنظمة الحوكمة الخارجیة
 
 الحوكمة الداخلیة  أنظمة -
 داخلیة للحوكمة للشركة تمنع التأثیرات السلبیة من المساھمین الرئیسیین؟ إذا نعم، كیف؟ھل تعتقد أن اإللتزامات ال .19
 إذا ال، لماذا؟
 ؟ حوكمة الشركات السعودیة لوائح وضع وتنفیذ عند الداخلیة للشركات الحوكمة أنظمة تعزیز كیف یمكن .20
 
 التحسینات -
 كیف یمكن للشركات تحسین أنظمة حوكمة الشركات الخاصة بھا؟ .21
 ما ھي االقتراحات التي ممكن أن ُتقدمھا لتحسین األنظمة الحالیة المتعلقة بحوكمة الشركات؟ .22
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